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Hazlitt on Wordsworth; or, The Poetry of Paradox 
by W . P. ALBRECHT 
The "poetry of paradox," says Hazlitt, "had its origin in the French 
revolution, or rather in those sentiments and opinions which produced that 
revolution. . . ." It was founded "on a principle of sheer humanity, on pure 
nature void of art." Although always a great defender of the French Revolu-
tion, humanity, and nature, especially as the gauge of art, Hazlitt put the 
poetry of paradox at the bottom of a scale of excellence down which English 
poetry had been sliding since the Renaissance. From "the poetry of imagi-
nation, in the time of Elizabeth," he says, poetry declined "by successive 
gradations" to "the poetry of paradox" in his own time. 1 
Much of contemporary poetry seemed "paradoxical" to Hazlitt, but most 
often his "poets of paradox" are the Lake School, especially Wordsworth. 
"The paradox [these poets] set out with was, that all things are by nature 
equally fit subjects for poetry; or that if there is any preference to be given, 
those that are the meanest and most unpromising are the best, as they leave 
the greatest scope for the unbounded stores of thought and fancy in the 
writer's own mind." It is in this sense, not in any political one, that the 
paradoxical poets leveled distinctions and, in an excess of revolutionary zeal, 
flouted "authority and fashion."2 Indeed, the fact that the chief practitioners 
of paradox had turned against the French Revolution, and against Hazlitt 
as well, may suggest that Hazlitt's evaluation of the poetry of paradox was 
not entirely disinterested. This was the view of Wordsworth, who in 1817 
wrote to Haydon that "the miscreant Hazlitt continues . . . his abuse of 
Southey Coleridge and myself. . . . " A hundred years later Hazlitt's old 
enemy Blackwood's Magazine asserted the "whimsical paradox" that "Haz-
litt, a Jacobin in politics, was a violent anti-Jacobin in literature."3 This 
proposition is acceptable only if "anti-Jacobin" is adequately defined. The 
Blackwood's article proceeds to confuse Hazlitt's literary anti-Jacobinism 
with the abuse of "Wordsworth's private character," but the paradoxes in 
Hazlitt's position may be resolved without recourse to his personal or politi-
cal disputes: Hazlitt is not guilty of his own charge against the "Ministerial 
Press" of making "literature the mere tool . . . of party-spirit,"4 nor is he 
repudiating the French Revolution, humanity, or nature. 
Hazlitt's dislike for Wordsworth's and Coleridge's politics is distinguish-
able from his evaluation of their poetry, just as his attacks on Scott the 
Tory are distinct from his admiration of Scott the novelist. Although he 
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singled out the paradoxical elements for disapproval, Hazlitt admired a 
great deal of Wordsworth's poetry; in fact, he placed Wordsworth "at the 
head of the poets of the present day, or rather . . . in a totally distinct class 
of excellence." Hazlitt, as Wellek has pointed out, recognized "the best of 
his time remarkably well"; and shortly after Hazlitt's death T . N. Talfourd 
could write in the Examiner that, despite his personal bitterness toward 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, only Hazlitt "has done justice to the immortal 
works of the one, and the genius of the other."5 Thanks especially to Howe's 
Life, it is no longer as difficult as the Victorians found it to respect Hazlitt; 
but it is nevertheless pleasant to note how firm Hazlitt's critical principles 
stood against political pressures and personal abuse. 
Hazlitt's literary anti-Jacobinism affirms, rather than rejects, his own 
political ideas. Probably better than any other part of his critical writings, 
Hazlitt's analysis of the poetry of paradox shows his belief that the good 
poet, like the good citizen, must fulfill the possibilities of his imagination: 
that poetic structure, like the best government, requires an escape from 
egotism into imaginative completeness. This principle is the key to Hazlitt's 
criticism of Wordsworth and other contemporaries. Occasionally, when 
Hazlitt expresses this principle in the commonplace terms of logic, decorum, 
and general nature, he may seem to apply it too harshly and mechanically; 
more often, however, the criterion of imaginative completeness leads Hazlitt 
to appreciate Wordsworth's excellence and to censure—in Wordsworth and 
others—what may justifiably be considered idiosyncrasy, bathos, and struc-
tural ineptitude. Hazlitt may sometimes, like many of his contemporaries, 
blur the distinctions between art and nature, but in his treatment of the 
poetry of paradox he takes a clear stand against subjectivism and formless-
ness, and insists that poetry attain a structured objectivity. 
I 
Hazlitt's general charge against the poets of his time is that they have 
gone to such extremes of subjectivity that they have failed to achieve either 
(1) a high degree of truth, (2) the means of poetic communication, or (3) 
both. Everywhere he finds a perverse individuality. Southey's "impressions 
are accidental, immediate, personal, instead of being permanent and univer-
sal." Shelley "trusted too implicitly to the light of his own mind. . . ." Keats, 
in Endymion, "painted his own thoughts and character. . . ." Byron is a 
"pampered egotist" who, instead of "bowing to the authority of nature, . . . 
only consults the . . . workings of his own breast, and gives them out as 
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oracles to the world." Landor's Imaginary Conversations is "a chef-d'oeuvre 
of self-opinion and self-will. . . ." Landor and, to a lesser degree, Southey 
are the principal examples of that extreme form of paradox that Hazlitt calls 
"Literary Jacobinism." Hazlitt has a number of good things to say about the 
style, characterization, and humor in the Imaginary Conversations, but all 
is "defeated" by Landor's outrageous love of paradox that offends both 
reason and common sense.6 At this point, Hazlitt's criticism of the poetry 
of paradox approaches a kind of commonplace logic-chopping, but his main 
concern is that the poets of paradox failed to consummate the imaginative 
process that great poetry exacts. 
Hazlitt's principal criterion for literary excellence is truth to nature, and 
all the kinds of poetry inferior to the "poetry of imagination" fall short of 
"truth," in one way or another. Inferior poetry suffers, in other words, 
from "abstraction." The truth-finding faculty is imagination, and whatever 
limits its scope limits the poet's perception and representation of truth. The 
imagination is a combining faculty. In our perception of everyday phe-
nomena, imagination immediately unites sensation with thought and feeling, 
and in poetry it continues to exert its amalgamating power in order to attain 
a still greater truth. Here its role is an objectifying and generalizing one. In 
a state of intense feeling the associations are more abundant; the imagination 
links the present with the past, summoning up thoughts and feelings which 
modify the present perception and give it the validity of repeated experience. 
Conditioned by past thoughts and feelings, the poet in a state of intense 
feeling immediately reaches "unpremeditated conclusions" of a high order 
of truth. Indispensable to the conditioning process is habitual sympathetic 
identification, which gives the poet's intuition of truth the validity of com-
mon experience. Emotion is important to the poet, therefore, both as a 
dimension of truth and as a condition in which he associates most copiously 
and, after proper conditioning by sympathetic identification, immediately ar-
rives at "profound sentiments."7 
The greatest poetry, Hazlitt believes, must not only comprise "profound 
sentiments" but also objectify these sentiments in generally moving images 
and exciting events. The state of feeling wherein the imagination defines 
the "internal character" or "the living principle" of its subject Hazlitt calls 
"gusto." This is also the state in which the imagination shapes the poet's 
experience into a work of art, selecting and combining those particulars that 
stimulate the reader's imagination to realize what is permanent and meaning-
ful in human life. 8 Reviewing The Excursion in 1814, Hazlitt divides poetry 
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into "two classes; the poetry of imagination and the poetry of sentiment." 
The first arises "out of the faculties of memory and invention, conversant 
with the world of external nature; the other from the fund of our moral 
sensibility." Here Hazlitt uses the term "poetry of imagination" in a nar-
rower sense than he usually does, for he apparently wants to emphasize 
the objectifying or externalizing power of imagination, its ability to fuse 
thoughts and feelings with concrete particulars. More frequently, as in de-
scribing Shakespeare's or Milton's poetry, he makes the "poetry o£ imagina-
tion" include high moral sensibility as well as excellent invention. In fact, 
in his review of The Excursion, he goes on to say that "the greatest poets 
. . . have been equally distinguished for richness of invention and depth 
of feeling." Since the days of Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton 
the decline of poetry can be traced to the failure to combine "moral sensi-
bility" and "fanciful invention." Young and Cowley possess the latter but 
not the former. ". . . Wordsworth, on the other hand, whose powers of 
feeling are of the highest order, is certainly deficient in fanciful invention: 
his writings exhibit all the internal power, without the external form of 
poetry."9 
What keeps modern poets from fusing profound thoughts and feelings 
with striking images and events is their "bias to abstraction." The advance 
of civilization, which has made people less immediately responsive to the 
world of sensation, has blunted the powers of both feeling and invention; 
scientific progress has substituted inquiry and experiment for "immediate 
communication with nature"; and, more recently, the French Revolution 
has "distracted all hearts" from imaginative completion by centering people's 
attention on abstract principles of government and the "general nature of 
men and things. . . . " 1 0 For Hazlitt the best poetry demands self-fulfillment, 
for both the poet and the reader, in the sense that every area of possible 
emotional, intellectual, and moral response must remain open to the probings 
of association that are initiated by concrete particulars. This fulfillment is 
hindered "wherever an intense activity is given to any one faculty" at the 
expense of "the due and natural exercise of others." Intellectual activity in 
which "ideas of things" are divorced from pleasure or pain "must check the 
genial expansion of the moral sentiments and social affections, must lead to 
a cold and dry abstraction. . . ." When an object or idea is severed from its 
association with pain or pleasure, as it must be in scientific or syllogistic 
reasoning, it is devaluated as material for poetry. For both poet and reader, 
the concrete particular, with its immediate emotional impact, must be 
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allowed to initiate and enrich the flow of associations—especially those re-
sulting from sympathetic identification—that modify perception and shape 
poetic truth. Other exclusive habits of mind, such as personal 'Vanity" or 
devotion to some philosophical or political scheme, have a similar effect on 
the imagination, excluding "profound sentiments" or preventing their ex-
pression in generally interesting images and events.1 1 Since the poet must 
respond completely—in sensation, thought, and feeling—to the evocative 
experience, he must not interpose his will; he must not, like Shelley, discard 
"every thing as mystery and error for which he cannot account by an effort 
of mere intelligence," or, like Southey, lack the "patience to think that evil 
is inseparable from the nature of things," or, like Coleridge, "subject the 
Muse to transcendental theories " 1 2 
In Hazlitt, therefore, we find the same paradox as in Keats. Just as the 
denial of self that Keats calls negative capability must precede the affirmation 
of self that he calls soul-making, so must a high degree of sympathetic identi-
fication, and consequent loss of self, precede the self-fulfillment that Hazlitt 
defines as the poetic experience. Whether, as in Wordsworth, "egotism" 
makes every object in nature mirror the poet's own thoughts and feelings, 
or, as in Godwin, uses character and passion to "spin a subtle theory," or, as 
in Coleridge, "mistakes scholastic speculations for . . . passion," this egotism 
in poetry is "servile, inert, . . . stagnant. . . ." Keats and Hazlitt use similar 
metaphors to suggest the vitality and completeness of the imaginative ex-
perience when it is uninhibited by any abstracting or dividing egotism. 
Modern literature, says Hazlitt, "halts on one leg"; it does not—like Keats's 
bright-eyed, purposeful Stoat—"run on all fours." Modern poets, says Hazlitt, 
"are more in love with a theory than a mistress"; whereas in his "instinctive-
ness," says Keats, the .poet should be like a Hawk or a Man "wanting a 
M a t e . . . . " It is this absorption in a self-integrating or self-completing purpose 
that embodies poetic truth in striking particulars.13 Neither Hazlitt nor, I 
think, Keats is insisting on the amorality of the imaginative process, not, 
at least, in any final sense. Douglas Bush has pointed out that what Keats 
opposes to "the wordsworthian or egotistical sublime" is "the impersonal, 
non-moral imagination of the poet of negative capability . . ."; but for 
Hazlitt, at least, the imaginative fusion includes morality: "impassioned 
poetry is an emanation of the moral and intellectual part of our nature, as 
well as of the sensitive—of the desire to know, the will to act, and the power 
to feel; and ought to appeal to these different parts of our constitution, in 
order to be perfect." 1 4 This emanation must, of course, come naturally 
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through the process of excited but conditioned association. Apparently it 
must come as spontaneously and organically as the Ancient Mariner's bless-
ing of the water-snakes, an act of unpremeditated but indisputable morality. 
The process of poetic creation, Hazlitt makes it clear, involves a moral re-
sponse—conditioned by sympathetic identification—that leaves its mark on 
the final product, but he protests that any premature moralizing can only 
obstruct the process short of fruition. 
As a political writer Hazlitt frequently objects to political ideas expressed 
in poems, plays, or novels; but when he considers a piece of writing as an 
imaginative work rather than a political document (and in Hazlitt's essays 
the distinction is not difficult to make), his objection is not to any particular 
set of ideas but to a writer allowing any ideas—political or otherwise—to 
control his imagination. His own political ideas, reduced to what Keats calls 
consequitive reasoning, are no more acceptable as material for poetry than 
anyone else's. "The cause of the people is indeed but ill calculated as a subject 
for poetry: it admits of rhetoric, which goes into argument and explanation, 
but it presents no immediate or distinct images to the mind. . . ." In fact, 
tyranny, if dramatized by striking and powerful characters like Coriolanus, 
will stimulate the imagination and prove more attractive and sympathetic 
than "abstract right." This does not mean, obviously, that literature must 
repudiate democratic ideas. "The spirit of poetry is in itself favourable to 
humanity and liberty. . . . " 1 5 In fact, both literature and the good society 
must be affirmations of individual freedom—achieved, not by reason alone, 
but by imaginative self-fulfillment. Like Hobbes and Locke, Hazlitt believes 
that each man is naturally free to pursue his selfish desires to the point where 
he would allow others the same freedom and that government exists to 
define this point and to restrain people from going beyond it. "Political 
justice" limits freedom according to the calculation of enlightened self-in-
terest, but political justice may be achieved only in a context of "moral 
justice," which requires sympathetic identification with others achieved not 
by reason but by imagination, and sustained, as Rousseau believed, by the 
"virtue" as well as the "wisdom" of its citizens. A free society demands "the 
hand, heart, and head of the whole community acting to one purpose, with 
a mutual and thorough consent." Only under these conditions is the indi-
vidual free in the sense that he makes the laws regulating his own behavior.1 6 
Analogous, in its completeness, to the individual self-realization and 
communal integration of a democratic society is the experience provided by 
the greatest kind of poetry—tragedy—which offers a kind of freedom itself, 
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as well as a means to realizing political freedom. Like "moral justice" tragedy 
integrates "the desire to know, the will to act, and the power to feel. . . ." 
The tragic poet does not, like Southey, overlook evil but represents it with 
all the truth of the imagination, so that the audience or reader enjoys not 
only intense feeling (hate as well as love) but also the power of \nowing 
the thing he hates. Therefore, aware of the justness of the representation and 
of his feeling toward it, he is impelled to act accordingly. This self-realization 
(emotional, intellectual, moral) in the face of evil offers freedom, not from 
the consequences of evil—which are inescapable—but from being deceived 
by it. Political freedom is also advantaged. The audience may recognize and 
even share, with a Coriolanus or an Iago, a natural "love of power" over 
others, but the overall effect of tragedy is to "substitute imaginary sympathy 
for mere selfishness. It gives us a high and permanent interest, beyond our-
selves, in humanity as such." At this point, where imaginative fulfillment 
culminates in unselfish identification—or, perhaps more accurately, un-
selfish identification culminates in imaginative fulfillment—Hazlitt's criteria 
for political and for poetic success become the same. At this point, ideally, 
both society and a poem achieve an organic unity correlative with the good 
citizen's and the poet's and the reader's self-integration. Of course, regarding 
the chances of reaching this ideal, Hazlitt is more sanguine about poetry 
than about society, although in his own time, he thought, poetry also faced 
some pretty serious difficulties.17 
II 
As we have seen, Hazlitt's objection to Shelley's and Southey's use of 
political ideas is that, by beginning with the idea, these poets set up an 
insuperable barrier to imaginative fulfillment. Wordsworth, too, sometimes 
stopped short of the kind of imaginative completeness that Hazlitt seeks in 
literature, but this is because he excessively delighted in "contemplating his 
own powers" rather than because any set of political ideas intervened. Words-
worth, of course, was no less aware than Hazlitt of the problems that the 
times imposed on a poet, and if he "contemplated his own powers," it was 
in order to solve one of the most difficult of these problems. Defining "the 
triumph of the mechanical philosophy," Basil Willey has noted that by the 
eighteenth century poets felt that "mythologies, including the Christian, 
were . . . exploded," that their "truth," as far as it goes, could be stated con-
ceptually (as in the Essay on Man), and that they could no longer be used 
in poetry except as recognized " 'fictions' of proved evocative power and of 
long association with poetic experience" (as in The Rape of the LocI(). A 
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major poet, therefore, forced by his concern for truth to deny the old mytholo-
gies, had either (like Keats and Shelley, often) to invent a new mythology, 
although not necessarily discarding all of the old, or (like Wordsworth) 
to "make poetry out of the direct dealings of his mind and heart with the 
visible universe . . . , " 1 8 But if Wordsworth rejected the mythology that had 
been rejected by scientific thought, he also rejected, as material for poetry, 
the conceptual world of the new science and (although not fully) the ex-
planatory method of Pope's philosophical poems. In a good many places, in-
cluding a passage in The Excursion (IV, 941-992) which Hazlitt quotes 
with approval, Wordsworth says that no abstractions should come between 
the poet and the sensory world which he molds to his thoughts and feelings. 
Hazlitt gives Wordsworth credit for the "immediate intercourse of [his] 
imagination with Nature" and his repudiation of the "cold, narrow, lifeless 
spirit of modern philosophy." "Tintern Abbey" (lines 76-83) shows how "a 
fine poet . . . describes the effect of the sight of nature on his mind"; and 
Hazlitt adds praise in what are unquestionably his highest terms: "So the 
forms of nature . . . stood before the great artists of old. . . ." This is the 
reason why Wordsworth's "general sentiments and reflections" attain depth, 
originality, and truth. 1 9 
The point at which "abstraction" drains the power from Wordsworth's 
poetry is that at which "vanity" or "egotism" limits his invention to those 
images, characters, and incidents that are interesting only to himself or, 
perhaps, other "retired and lonely student[s] of nature. . . ." This is a failure 
in sympathetic identification. Shakespeare and Milton, through the com-
pleteness of their identification with others, gained "a deeper sense . . . 
of what [is] grand in the objects of nature, or affecting in the events of 
human life," so that their images, characters, and incidents are meaningful 
and moving to a large number of readers. Wordsworth's materials, on the 
other hand, do not touch off such splendid associations. At one extreme, 
Hazlitt—always empirical—brings the "mysticism" of the Immortality Ode 
down to earth with a few common-sense observations, although elsewhere 
he quotes some lines of this poem approvingly. As might be expected, he 
very often is unsympathetic with the "dim, obscure, and visionary" in 
Coleridge (although liking parts of "Christabel" and proclaiming "The 
Ancient Mariner" "a work of genius"); but, as far as Wordsworth is con-
cerned, his usual objection is at the other extreme: to those materials that are 
ordinary and unpoetic. Vain Wordsworth will "owe nothing but to himself" 
and therefore abjures "figures," "fantasies," "the gorgeous machinery of myth-
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ologic lore," "the splendid colors o£ poetic diction/' "striking subjects/' and 
"remarkable combinations of events" in favor of "the simplest elements of 
nature and the human mind/' "the commonest events and objects," "trifling 
incidents," "the most insignificant things," and those objects "the most simple 
and barren of effect." As one might expect, these "objects (whether persons 
or things)" do not "immediately and irresistibly . . . convey [his feelings] 
in all their force and depth to others " 2 0 
Up to a point, with his emphasis on common experience and general 
associations, Hazlitt is merely making the same objection to Wordsworth 
that Jeffrey made in his review of The Excursion in November 1814. In his 
Encyclopaedia Britannica article on "Beauty" (1824), which is an expanded 
version of his May 1811 review of Archibald Alison's Essays on the Nature 
and Principles of Taste, Jeffrey agrees with Alison and others that beauty 
depends not on a thing itself but on the affections and sympathies that we 
associate with it. For the enjoyment of beauty, therefore, the best taste— 
which is the awareness of the most beauty—belongs to the person whose 
affections are so warm and so much exercised that he builds up a multiplicity 
of pleasurable associations. But Jeffrey is not content with mere subjectivism 
in art. The creation of beauty for others to enjoy requires the poet or artist 
"to employ only such objects as are the natural signs, or the inseparable 
concomitants of emotions, of which the greater part of mankind are sus-
ceptible. . . ." If, instead, he obtrudes objects not commonly associated with 
any interesting impressions, he is guilty of "bad and false" taste. This is 
Wordsworth's principal defect, resulting, no doubt, from "long habits of 
seclusion, and an excessive ambition of originality " 2 1 
Jeffrey's appeal to the susceptibility of "common minds" does not, re-
gardless of the quality of those minds, set a very sophisticated standard of 
taste. Art, Jeffrey is saying, offers pleasure like that associated with certain 
objects in actual life but lacks, or at least makes no use of, an order or truth 
peculiar to itself. As Wellek points out, "Jeffrey and his models . . . have 
no criterion to set off enjoyment of a peaceful landscape, or sudden insight 
into character from experience derived from art objects." 2 2 Hazlitt fre-
quently invites the same criticism. His highest praise for Shakespeare's 
characters, for instance, is that we know them as we know real persons or 
that we can completely identify ourselves with them. As we have seen, he 
fuses the social and the aesthetic effects of tragedy. He does not, like Cole-
ridge, separate "the Good" and "the Beautiful." 
The importance of how a poet combines and organizes his value-charged 
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materials is nevertheless something that Hazlitt was aware of. Although 
The Excursion "excites or recals the same sensations which those who have 
traversed that wonderful scenery must have felt," Hazlitt adds that "all is 
left loose and irregular in the rude chaos of aboriginal nature." The cause 
of this poor construction is egotism: that great fault of the poets of paradox. 
Wordsworth has merely recorded his own experience—his own sensations 
and his accompanying feelings and thoughts. The result is not only "naked-
ness" (of commonplace, undercharged materials) but also "confusion." 
Wordsworth's structural faults—like the "tendency of [his] mind"—are 
"the reverse of the dramatic." The Excursion lacks what is most important to 
a dramatic poem—that is, a suitable action or series of actions. Words-
worth would have done better to make the poem completely a "philosophic" 
one unencumbered by narrative and description which only "hinder the 
progress and effect of the general reasoning." Evidently Hazlitt thinks that 
a logical sequence of propositions would be a better unifying principle than 
broken narrative that "shuns the common 'vantage-grounds of popular story, 
of striking incident, or fatal catastrophe. . . ." Wordsworth's originality, 
carried to an egotistical extreme, has hindered him in a way that Scott's 
lack of originality proved helpful, because, forced to draw on tradition, Scott 
"selects a story . . . sure to please. . . ." Hazlitt likes these generally exciting 
incidents for the same reason that he values generally interesting images 
and characters: that is, as particulars that will excite the reader into imagina-
tive creation. But also Hazlitt thinks of a series of exciting events as central 
in a poem's structure and, for the best poetry, even indispensable. A painting 
or a statute can harmonize its varied particulars within the limits of plane 
or solid geometry, but a poem adds the dimension of time; and to propel 
the reader's imagination along this axis, a sequence of exciting actions is the 
most effective means. Unlike the painter or sculptor, the poet must translate 
"the object [he describes] into some other form, which is the language of 
metaphor or imagination; as narrative can only interest by a succession of 
events and a conflict of hopes and fears." 2 3 Of course Hazlitt admires a 
number of poems, including a good many of Wordsworth's, which progress 
through time with little or no narrative; but for Hazlitt, as for Dr. Johnson, 
the highest sort of invention is narrative and dramatic, with diversified 
characters clashing in "remarkable combinations of events. . . ." Hazlitt puts 
a premium on action as providing particulars both individually interesting 
and collectively propulsive. But he is less interested in a closely knit plot than 
in a luxuriant texture of feeling. He would have agreed with Matthew 
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Arnold that "the eternal objects of poetry . . . are actions," that suitable ac-
tions "most powerfully appeal to the great human affections," and that a 
"great" action so dominates a poem with the "feeling of its situations" that it 
precludes any "detached impressions" or "personal peculiarities."24 
Broken, undercharged, non-propulsive narrative is of course not the only 
undramatic sin that Hazlitt traces to Wordsworth's egotism. With "a fastidi-
ous antipathy to immediate effect," Wordsworth intrudes into The Excursion 
not only his interpretation of particulars that should not need interpretation 
but also superfluous particulars that "hang as a dead weight upon the imagi-
nation. . . ." There is, furthermore, "no dramatic distinction of character." 
"The recluse, the pastor, and the pedlar, are three persons in one poet." 
Hence, because he ascribes the same sort of imaginative coloring of natural 
objects to all his characters, in this poem and others as well, Wordsworth 
offends with dramatic impropriety. Hazlitt is willing to accept this coloring 
or molding as long as Wordsworth does not try to pass it off as some charac-
ter's rather than his own, but Hazlitt loses faith when Wordsworth makes 
"pedlars and ploughmen his heroes and . . . interpreters. . . . " Swallowed up 
by his own feelings, Wordsworth's materials lack variety and contrast. The 
unity of The Excursion lies in "an endless continuity of feeling"—Words-
worth's own—and not in the control of varied materials. The sort of "whole" 
which Wordsworth "cannot form"—but which Hazlitt prefers—is one that 
preserves great variety, comprising "all the bustle, machinery, and pantomime 
of the stage, or of real life . . . . " 2 5 But the stage and real life are not the same 
thing, and in an analysis of Hazlitt's criticism both comparisons must be 
taken into account. Hazlitt rarely lets us forget that he loved the theater— 
where, of course, he reviewed plays for the Champion, the Examiner, the 
Morning Chronicle, and The Times—but his liking for the dramatic is of 
one piece with his theory of the imagination. Since imaginative fulfillment 
depends on a self-denying sympathy, a work of art should break free from 
self-regard and gain an existence as independent as possible of the purely 
personal. Invention succeeds as egotism dwindles and as the poet himself 
appears to drop out altogether, no longer coming between an image, an 
action, or a character and the reader. Imaginative fulfillment externalizes 
itself in a form in which the organic and the dramatic are necessary correla-
tives, duplicating each other as they reach a consummation. 
In "Laodamia" (published in 1815 and first mentioned by Hazlitt in 
1824 as one of Wordsworth's "later philosophical productions") Hazlitt finds 
Wordsworth a better craftsman than in The Excursion, "Laodamia" is of 
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course a narrative with dialogue, but to explain the poem's structure Hazlitt 
must obviously look for something other than a succession of lively incidents. 
". . . The texture of the thoughts has the smoothness and solidity of marble." 
In fact, Hazlitt decides that "Laodamia" succeeds in the manner of sculpture 
or painting, for he applies to the poem a term that he generally reserves for 
the visual arts: "the ideal." The ideal comprises essential qualities of an 
object or a person as represented not in the general terms of the understand-
ing but in the particulars seized upon by the imagination in a state of intense 
feeling. It is "the abstraction of any thing [not from its individuality but] 
from all the circumstances that weaken its effect, or lessen our admiration 
of it." It includes, among its conditions, balance, harmony, and repose; con-
sequently it "rejects as much as possible not only the petty, the mean, and 
disagreeable, but also the agony and violence of passion, the force of contrast, 
and the extravagance of imagination." Poetry, however, can make good use 
of these latter qualities; for the poet in translating the object of his imagina-
tion into some other form has no choice but a progression through time, for 
which nothing is better than "a succession of events and a conflict of hopes 
and fears." Therefore the ideal character, reposing unchanged in harmony, 
is a handicap to a poet or novelist, providing only "a succession of actions 
without passion." Hazlitt, as usual, prefers "interesting and dramatic charac-
ters" (Shakespeare's), who are "men and not angels." Sculpture and painting 
must remain the "strong-hold" of the ideal. Yet in addition to dynamic 
progress through varied incidents, the greatest poetry—tragedy—achieves 
the steady balance of the ideal in "the superiority of character to fortune and 
circumstances, or the larger scope of thought and feeling thrown into it, 
that redeems it from the charge of vulgar grossness or physical horrors." 
Hazlitt finds "permanent tragedy" in the equipoise of "pride of intellect 
and power . . . confronting and enduring pain" that Milton has given Satan 
and again in the "feeling of stoical indifference" that Wordsworth achieves 
in "Laodamia." 
Know, virtue were not virtue, if the joys 
Of sense were able to return as fast 
And surely as they vanish. Earth destroys 
Those raptures duly: Erebus disdains— 
Cairn pleasures there abide, majestic pains. 
The speaker, Protesilaus, is obviously an ideal character, but Hazlitt's only 
adverse comments on this poem are on "some poorness in the diction, and 
some indistinctness in the images" (both unspecified). ". , . The greater 
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part of [the poem] might be read aloud in Elysium" for the enjoyment of 
"departed heroes and sages"; and Hazlitt would as soon have written the line 
"Elysian beauty, melancholy grace" "as have carved a Greek statue."2 6 Yet, 
in the context of Hazlitt's total criticism of Wordsworth and his overall 
admiration for the dramatic, the structure of "Laodamia"—whereby Words-
worth objectifies his feelings in the static balance of painting and sculpture— 
scarcely represents a major triumph. 
To summarize: the paradoxical, or egotistical, in Wordsworth results 
not only in materials sometimes lacking general interest, but also in several 
structural defects: intrusive interpretation and other superfluous interpola-
tions, dramatic impropriety, indistinct characterization, monotony (rather 
than variety in unity), and actions less than large and controlling. Words-
worth's structural success in "Laodamia" remains of a different order from 
that which Hazlitt usually admires in poetry. 
I l l 
Given these criteria, we may infer why Hazlitt found some of Words-
worth's poems worthy of high praise and why he objected to others. Inso-
far as Hazlitt deals with specific poems—which is usually in a fragmentary 
way—the score favors Wordsworth. Howe's index to the Wor\s lists thirty-
two of Wordsworth's poems by title. 2 7 Of these, Hazlitt praises eight (six 
without reservation), favorably quotes six more, expresses disapproval of 
nine (five of them only for their political sentiments), takes a divided view 
of one, and quotes or mentions eight more without any clear evaluation— 
except, of course, that he apparently thought them worth quoting or men-
tioning. In addition, among those poems of which "it is not possible to speak 
in terms of too high praise," Hazlitt includes (in his 1818 lecture "On the 
Living Poets) "several of the Sonnets, and a hundred others of inconceivable 
beauty, of perfect originality and pathos." 2 8 
Among the poems that Hazlitt criticizes adversely, The Excursion is the 
only one that he deals with at any length, in the review (appearing in three 
issues of the Examiner, August to October 1814) that I have already dis-
cussed. In 1816 he briefly mentions "Simon Lee," along with "ideot boys 
and mad mothers," to suggest the meanness of Wordsworth's materials. This 
also seems to be his objection, in 1821, to "The Leech-gatherer," although, 
like other critics from Coleridge on, he greatly admired parts of this poem; 
and in 1817, as we have seen, he found fault with the "mysticism" in the 
Immortality Ode. In the remaining poems in this group—"Gipsies," the son-
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net "November, 1813," the Thanksgiving Ode, and the sonnets on Schill and 
Hofer—Hazlitt finds evidence of Wordsworth's apostasy and is characteristi-
cally scornful of such support for the ruling class and "legitimacy."2 9 His 
comments on these five poems all follow Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 
June 1815 and, except for one mention of the Hofer and Schill sonnets in 
1828 (when Hazlitt was working on his Life of Napoleon), they fall within 
Hazlitt's most active period as a political writer (from his reply to "Vetus" 
in November 1813 to the publication of Political Essays in 1819). 
This period was marked by the restoration of the Bourbons abroad and 
by further denials of civil liberty in England: by hard times, riots, and 
countermeasures leading to the brutality and slaughter at Peterloo. Although, 
as Talfourd reports, Hazlitt was "staggered under the blow" of Napoleon's 
defeat, the succeeding months and years find him as resolute as ever, in a 
time when such resolution was far from safe, in attacking the divine right 
of kings, the Congress of Vienna, the hanging of John Cashman for his part 
in the Spa-Fields riot, the reduction of the Poor Rates, Castlereagh, Canning, 
Malthus, Gifford, and, on political grounds, his one-time friends and fellow-
revolutionaries Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Southey. If these attacks seem 
severe, we must recall the political climate in which Wordsworth, in his 
Thanksgiving Ode (1816), could praise an aggressive Deity for his "pure 
intent" worked out in "Man—arrayed for mutual slaughter" and Southey 
could write in 1817: "We are in danger of an insurrection of the Yahoos:—it 
is the fault of the governments that such a cast should exist in the midst of 
civilized society, but till the breed can be mended it must be curbed, & that too 
with a strong hand." 3 0 It was during this period that the Tory periodicals, the 
Quarterly and Blac\woodfs, responded to Hazlitt's attack on the govern-
ment with vicious and libelous abuse and that, after Hazlitt's review of The 
Excursion, Wordsworth took some pains to spread his report of an incident, 
evidently some sexual adventure of Hazlitt's, that had taken place near 
Keswick in 1803. Wordsworth reported the matter in conversations with 
Lamb (1814) and Crabb Robinson (1815); and writing to John Scott on 11 
June 1816, in a passage omitted from The Letters of William and Dorothy 
Wordsworth, Wordsworth mentioned that he had told Haydon of the 1803 
incident and concluded that Hazlitt is "a man of low propensities, & of 
bad heart. . . . His sensations are too corrupt to allow him to understand my 
Poetry—though his ingenuity might enable him so to write as if he knew 
something about it." In the 7 April 1817 letter already quoted (p. 2 above) 
Wordsworth urged Haydon "not to associate with the Fellow, he is not a 
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proper person to be admitted into respectable society, being the most per-
verse and malevolent Creature that ill luck has ever thrown in my way. 
Avoid him—hie niger est—And this, I understand, is the general opinion 
wherever he is known in London." 3 1 One can understand the relish with 
which, in his lecture "On the Living Poets" (1818), Hazlitt said that Words-
worth's 
egotism is in some respects a madness. . . . He hates all science and all art; 
he hates chemistry, he hates conchology; he hates Voltaire; he hates Sir Isaac 
Newton; he hates wisdom; he hates wit; he hates metaphysics, which he says 
are unintelligible, and yet he would be thought to understand them; he hates 
prose; he hates all poetry but his own; he hates the dialogues in Shakespeare; 
he hates music, dancing, and painting; he hates Rubens, he hates Rembrandt; 
he hates Raphael, he hates Titian; he hates Vandyke; he hates the antique; 
he hates the Apollo Belvidere; he hates the Venus of Medicis. This is 
the reason that so few people take an interest in his writings, because he takes 
an interest in nothing that others do! 
Yet it is in this same lecture that Hazlitt has only the highest praise for more 
than a "hundred" of Wordsworth's poems; and seven years later, in The 
Spirit of the Age, where Hazlitt makes his usual high evaluation of much 
of Wordsworth's poetry but with particular appreciation of "his later philo-
sophic productions," Hazlitt refers to his earlier list of Wordsworth's hates 
as "mere epigrams and jeux-d'esprit, as far from truth as they are free from 
malice " 3 2 
In "The Thorn," the "Mad Mother" ["Her eyes are wild"], and "The 
Complaint of a Poor Indian Woman" [sic], Hazlitt found, when Coleridge 
read these poems aloud to him in January 1798, "that deeper power and 
pathos which have since been acknowledged . . . as the characteristics of [the] 
author. . . ." At least this is the discovery that Hazlitt affirmed in "My First 
Acquaintance with Poets" (1823). In 1818 he again listed the "Complaint" 
among those others of Wordsworth's poems of which "it is not possible to 
speak in terms of too high praise": "Hart-Leap Well," "The Banks of the 
Wye" ["Tintern Abbey"], "The Reverie of Poor Susan," parts of "The 
Leech-gatherer," "To a Cuckoo [sic], and "To a Daisy" [sic] (which may 
be any of the three poems Wordsworth called "To the Daisy" but which, 
because all the other poems referred to in "On the Living Poets" had been 
published by 1807, is probably one of the two poems of this title that appeared 
in the 1807 edition, although the one in the 1815 edition cannot be ruled 
out). "Hart-Leap Well" seems to be Hazlitt's favorite, with "Laodamia" 
later becoming a close competitor.3 3 
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In all o£ these, we may infer, Hazlitt discovered not only profound 
thoughts and sentiments but also a satisfactory degree of "fanciful invention." 
Five of these poems—"The Thorn," "Her eyes were wild," "The Complaint," 
"Hart-Leap Well," and "Laodamia"—are dramatic in that each deals with 
a tense, crucial situation and that the speakers, except in a very minor way 
in "Hart-Leap Well," are not the poet himself; all five have a distinct narra-
tive element; and all have vivid and splendid or awesome imagery. 
Apparently—in 1798 and again in 1823—Hazlitt did not consider "The 
Thorn" and "Her eyes were wild" irreparably damaged by psychotic moth-
ers or "a little muddy pond." In "Hart-Leap Well" Wordsworth, it seems, 
has found a suitable story—somewhat like Scott's material—to drama-
tize the thought and sentiment expressed in the last stanza (with what, 
according to Hazlitt's standards, one might consider an excess of inter-
pretation and, indeed, interpretation that is not adequately prepared for 
dramatically). Hazlitt's reasons for admiring "Laodamia" have already been 
examined. The parts of "The Leech-gatherer" that pleased Hazlitt can only 
be guessed at: perhaps he felt, in the measured cheerfulness of the old man, 
something of the reposeful "ideal" that he discovered in "Laodamia"; 3 4 
probably he liked the sentiment and some of the imagery, but not the inele-
gant details ("muddy water" again). The old man is scarcely of lower 
station than the "poor Indian woman" (although, a local product, he may 
seem more commonplace), but his situation is less immediately dramatic, 
the poem's narrative interest is slight, and characterization remains indistinct 
(as Charles Williams notes, the Leech-gatherer seems to be "the impersonated 
thought of some other state of being, which the acceptance of the noble 
doctrine it teaches leaves in itself unexplored") 3 5 
In "Tintern Abbey," which was written later than any other poem in the 
first edition of Lyrical Ballads, F . W. Bateson points out that "Wordsworth 
[practically for the first time] speaks the language that he was afterwards 
to speak in prose and in verse. . . . With its long sentences, its involved 
grammar and its polysyllabic vocabulary it was a form of discourse that 
abandoned all pretense to being the poetry of the people."3 6 In another 
respect, however—in its direct molding of sensory experience to the poet's 
feelings—it is still paradoxical, and it is for this quality that Hazlitt especially 
admires the poem and places Wordsworth in "a totally distinct class of excel-
lence." Wordsworth has become openly autobiographical, and the analysis 
of his own mental processes has become as important as the details of ex-
ternal nature. 3 7 But of course the poem escapes the excesses of paradox: in 
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ascribing these sensations, thoughts, and feelings to himself and Dorothy, 
Wordsworth does not commit any dramatic impropriety; more than in the 
Immortality Ode he keeps his consolation for the loss of youth's "dizzy 
raptures" within empirical (if not entirely logical) limits; and, to be sure, 
no mud puddles or molehills devalue the banks of the Wye as material for 
poetry. 
We may only infer Hazlitt's reasons for mentioning the remaining three 
poems favorably; and for lack of specific evidence, these inferences must be 
brief. "The Reverie of Poor Susan," although not published until 1800, was 
written before "Tintern Abbey" and is a kind of preliminary sketch for it. 
It avoids the first person; and its concrete particulars are appropriate to the 
character (therefore "dramatic" and not merely "picturesque"). The poem 
has a clear chronological structure, with its parts neatly describing successive 
stages of the process of association: the initiating bird song, the delightful 
recall of pleasing images, and their subsequent fading away. "To the Cuckoo" 
is a first-person lyric with a good deal of generally appealing concrete detail; 
the imagery is given texture by the basic metaphor (the bird is a "Voice" 
suggesting "an unsubstantial^ faery" world). A very similar case could be 
made for the 1807 daisy poem beginning "In youth from rock to rock," while 
the other daisy poem of that year, beginning "Bright Flower," although less 
concrete is closely structured and is a good example of unmuddied Nature 
imaginatively molded to express profound sentiments. 
IV 
In an article on "Hazlitt's Preference for Tragedy" (PMLA, L X X I [1956], 
1042-51) I wrote that Hazlitt's practical criticism is in some respects better 
than his theory. This might also be said about his favorite thesis that 
imaginative activity has steadily declined since Shakespeare and Milton; for 
this thesis forced him to put the poetry of paradox at the bottom of his scale, 
whereas his evaluation of Wordsworth's individual poems is usually a high 
one. Despite personal and political animosity, Hazlitt recognized the imagina-
tive power of Wordsworth's "immediate intercourse" with sensory nature, 
his consequent kinship with "the great artists of old," and his unique ex-
cellence in his own time. 
But this imaginative excellence, Hazlitt believes, has been pulled up 
short of fulfillment, and therefore lacks the dramatic invention that the 
greatest poetry requires. If Hazlitt's estimate of Wordsworth is high, it is 
also discriminating. Wordsworth shares the fault that, in general at least, 
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gives his contemporaries the lowest place on Hazlitt's scale. Hazlitt's case 
against contemporary poetry rests on the various kinds o£ egotism that per-
verted reason or—what is more important to Hazlitt—blocked the imagina-
tion. He objects to the "literary Jacobinism" of Landor and Southey, to the 
intrusion of political ideas by Shelley and Godwin and of metaphysics by 
Coleridge, to Wordsworth's choice of materials remote from general ex-
perience and interest, and to the structural defects of.paradox: interpretation, 
needless interpolation, dramatic impropriety, lack of variety, and slightness 
of action. Hazlitt nevertheless takes account of Wordsworth's "ideal" but 
undramatic structure in "Laodamia." Hazlitt's ideas of structure are 
obviously less sophisticated and less comprehensive than those that have be-
come current in this century, but they are sound and fundamental. 
Hazlitt is always searching literature for the kind of truth that duplicates 
nature; but, at the same time, his respect for the truth of nature (imagina-
tively molded, but undistorted by the merely personal) leads to his high 
regard for the kind of poetry that has broken free from the poet himself. 
This freedom is most complete when the structure is most completely dra-
matic. There is nothing contradictory in this emphasis on both the truth 
of nature and poetic structure. The poet's imagination can embrace the 
truth of nature only when unhampered by any sort of egotism, for truth 
requires complete self-fulfillment—intellectual, emotional, and moral—and, 
if the process of association leading to this fulfillment is blocked by pre-
conceived ideas or other forms of self-regard, the highest truth will not be 
attained. Thus the process of imagination and artistic creation proceeds 
simultaneously toward two goals, each dependent on the other: the complete-
ness of self-fulfillment and its counterpart in organic yet objective form 
wherein "profound sentiments" are realized in images, characters, and in-
cidents of the most pleasing and striking kind. Only then is the poet's in-
vention rich enough to embody profound sentiments. 
Nor is there any inconsistency between Hazlitt's revolutionary political 
doctrine and his repudiation of this doctrine as material for poetry. Any 
doctrine, egotistically insisted on, aborts the imaginative completeness that 
Hazlitt makes the basis of both aesthetic and political achievement, a process 
that integrates the individual—and, ideally, society—emotionally, intellect-
ually, and morally. Successful literature, therefore, cannot help being politi-
cally and socially useful, and there can be no basic conflict between humani-
tarian goals and poetic achievement. If Hazlitt is guilty of a paradox, it is 
one that his job as a political writer made difficult to avoid, for the urgency 
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of writing on current issues puts negative capability to a bitter test. Of course, 
negative capability is a condition of imaginative writing only; but Hazlitt's 
political essays are rarely, if ever, addressed to consequitive reasoners. Since, 
to combat the "cold, philosophic indifference" of his opponents,38 Hazlitt 
exploits all the resources of literature, his political writings become imagina-
tive works into which he rushes with ideas as demonstratively preconceived 
as Shelley's and Southey's. 
Yet, as positive as Hazlitt may be on basic principles, almost the whole 
body of his political writing aims at the negation of political actions that 
he thought would further restrict the people's rights. He opposed Poor-Law 
reform, for instance, because—inadequate as the Poor Laws were—he be-
lieved that in the current political atmosphere of selfishness and greed any 
legislative action would hurt the working classes more than it would help 
them. Hazlitt is more like Arnold than a first glance might suggest. Before 
right was ready, he thought, he could do no more in a practical way than 
to stand off further wrongs. Politically as well as aesthetically, he urges 
disinterestedness: the sympathetic identification that is needed for imagina-
tive fulfillment. This is clear in Hazlitt's political writings. Among his 
critical essays it is clearest in his criticism of Wordsworth, the chief poet 
of paradox. 
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Browning's Use of Historical Sources in Strafford 
by HAROLD OREL 
The obstinacy with which Robert Browning pursued an unsuccessful 
play-writing career, even at" some expense to his personal fortune, is a remark-
able aspect of his life. His plays failed to attract large audiences. Some of 
them were not produced during his lifetime, and Luria—so far as I know— 
has never been performed. A Soul's Tragedy, though not meant for the stage, 
was cast in the form of a play, and the London Stage Society's production of 
it in 1904 confirmed the dismal general impression of the poet's "dramas." 
Why, then, did Browning persist for so long? 
When Browning responded to William Charles Macready's invitation to 
write a play and keep the actor-producer from going to America,1 he was 
undoubtedly hoping to elevate the dreary standards of early nineteenth-
century drama. A clash in personalities soon indicated to Macready that 
Browning was ignorant of, and perhaps unsympathetic toward, the available 
resources and needs of the contemporary stage.2 Browning, like Tennyson 
(who, later in the century, entertained an ambition to supplement Shake-
speare's cycle of historical plays), never learned to write plays that would 
satisfy both his own standards as a poet and the tastes of Victorian audiences. 
Later admirers of Browning have ignored his plays3 in favor of his nar-
rative, dramatic, and lyric poems. For Browning, a failure to do as much as 
he thought possible to do was frustrating enough; but he never knew objec-
tively how well he had done. His wife's evaluations of the worth of his 
plays influenced him greatly; but she never saw their virtues in quite the 
same way as he did, and, in general, she did not approve of his play-writing. 
The aim of this paper is to look more closely at Strafford, the first of 
Browning's seven essays at conventional dramatic form (five dramas and 
two "closet pieces" over a ten-year period), and in some ways the most in-
teresting experiment he ever carried through. Macready, who at first doubted 
that it would be successful, worked hard to stage it. During the final re-
hearsals his hopes rose higher than the event justified; but the play was not 
a disaster, and Macready's respectable production turned it into a moderate, 
and limited, success. His editorial work on subsequent plays submitted to 
him by Browning was more rough-shod, even brutal, and Strafford as a text 
is certainly closer to what Browning intended than A Blot in the 'Scutcheon, 
which Macready produced after proposing cuts that ran to approximately 25 
per cent of the play, and certainly a better play than The Return of the 
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Druses, which Macready, out of patience, finally refused to produce. If any 
of Browning's plays deserves study, it is Strafford. 
Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, was an English historical figure 
of some complexity, even ambiguity, who moved with a dignified and noble 
eloquence toward his premature death. Browning depended for most of his 
facts on John Forster's Life, which appeared in 1836 as Volume II of Lives 
of Eminent British Statesmen in The Cabinet Cyclopaedia. F. J. Furnivall 
claimed, in the 1892 reprint published under the auspices of the London 
Browning Society, that Browning had contributed a great deal to the writing 
of Forster's Life; but William Clyde DeVane doubts, with some justice, that 
Browning's collaboration was quite so extensive.4 Browning probably con-
tributed his help more in the way of interpretations than in the way of actual 
phraseology, and most likely after all the materials had been collected. These 
materials were to be found in the article in Biographia Britannic a; in the 
life in Macdiarmid's British Statesmen; in Sir George Radcliffe's memoir; 
and in the selection from Strafford's letters published by Dr. Knowler in 
1739. Indeed, as the historian C. H. Firth remarked in the London Browning 
Society reprint, a biographer of Strafford in 1836 had a larger amount of 
information at his disposal than in the case of any other statesman of the 
seventeenth century. 
What Browning wrote of the history cannot be known at this late date. 
FurnivalPs assumption that Browning ought to have most of the credit 
depends, in part, on remarks that the poet made to him on three separate 
occasions; and in part on a feeling that certain passages are in the poet's 
idiom. But Furnivall admits that he never inquired directly as to just how 
much Browning contributed. We do know that Forster made the full collec-
tions and extracts, and since the stage at which the poet was asked to assume 
the final editing remains unspecified, the reprinting of Forster's biographical 
sketch as Robert Browning's Prose Life of Strafford seems unwarranted. 
Firth's severe strictures against Browning as historian have remained 
unchallenged for some seven decades. Forster's illness certainly contributed 
to the haste and inadequacy of the memoir, and the evidence, as Firth re-
marked, was "in many respects defective."5 Historians might well object to 
a point of view that interpreted Strafford's motives on the basis of two cen-
turies of hindsight. After all, 1836 is not 1632, and Strafford was not a party 
man; in brief, his character did not drastically change when he deserted the 
popular party, and his conduct is only superficially explained by such phrases 
as "the development of the aristocratic principle" and "the intensity of the 
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aristocratic principle." Firth's censure is based upon the belief that Strafford 
regarded as compatible "the liberties of the people and the prerogative of 
the Crown" 6 and that the King (rather than Parliament) would be the 
natural ally of a reformer. 
But the indictment does not end there. Browning's sketchy knowledge of 
the first half of the seventeenth century, and the meager documentation for 
Strafford's earlier career, contributed to some misleading chiaroscuro. The 
poet, argues Firth, unfairly minimized the value of Wentworth's work in 
Ireland; the restoration of order, the establishment of a reign of impartial 
justice, and the increase of material prosperity were all accomplished under 
Strafford's reign, even if the minister used force freely and argued that the 
end justified the means. Browning failed to consult the Hardwicke State 
Papers, the Clarendon State Papers, and Rushworth for the information he 
needed about the fourteen months that followed Strafford's return to Eng-
land (September 22, 1639). He attributed to Strafford several mistresses— 
Lady Carlisle, Lady Carnarvon, and Lady Loftus—on "very insufficient 
evidence," and, in the case of Lady Carnarvon, "entirely . . . on a confusion 
of names." 7 He criticized Strafford's behavior toward his third wife, but, 
Firth remarks, nobody really knows much about the circumstances of the 
marriage. 
Now these are serious charges, even though, as I have sought to show, 
Browning's degree of culpability is conjectural, and even though, as I per-
sonally believe, Firth's faith in the objectivity of "true history" leads one to 
inquire whether the phrase is not an oxymoron. It may well be impossible 
to remain unaffected by the assumptions of one's own age, despite the fact 
that one may recognize and deplore them. But Browning's dilemma is worth 
considering in more detail, for, even when we grant the literary and dra-
matic failings of Strafford, the charge that the events of the play constitute 
a faulty reading of history, and are based upon a similarly faulty historical 
memoir, will not bear up under examination. 
Strafford as a play differs in several significant respects from the memoir 
that both Forster and Browning wrote. (Firth acknowledged the existence 
of these differences, but failed to stress their dramatic usefulness to Brown-
ing.) For example, Strafford in the memoir is not mentioned as intending to 
accuse Pym and his associates of maintaining clandestine relations with the 
rebels, and encouraging them to bring a Scottish army into England; in the 
play the accusation becomes an effective moment in Act III, Scene ii. Straf-
ford's trial is unusual (in history) because of the change of procedure from 
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impeachment to attainder; Firth argues that the importance of this change 
is "inadequately appreciated" by Browning and that the facts are not cor-
rectly told; but the speeches of Vane and Pym in Act IV, Scene ii, emphasize 
the true meaning of the change. Vane, for example, denounces the new 
course of action: 
Consider, Pym! 
Confront your Bill, your own Bill: what is it? 
You cannot catch the Earl on any charge,— 
No man will say the law has hold of him 
On any charge; and therefore you resolve 
To take the general sense on his desert, 
As though no law existed, and we met 
To found one. You refer to Parliament 
To speak its thought upon the abortive mass 
Of half-borne-out assertions, dubious hints 
Hereafter to be cleared, distortions—ay, 
And wild inventions. Every man is saved 
The task of fixing any single charge 
On Strafford: he has but to see in him 
The enemy of England. 8 
Pym's defense, belligerently given, provides a measure of the passions which 
Strafford's conduct under the King's protection stirred up: 
By this, we roll the clouds away 
Of precedent and custom, and at once 
Bid the great beacon-light God sets in all, 
The conscience of each bosom, shine upon 
The guilt of Strafford: each man lay his hand 
Upon his breast, and judge! 9 
A reader may well ask whether Strafford's sense of betrayal, after receipt 
of the news that the King had signed the Bill, is communicated by the his-
torically probable, "My body is theirs, but my soul is God's. There is little 
trust in man; God may yet, if it please him, deliver me," or the poetically 
brilliant, 
Put not your trust 
In princes, neither in the sons of men, 
In whom is no salvation!1 0 
In at least one case, Firth's literal reading of the primary source seems 
less convincing than the interpretation provided by either the memoir or the 
play. During the trial Pym's peroration in defense of the law which was to 
result in Strafford's condemnation concluded with the statement, "There are 
2 6 
HISTORICAL SOURCES IN Strafford 
marks enough to trace this law to the very original o£ this kingdom; and if 
it hath not been put in execution, as he allegeth, this 240 years, it was not for 
want of a law, but that all that time hath not bred a man bold enough to 
commit such crimes as these!" At this moment, according to Forster and 
Browning (quoting Baillie), "Strafford had been closely and earnestly 
watching Pym, when the latter, suddenly turning, met the fixed and wasted 
features of his early associate. A rush of other feelings crowding into that 
look for a moment dispossessed him. 'His papers he looked on,' says Baillie, 
'but they could not help him to a point or two, so he behooved to pass them.' 
But a moment, and Pym's eloquence and dignified command returned." 
Browning recaptures this moment in Act IV, Scene ii, when the spectators 
of the trial, in a passage adjoining Westminster Hall, are startled by Pym's 
momentary faltering at the moment he beholds Strafford's face : 
There! 
What ails him? No—he rallies, see—goes on, 
And Strafford smiles. Strange! 1 1 
Firth admits that the incident is dramatic, but argues that all the authorities 
say is, that during Pym's answer to Strafford's defense his memory for a 
moment failed him. 1 2 However, there is no real evidence for or against this 
"striking incident," and Browning's interpretation is both imaginative and 
plausible. 
The major value of Firth's analysis is that it notes the existence of a real 
willingness on Browning's part to go along with the judgment of Strafford's 
contemporaries: to judge the statesman with too great harshness, but to treat 
the personal characteristics and the private life with great fairness (though 
even here, Firth hastens to add, there are occasional errors and omissions in 
his sketch). The major defect is that it unsympathetically rejects any reading 
of the data that the primary sources do not explicitly provide; as a young 
historian in his thirty-fifth year, Firth had not yet developed the broader 
perspective of his later studies of the Protectorate. That another view of 
Browning's achievement can be held may be seen in R. S. Gardiner's state-
ment that this is a poet's conception of Strafford's life: "Yes, it makes mistakes 
in facts and dates, but it has got the man—in the main." 1 3 
For the moment, let us suspend judgment on the somewhat arid question 
whether Strafford is historically convincing, and investigate the means by 
which Browning established the nature and intensity of Parliament's opposi-
tion to Strafford. 
The case against Strafford was a complicated one. He was the King's man, 
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and as such represented the principle of autocratic whim which could not 
be directly touched by those who most hated it. Since Charles was notoriously 
unstable in his policies, and could be swayed by those near him who urged 
their policies with greatest eloquence, revenge against the royal power could 
be taken only by a crippling blow delivered against his favorite. That Charles 
failed to understand the true direction of Parliament's hatred when he 
agreed to allow Parliament to strike down his loyal minister proved one of 
the final ironies of his unhappy career. 
But Strafford personally was a difficult man to love. Sir Henry Vane— 
who had ample cause not to admire him—cited several reasons why his 
adversary had become dangerous and untrustworthy in the decade since he 
last sat with the Faction. 
. . . when I think on all that's past 
Since that man left us, how his single arm 
Rolled the advancing good of England back 
And set the woeful past up in its place, 
Exalting Dagon where the Ark should be,— 
How that man has made firm the fickle King 
(Hampden, I will speak out!)—in aught he feared 
To venture on before; taught tyranny 
Her dismal trade, the use of all her tools, 
To ply the scourge yet screw the gag so close 
That strangled agony bleeds mute to death— 
How he turns Ireland to a private stage 
For training infant villainies, new ways 
Of wringing treasure out of tears and blood 
Vane's argument was a compelling one; no man knew what Wentworth 
dared, what the King was capable of doing now that his favorite had re-
turned from Ireland (where he had been carrying out his policy of 
Thorough), or how the unpopular policies of Hamilton, Cottington, and 
Laud might yet—in Rudyard's words—"be longed-for back again." 
Hence, the first of the four problems that Browning had to resolve before 
Strafford could become dramatically viable may be stated thus: the issues 
responsible for the Civil War were too complicated, and the number of years 
involved too great, for any balanced review of the historical evidence. Quite 
apart from the question of whether Macready's audience wanted such a re-
view in the theatre, the two hours' traffic of the stage made it necessary for 
him to create in John Pym Strafford's fearsome antagonist, and, as a con-
sequence, to oversimplify or ignore such issues as the Petition of Right; the 
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payment of ship-money; the complicated relationship of Scotland to both 
the Crown and the Faction; the degree to which Wentworth personally 
profited from the conversion of Ireland to an Aceldama (although Lady 
Carlisle dared to mention the popular unrest over his profit in the Customs, 
I, i i ) ; the twelve subsidies which the King demanded; the contents of the 
indictment drawn up against the Earl; and the damning notes which Vane 
sent to Pym, sealing Strafford's fate. This concentration on personality has 
recently been deplored by H. B. Charlton, and the essay in which Charlton 
makes his case against Browning's lack of interest in social institutions and 
social organization is a powerful one. 1 5 Nevertheless, if choice had to be 
made and some elements stressed at the expense of others, Pym's fanatical 
determination to crush Strafford is surely the most dramatic single element 
Browning could have seized upon. 
Pym's greatness is never in question, from the moment he announces to 
his followers at the house near Whitehall: 
Heaven grows dark above: 
Let's snatch one moment ere the thunder fall, 
To say how well the English spirit comes out 
Beneath it! ( I , i ) 1 6 
to the final terrible confrontation of Strafford : 
This is no meeting, Wentworth! Tears increase 
Too hot. A thin mist—is it blood?—enwraps 
The face I loved once. (V, i i ) 1 7 
He walks with God, and listens to the voice of England, which speaks to 
him and commands him: 
England,—I am thine own! Dost thou exact 
That service? I obey thee to the end. 1 8 
His is the final complete triumph. Strafford's moment of humiliation in 
III, ii, when the aging and betrayed Earl must kneel before Pym at the bar, 
"standing apart," prefigures that extraordinary scene in which Pym, a minis-
ter of the Lord, humiliates Charles by warning him that even kings stand 
in need of human aid: 
I thought, sir, could I find myself with you, 
After this trial, alone, as man to man— 
I might say something, warn you, pray you, save— 
Mark me, King Charles, save—you! 
But God must do it. Yet I warn you, sir— 
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(With Strafford's faded eyes yet full on me) 
As you would have no deeper question moved 
—"How long the Many must endure the One," 
Assure me, sir, if England give assent 
To Strafford's death, you will not interfere! 
Or— (IV, h i ) 1 9 
Against such a threat Charles, never famous during his reign for the neces-
sary wisdom that at least might have delayed his downfall, can only accede: 
God forsakes me. I am in a net 
And cannot move. Let all be as you say! 2 0 
Yet only moments before, in pleading with Pym for a more merciful treat-
ment of Strafford, Charles had enumerated all the reasons that should have 
made such a surrender unthinkable: Strafford's friendship for him, his 
knowledge that he had wronged his minister, his awareness that some in the 
kingdom believe Strafford saved him, Strafford's pride, and even Strafford's 
"wife and children, household cares . . . ." Before Pym's glaring eye (a 
moment of theatre that a fine actor will exploit) Charles's courage, such as 
it is, evaporates. 
Browning's characterization of Pym is enriched by that very element 
Firth found so distracting: Pym's belief that Strafford had committed an 
act of apostasy. Pym confesses early to Vane that he can never quite forget 
his friend (I, i) ; 2 1 accuses Wentworth of selling his soul for a title, and in 
a moment of deep emotion calls him "ancient brother of my soul" (I, ii) ; 2 2 
and hopes for the best when Charles dissolves the Parliament: 
Strafford is ours. The King detects the change, 
Casts Strafford off forever, and resumes 
His ancient path: no Parliament for us, 
No Strafford for the King! (II, i ) 2 3 
He proves mistaken, and his personal shock is well communicated by a 
speech made during his next encounter with the man he believes a Judas: 
Do I affect 
To see no dismal sign above your head 
When God suspends his ruinous thunder there ? 
Strafford is doomed. Touch him no one of you! (II, i i ) 2 4 
From this moment he determines to destroy his former friend, his political 
ally, the man he loved above all others. No niceties of conscience about the 
Bill of Attainder, no objections raised by Rudyard, Fiennes, or Vane, can 
move his hardened heart. When Fiennes says, "I never thought it could have 
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come to this," Pym's answer is a solemn charge of duty to an inner light: 
But I have made myself familiar, Fiennes, 
With this one thought—have walked, and sat, and slept, 
This thought before me. I have done such things, 
Being the chosen man that should destroy 
The traitor. (IV, i i ) 2 5 
At the very moment that Stafford, embittered by the fullness of his knowl-
edge of the King's weakness of character, opens the door that leads to the 
river and the escape that Lady Carlisle has planned for him, Pym's entrance 
signifies the futility of Strafford's hope for a successful flight to France. It 
is a speech of superb rightness that Pym makes: it is the speech that Pym, 
in terms of the man he has revealed himself to be, must make at play's end: 
Have I done well? Speak, England! Whose sole sake 
I still have labored for, with disregard 
To my own heart,—for whom my youth was made 
Barren, my manhood waste, to offer up 
Her sacrifice—this friend, this Wentworth here— 
Who walked in youth with me, loved me, it may be, 
And whom, for his forsaking England's cause, 
I hunted by all means (trusting that she 
Would sanctify all means) even to the block 
Which waits for him 
I do leave him now. 
I render up my charge (be witness, God!) 
T o England who imposed it 
I never loved but one man—David not 
More Jonathan! Even thus, I love him now: 
And look for my chief portion in that world 
Where great hearts led astray are turned again (V, i i ) 2 6 
The complicated reasons that make any statesman's action controversial, im-
possible to treat definitively, are masterfully handled in this speech: the self-
dramatizing and the self-pity, the invocation of a nation's need as greater 
than personal ties, the hopelessly commingled cant and sincerity of the suc-
cessful demagogue, are all here. Pym becomes in several ways the most 
dynamic, fully explored human being of Browning's play; he is everywhere 
credible, and on occasion even awe-inspiring. 
The second major difficulty confronting Browning as he reviewed the 
historical documentation was this: Stafford needed to tal\ to someone who 
could sympathize with his secret thoughts. The record provided no con-
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venient confidant. Away in Ireland for so many years, Wentworth had lost 
contact with those who had been his former allies. Charles, on whose good 
offices Strafford's fate depended, was not the logical choice; if Strafford had 
had free access to the King during his final year, the trial would never have 
developed as it did. Browning was clearly puzzled by the dearth of informa-
tion about Strafford's relationship to his third wife, Elizabeth, daughter of 
Sir Godfrey Rhodes, and preferred not to speculate about it to the extent 
that Forster's memoir had done. But it was essential that Strafford, beset on 
all sides by enemies eager to see him down, should devise counter-strategy 
lest his case become merely pathetic (Browning, after all, subtitled his play 
"A Tragedy"). The choice of Lady Carlisle, a great woman of the court, 
friend of both the King and Queen, a wit and beauty who appealed to the 
imaginations of contemporary poets, was understandable. To her Strafford 
could pour out his resentment against Charles's shabby treatment of him; 
from her he could learn of the sitting of the Council and its deliberations on 
Scotland; with her he could rejoice at the prospect of complete triumph as 
soon as he revealed the conspiracy of Bedford, Essex, Brooke, Warwick, 
Savile, Saye, Mandeville, and Pym to bring a Scots army into England. It 
does not matter that most of what he says is foredoomed, unrealistic rhetoric 
in a whirlwind: we as spectators must know what is in his mind, and Lady 
Carlisle, as confidante, affords us that opportunity. 
But even more: Browning suggests, with an astonishing delicacy of 
treatment, that Lady Carlisle loved Strafford, and forebore to reveal it be-
cause of her respect, however grudging, for his greater love for the King. She 
could not lure him 
from a love like that! 
Oh, let him love the King and die! 'Tis past. 
I shall not serve him worse for that one brief 
And passionate hope, silent forever now! (II, i i ) 2 7 
Her role remains essentially passive throughout most of the play—she does 
not even inform him of the fact that he has been impeached—for what she 
exhorts Strafford to do, his character and the tides of history forbid him to 
accomplish. When, finally, she sets in motion the plan for his escape, she 
insists that credit be given Charles. 
Prove the King faithless, and I take away 
All Strafford cares to live for: let it be— 
'Tis the King's scheme! (IV, i ) 2 S 
This failure of Strafford to recognize either the depth or the quality of Lady 
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Carlisle's devotion is consistently developed. His wondering question, "You 
love me, child?" (V, i i ) , 2 9 is simply a final inquiry about the love of a 
follower. That Browning refused to believe that Lady Carlisle was Strafford's 
mistress—Forster's memoir is more speculative on this whole matter of 
Strafford's private life—testifies to a considered judgment on the poet's part. 
Indeed, the restraint of Lady Carlisle in disclosing her unworthy love for a 
man who has consecrated himself to another cause is one of Browning's 
finer touches of characterization. 
The third problem was that Charles, a man who unerringly did the wrong 
thing, had to be presented as a \ing worthy of Strafford's love. On this score 
Browning's success was more limited. The historical facts show a King 
determined to throw away his crown, and—alienated by Charles the reckless 
monarch—Browning's sympathies were not enlisted by Charles the human 
being. Vane's accusation, 
. . . it may be fear or craft, 
As bids him pause at each fresh outrage (I, i ) , 3 0 
is unperceptive; a third explanation, stupidity, suggests itself more readily 
on the basis of Charles's vacillations within the play. When the King confers 
an earldom on Strafford, he declares that "henceforth touching Strafford 
is/To touch the apple of my sight"; but minutes later he can scarcely tell 
the Queen that the calling of the Irish Parliament was Strafford's idea rather 
than his own, and he regards as enlightened statecraft his decision to "buy 
the leaders off" (I, i i ) . 3 1 Swayed by Vane's reasoning, without consulting 
Strafford, he rejects the six subsidies that the English Parliament has offered, 
demanding twelve subsidies or nothing, and when Strafford points out to 
him the enormity of the mistake he has committed, shifts the blame to "old 
Vane's ill-judged vehemence." 3 2 He slanders Strafford by accusing him of 
having advised the war, which is now going badly; 3 3 and when Pym, Hamp-
den, and Vane enter for an explanation of why he has dissolved the Parlia-
ment, willingly allows Strafford to shoulder the responsibility for having ad-
vised the action. 3 4 His inordinate delay in defending the man whom Hollis 
rightly calls "the sole roof-tree/Which props this quaking House of Privi-
lege" 3 5 is appalling testimony to his executive abilities, as are his incoherent, 
emotional schemes to incite Percy to fall on the Parliament with an army, 
thereby freeing Strafford and (presumably) ending popular discontent.36 His 
crumbling before Pym's demand that he sign the Bill of Attainder is of 
a piece with the childish disguise by which he enters the Tower of London 
to gaze upon his handiwork, a discredited and dying Strafford. And Brown-
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ing, in giving to Charles a final speech of foredoomed bravura, may have 
been thinking of Shakespeare's Richard II : 
The Parliament!—go to them: I grant all 
Demands. Their sittings shall be permanent: 
Tell them to keep their money if they will: 
I'll come to them for every coat I wear 
And every crust I eat: only I choose 
To pardon Strafford. As the Queen shall choose! 
—You never heard the People howl for blood, 
Beside! ( V , i i ) 3 7 
But to understand why Strafford should love such a man, one must 
recognize the full dimensions of Browning's dilemma; for the fourth prob-
lem faced by the poet, working with the life he and Forster had written, 
was simply this: Strafford, acting as minister to a King who continually be-
trayed him, could have been under no illusions about Charles s character; 
his decision to remain loyal insured his death; reasons had to be found to 
ma\e such a decision convincing. These reasons were not in the public or 
private records of the seventeenth century, and Browning had to reconstruct 
imaginatively the process of reasoning whereby a glintingly sardonic intelli-
gence could subscribe itself wholly to Charles's cause. 
One matter of some concern to this play is Strafford's health. Although 
only forty-six when he returned to England, Thomas Wentworth was known 
to be a very sick man. Pym, announcing his arrival, strikes the note: 
Wentworth's come: nor sickness, care, 
The ravaged body nor the ruined soul, 
More than the winds and waves that beat his ship, 
Could keep him from the King. (I, i ) 3 8 
Wentworth knows the truth about the condition of his health. Speaking to 
Lady Carlisle, he resolves to remain calm. 
How else shall I do all I come to do, 
Broken, as you may see, body and mind, 
How shall I serve the King ? Time wastes meanwhile. . . . 
(i,u)39 
Even Charles, alarmed by Strafford's appearance, urges his minister to spare 
himself: "You are so sick, they tell me." (I, i i ) 4 0 The Queen sneers, after his 
departure, "Why, he looks yellower than ever!" (Ibid.)*1 One of the more 
touching, and quietly beautiful, moments of the play materializes when 
Strafford, about to leave for the Scottish War, speaks to Lady Carlisle thus: 
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I shall make a sorry soldier, Lucy! 
All knights begin their enterprise, we read, 
Under the best of auspices; 'tis morn, 
The Lady girds his sword upon the Youth 
(He's always very young)—the trumpets sound, 
Cups pledge him, and, why, the King blesses him— 
You need not turn a page of the romance 
To learn the Dreadful Giant's fate. Indeed, 
We've the fair Lady here; but she apart,— 
A poor man, rarely having handled lance, 
And rather old, weary, and far from sure 
His Squires are not the Giant's friends. (II, i i ) 4 2 
Another such moment comes in V, ii, when Strafford, sitting with his 
children, sings to them an Italian boat-song; the autumnal mood leads to 
reminiscences of Venice, which Strafford visited when he was young, and to 
reflections on the caprices of Fame and Time. 
There is, in brief, a sense of irrevocable commitment about Strafford's be-
havior. He has used up his energies; little enough is left for what Charles 
needs; and when Charles, stung by a reproof, asks whether Strafford is 
being disrespectful, his minister's answer is illuminating: 
My liege, do not believe it! I am yours, 
Yours ever: 'tis too late to think about: 
To the death, yours. (II, i i ) 4 3 
This belief that wasting time, or the frailties of flesh, may interfere with 
duty, is very strong in Strafford. Neither Lady Carlisle nor John Pym can 
understand it fully; hence their efforts to make Strafford change his course; 
hence his rebuffs of what, after all, is kindly meant. He never seriously con-
siders the possibility of deviating from his course. It is too late to thin\ about. 
He is convinced that only he can save Charles: 
I have no right to hide the truth. 'Tis I 
Can save you: only I. (I, i i ) 4 4 
The knowledge of impending death from natural causes underscores his 
urgency. 
The fact that Charles is unworthy of such allegiance does not escape 
Strafford, and indeed the play resounds with Strafford's denunciations of the 
King's caprices. "You know him," he says sadly to Lady Carlisle at one point, 
"there's no counting on the King." (Ill , i i ) 4 5 At another moment, impas-
sioned with fury, he tears off the Order of the Garter and cries, "I tread a 
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gewgaw underfoot,/And cast a memory from me." (I l l , i i i ) 4 6 But at the last 
he finds it in himself to forgive, even to ask forgiveness from, the King: 
I had forgotten 
Your education, trials, much temptation, 
Some weakness: there escaped a peevish word— 
'Tis gone: I bless you at the last. (V, i i ) 4 7 
He will not flee for his own sake, for that of Lady Carlisle or of his children; 
but for the King, for that "awful head," yes, he will open the door, knowing 
that before him lies "something ominous and dark,/Fatal, inevitable."4 8 He 
is the King's to the death. 
Perhaps Browning's explanation, which amounts to the hypothesis that 
Strafford's illness made any other course of action impossible, and at least 
kept consistent and whole a foolish faith, is not wholly convincing; but it 
does not contradict known facts, and, like the answers that Browning worked 
out to his other problems in dramatizing Strafford's fate, it may be the best 
that any dramatist can come up with. Browning's use of his historical sources, 
taken all in all, is enlightened and at times brilliant. It is certainly better than 
Firth gave it credit for being. 
The failings of Strafford as a play are manifest enough: the assumption 
that a nineteenth-century audience is deeply conversant with the events of 
a troubled, complex period some two centuries earlier; the irritating man-
nerism whereby one speaker finishes the sentence of an earlier speaker, and 
in turn has his sentence finished for him by a third speaker; the compact 
imagery which must frequently militate against effective elocution and 
stage business; the confusingly compressed passage of time; and the nagging 
suspicion of Strafford's unheroic stature that most readers will have. But 
that Browning's interpretation of Strafford's life traduces history is not an 
additional failing to be marked against the play. A sympathetic reading can 
hardly fail to confirm Browning's own judgment, contained in his preface 
to the first edition: "The portraits are, I think, faithful " 4 9 
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Liberalism and the Political Philosophy 
of Thomas Hill Green 
by WALTER E . SANDELIUS 
The importance of Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882), the principal philos-
opher of English liberalism during the late nineteenth century, has not been 
adequately estimated.1 Of course Green's influence upon subsequent political 
thinkers, both within Great Britain and beyond, has not escaped notice. It is 
well enough known that the democratic version of philosophic idealism has 
been largely indebted to the career, outwardly unexciting though it was, 
of this Oxford don. Yet current materialist ideologies have somewhat ob-
scured his significance. 
No word employed in political debate has been the subject of more con-
fused controversy than liberalism. In recent time, from both right and left 
this flag, as representing one point of view or another, has been either dis-
counted or violently attacked. Liberalism of the Utilitarian phase, it may 
appear from what follows, has in part deserved the criticism from the right, 
however unthinking and ill-informed much of this has been. On the other 
side, one like Harold Laski, influential socialist of the parliamentary kind 
that he was, regarded liberalism as a dead doctrine. How far did he take 
account of T . H. Green? 
I. LIBERALISM IN GENERAL AND THE ENGLISH REVISED VERSION 
Liberalism, it has been said, is a temper of mind rather than a doctrine. 
Yet a temper of mind may also have its rationale. Some clarity about funda-
mentals is important in time of crisis. Liberalism is a faith in reason and the 
uses of reason, a faith colored, as Morris Cohen said, "with a deep humility 
before the vision of a world so much larger than our human hopes and 
thoughts. If there are those who have no use for the word 'faith' they may 
fairly define liberalism as a rationalism that is rational enough to envisage 
the limitations of mere reasoning." Liberalism is a freeing, not only of mind, 
but of man's being. It was identified in the nineteenth century with the 
after-effects of the French Revolution, with representative government, the 
English Reform Bill, the growth of suffrage, civil liberties, the expansion of 
economic opportunity through the repeal of privilege; but it may be traced 
back to earlier elements of the Western heritage. Personal dignity and "the 
fair chance" were common objectives of the repeal of laws at the beginning, 
and of the passage of laws at the end, of the nineteenth century. Adam Smith 
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and Jeremy Bentham had sought repeal of laws; the later revisionist liberal-
ism advocated repeal of privilege through a measured extension of the state. 
Some sort of social law it is that the status quo (whatever for the time it is, 
whether a maximizing or a minimizing of the state) brings cumulative ad-
vantage to those who have the priorities. The persisting need for a continu-
ing correction of the inequities that afford undue advantage to the successful 
and the strong, priorities that enable mediocrity at length to become en-
sconced in privilege, involves the state. Revisionist liberalism demanded 
more responsibility from the state, lest the enlarging collectivist orders in 
the so-called private sector take undue advantage of the public. Liberalism 
in modern times has made common cause at first with the middle class, 
increasingly with democracy and the common man. 
Throughout Locke's philosophy of natural right, the anti-natural-law 
utilitarianism of Bentham and the Mills, and the religious idealism of 
Green persists the idea of individual right. These doctrines employ reason. 
While questioning all absolutes they do not do so to the end of concluding 
simply that no abiding truths or values exist. 
Green differed, however, from both Locke and the Benthamites in their 
basic premises. Green revived thinking about natural law in the context of a 
new dynamic. Bentham had supposed this doctrine to have been demolished 
by Hume; but finding that job not well enough done he directed his own 
sledge-hammer blows against it. Yet the utilitarians too were agreed that, 
however valuable their aim of liberating man to use reason freely and of 
subjecting to its scrutiny all established orders, rules, and authorities, it is not 
enough to say that liberalism is a faith only in method and procedure. 
One cannot believe in freedom of inquiry except on the prior assumption of 
the right to life itself. Nor is mere life worth having if it be not a tolerable 
life. The right to life, and to the good life, is not merely procedural but 
substantive right. 
The idea that not mere life but the good life is the summary end of the 
state goes back to the ancient Greeks. So do many of the ideas of modern 
liberalism. Oriental monarchies had ruled largely through fear, and had im-
posed conformity; but Greek merchant adventurers before the sixth century 
B. C, Greek scientists and philosophers from Thales to Aristotle, left after 
them their legacies of the free life, despite their institution of slavery and 
class structures. This inheritance persists. The freedom of inquiry, the at-
tendant growth of toleration, the habit of initiative, the conception of in-
dividual right and the regard for human personality, the enforcement of a 
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rule of law by the community itself, the anticipated creativity—these are 
constituents of the liberal way. 
The deeper elements of this civil tradition, "the public philosophy" as 
it is called by Walter Lippmann, may not be clearly seen. Its intellectual 
foundations, though not the humanitarian element by and large, were 
largely lost to view in the Utilitarian School. That English liberalism was 
brought back into the main stream of Western political thought was in large 
part the work of T . H. Green.2 Green, of course, did not return to the 
natural-law concepts of Locke—though he, too, has his share of responsi-
bility for the recent revival of Locke, as part of the opposition to modern 
excesses of relativism. He criticized the fixities in Locke's conception of 
rights. In a modern form he represents the tradition of the higher law, with 
its continuity of centuries. But more to the immediate point, he was to be-
come, more than did the J . S. Mill of the later phase, more than Herbert 
Spencer with his liberalist application of biological concepts, and more than 
the other philosophers of English idealism,3 the creative influence of the 
revised liberalism that today contends on the one hand against reaction, and 
on the other against the materialist ideology of Marx. 
II. FREEDOM, RIGHTS, AND MORALS 
Green's England is that of the 1870's onward. The Liberal Party, which 
had drawn its original inspiration from the Benthamite Radicals and their 
advocacy of a minimum of state regulation, already was supporting such 
measures as factory regulation, grants to education, sanitary laws, land-
tenure reform, and other extensions of the public power. Its dissatisfaction 
with the condition of the country and with the erstwhile policy of the nega-
tive state was much like the dissatisfaction of its leading exponent, J . S. Mill 
himself. Mill's thought in its later evolution was not systematically set forth. 
It fell to Green to supply a rationale for the changes in liberalism as both a 
movement and as a philosophy. This he was prepared to do by virtue of his 
natural sympathies with the middle class and with the poor, his place in the 
academic halls where so much of English political leadership has found its 
source and inspiration, his scholarly and tenacious mind, and his intense, 
lifelong pursuit of highest truth joined to a liking for practical politics in 
those various minor capacities which he found open to him. Not a few of 
the nation's leaders, who continued to come by way of Oxford as of old, 
were to be indebted to him. His influence upon subsequent English philoso-
phy and political thought, while not so conspicuous as that of others of less 
originality or depth, has persisted. 
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The state was a negative good to the Benthamites. It has been alleged at 
times that it was so also to Green and his followers. The reforms urged by 
Green in the practical sphere contradict this view. As much as any major, 
non-Marxist thinker in the English-speaking world, he stood for limitations 
upon the traditional freedom of contract, and did so in the interests of a 
larger freedom, factory regulation, temperance control, restricting abuses by 
landowners, and promotion of the health and education of the individual 
generally: "To an Athenian slave, who might be used to gratify a master's 
lust, it would have been a mockery to speak of the state as the realization of 
freedom: and perhaps it would not be much less so to speak of it as such to 
an untaught and underfed denizen of a London yard, with gin shops on 
the right and on the left." 4 Or again: "Our modern legislation, then, with 
reference to labour, and education and health, involving, as it does, mani-
fold interference with freedom of contract, is justified on the ground that it 
is the business of the State, not indeed directly to promote moral goodness, 
for that, from the very nature of moral goodness, it cannot do, but to main-
tain the conditions without which a free exercise of human faculties is im-
possible."5 
This, says Lane Lancaster, "sounds like an argument in philosophic lan-
guage for what Franklin Roosevelt called 'the abundant life,' and indeed it 
is." It is of importance that Green defended the institution of private prop-
erty, while elucidating limitations prescribed by the general welfare, and 
while believing also that the end of a free society is not "the accumulation 
of comforts." 
Utilitarian liberalism had developed a materialist philosophy to support 
a minimal state. The idealistic liberalism of the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century was, on the other hand, founded on the idea of a higher law which 
would enlist the service of the state to support a positive freedom, a freedom 
of self-realization through the good life. Green was religiously oriented. To 
him the state was a means to the end of moral goodness, a means whereby 
merely formal and real freedom, between liberty and law, between the in-
terest of the individual and the common good, could be reconciled. Moral 
goodness as the end of the state is of the essence of that which distinguishes 
man from the natural order—not merely reason but a kind of self-conscious-
ness, which, as seen by Green, has affinities with the Hegelian Absolute 
Mind. 
According to Green's metaphysic, man's self-consciousness is part of the 
universal self-consciousness; human limitations in what he understands and 
wills, exist, but he participates in the whole. Being human, he possesses rea-
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son and will; he is self-conscious man. To be conscious is to have an object 
for the reason and will. Among the objects of which man is conscious is 
himself. Apart from the object of his self-consciousness he has no existence 
as what he is. A self-consciousness must include both the subjective and the 
objective. Consciousness can in no wise be severed from its object. The con-
scious in man reaches out in some sense to the whole of the interrelated 
universe. The objective and the subjective are not severable; the objective is 
universal; it follows that man's self-consciousness, too, must be part of a 
universal self-consciousness. 
The object of the will can only be that which is thought good for the self. 
Green did not mean simply one's own pleasure. To have any awareness of 
the good of self is to be aware of the comparable good of others. Thus the 
universal self-consciousness can only be a concern with its own good. The 
true good of any partial self exists imbedded in the good of the whole. 
The good of the self may be envisioned in terms of freedom. No freedom 
can be without a responsible opportunity for choice. Moral being, consisting 
of the exercise of reason and will, can realize itself only through the making 
of choices such as promote the good. Green held with Kant that the one 
supreme good is the universal good will. Freedom for the idealist consists of 
life in accord with the moral law. This never can be rid of the necessity and 
the responsibility for choice between the better and the worse; there exists 
a standard of the good. Moral (as distinguished from ideal) right consists of 
the free choosing of what one ought to choose: the common good, the in-
dividual good, the universal good, ultimately as One. 
The opportunities of moral growth, however, depend also upon external 
circumstance. The liberty which is the direct concern of the state is that sum 
of inter-personal and inter-group relationships conducive to moral being. 
The state exists to remove the hindrances thereto. This is not to suggest a 
minimum of state action. But the state may not try to enter—it cannot enter 
—the moral sphere as such. It can at most "remove hindrances" to the exer-
cise of that responsible volition which makes a man what he is. Of the es-
sence of such "removal of hindrances" is the safeguarding and the promot-
ing of the equal opportunity to each, in accord with capacity and need. 
Men cannot be made good by act of parliament. The spring of morality, 
moreover, is the spring of man's spiritual nature. Yet this inner voice may 
manifest itself more or less strongly, depending upon limitations of the social 
milieu: the family, the state, and other group forms. Rights are conditions 
of the social interrelationship such as conduce to the moral good. At the 
same time, the ideal condition, while always greater than the mores, is a 
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potential implicit in the mores. Rights are not primordial as in the Lockean 
view, but teleological in the Aristotelian sense. Are they, then, eternal forms 
laid in heaven ? Green argues that what may be called a natural right has a 
changing content, and at the same time an enduring consistency. Are there 
not change and consistency, both, in all that lives? 
Freedom, while it is contingency, is also law. This is true of both political 
and moral freedom. Moral freedom, as already said, is premised on the op-
portunity of the individual to err, though he does not truly achieve freedom 
except insofar as he does not sin, that is, except insofar as he has the under-
standing and the will to be his best self. Political liberty is the opportunity 
extended by the social condition, and in turn enforced by the state, in pro-
portion to which the moral life may grow. Rights—though with the in-
dividual human being as the fundamental subject and object alike—are not 
thinkable except in a social context. Rights imply forbearance or obligation. 
Ideal right connotes that social condition that by its nature can be embodied 
in the mores. Thus, political liberty is opportunity subject to a social respon-
sibility: the best conceivable responsibility for each and all. The ideal is seen, 
ofttimes, more clearly by a lone protesting prophet than by the contentious 
many of a confused generation. 
Rights, however, are necessarily subject to social recognition. This point 
of Green's has been a stumbling block to some. If they are not rights until 
socially recognized, it may be said, what are they but the mores? In what 
sense are they to be conceived as ideal rights ? Green really means that ideally 
they are capable of social recognition and of social enforcement, though he 
does not always state this point clearly. 
Green himself, commonly uses interchangeably the words "moral" and 
"spiritual." What, then, is the relation of the "moral" or the "spiritual" to 
the "natural"? 
The opposition to "naturalistic" ethics, which he adumbrates in his Pro-
legomena to Ethics, does not abandon his often-expressed view that nature 
is the first stage of God's revelation of himself. The pursuit of truth, he 
holds, is "in principle identical with the striving after God which animates 
the moral life." By "spiritual" he meant "the natural rightly understood," 
and by moral life "not an escape from, but a completion of, physical pro-
cesses." As the editor of his Wor\s and one of his best interpreters, A. L. 
Nettleship, has written: 
In his own mind there could be no competition between laws of nature and 
laws of morality, for he regarded the former as stages in the self-development 
of the same mind as the latter; but when men of science first treat the facts 
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which they have established as final and independent existences, and then 
proceed to include among them the principle of which they are the partial 
expression and without which they would not be facts at all, they seemed to 
him to be misunderstanding their own procedure, and to be on a track 
which must lead to the stultification not only of moral aspiration but of the 
scientific impulse itself. He would have adopted the saying that science tells 
us what is, not what ought to be, not in the sense that the actual and the 
ideal are two independent worlds, but in the sense that any particular branch 
of experience, while it may be, and for practical purposes must be, treated as 
self-contained, is in truth related at every point to something which goes 
beyond it . . . and which necessitates the conversion of the mere 'is' into an 
ought to be' ("Memoir" in Wor\s, III, cxliii-cxliv). 
This thought is stated by Green as follows: 
If it is true on the one hand that the interpretation of nature by the supposi-
tion of ends external to it, with reference to which its processes are directed, 
has been discarded, and that its rejection has been the condition of growth 
in an exact knowledge of nature, on the other hand the recognition of ends 
immanent in nature, of ideas realized within it, is the basis of a scientific 
explanation of life. The phenomena of life are not ideal, in the sense in 
which the ideal is opposed to that which is sensibly verifiable, but they are 
related to the processes of material change which are their conditions, as 
ideas or ideal ends which those processes contribute to realize, because, while 
they determine the processes (while the processes would not be what they 
are but for relation to them), yet they are not those processes, not identical 
with any one or number of them, or all of them together (II, 437). 
Idealism, as he says elsewhere, is "not the admission of an ideal world of 
guess and aspiration alongside of the empirical, but the recognition of the 
empirical itself as ideal" (I, 179), which "trusts, not to a guess as to what is 
beyond experience, but to analysis of what is within it" (I, 449). 
The 'is' of the moment is a mingling, in some proportion, of the ideal 
with its imperfection. Perfection will never be wholly and humanly grasped. 
However, a consciousness that ideal aims are actualities at work in every 
living experience, an awareness that the 'is' of the moment is the potential 
of the more of that which it already is, the knowledge that the 'ought to be' 
is but one face of the larger 'is,' strengthens the good—the good of each and 
of all. 
The debate between Green and the utilitarians (Henry Sidgwick, for 
example) on the relation of pleasure to the good, is beyond the limits of this 
paper. The hedonistic creed had been roundly attacked by Ruskin, Carlyle, 
and others to whom Green acknowledged his debt; but, unlike Carlyle, 
Green held democratic sympathies. In the matter of proposed social reforms, 
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he had less in common with these men, again especially with Carlyle, than 
with the utilitarians whose contributions to the national well-being he freely 
acknowledged. The widespread influence which the doctrines of the latter 
had achieved he attributed to the character and conspicuous ability of the 
leaders of this school, which "had the great lesson to teach, that the value 
of all laws and institutions, the rectitude of all conduct, was to be estimated 
by reference to the well-being of all men, and that in the estimate of that 
well-being no nation or class or individual was to count above another." 
The acceptance of this lesson in practice, "not the theory that the end of life 
is pleasure," had made utilitarianism a power for good. 
There is a degree of philosophical utilitarianism in Green, too, though it 
has been largely put aside in favor of the Kantian and Hegelian influence. 
He largely shared the practical objectives of the contemporary utilitarians. 
He worked hard for the improvement of middle-class education. All English 
youth—he believed—should have the chance to become gentlemen at insti-
tutions that would alter the methods by which the so-called public schools 
now develop the "conventional character of the English gentleman." He 
struggled for temperance laws, and for protection of the poor against privi-
lege embedded in the law. He opposed foreign policies that would increase 
the risk of involvement in war. During America's Civil War he strongly 
espoused the Northern cause, writing to his sister: " I should be sorry to 
have you believe the nonsense which the Times writes about the most im-
portant struggle that the world has seen since the French Revolution." War 
against the North "would make England a wretched country to live in for 
the term of our lives at least." He attacked the shallowness of educated Eng-
lish opinion on the subject. As for philosophic foundations, "The fabric of 
European society stands apparently square and strong on a basis of decent 
actual equity, but no rationale of this equity is generally recognized. The 
hedonism of Hume has been turned into utilitarianism, the jacobinism of 
Rousseau into a gentle liberalism, but neither ism could save the 'culture' of 
England, in the great struggle between willfulness and social right across the 
Atlantic, from taking sides with the willfulness. Whatever might be the 
case practically, it had not learnt speculatively that freedom means some-
thing else than doing what one likes. A philosophy based on feeling was 
still playing the anarch in its thoughts" (III, 117). 
Freedom is no mere absence of restraint. This was the Hegelian lesson 
that needed to be learned. How far is Green justly charged with an Hegel-
ianism that is not followed out to its necessary conclusions? Since he ac-
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cepted the premise of the general will, should this logically have taken him 
away from his democratic predilections? 
III. GREEN VERSUS HEGEL; THE POLITICAL AND THE SPIRITUAL 
Green stood closer to Kant than to Hegel, and was greatly concerned 
about clarifying the obscurities and correcting the inconsistencies of Kant. 
"The vital truth" which he found in Hegel was: "That there is one spiritual 
self-conscious being, of which all that is real is the activity or expression; 
that we are related to this being, not merely as parts of the world which is its 
expression, but as partakers in some inchoate measure of the self-conscious-
ness through which it at once constitutes and distinguishes itself from the 
world, and that this participation is the source of morality and religion" (III, 
146). But the conception that "the objective world, in its actual totality, is 
thought," rather than the materiality that manifests the idea, requires us to 
remember also that the processes of human intelligence "are but reflections 
of that real thought under the conditions of a limited nature." This recogni-
tion of the imperfect and the limited in all of man's thinking and action is 
what Hegel himself did not well remember, though he too had said the 
same. Hegel makes "leaps in the dark," as when, unaccountably (for a 
philosopher), he identifies the march of God on earth with the Prussian 
monarchy. Both he and Rousseau posit an ideal reality, called by Rousseau 
the general will, and by Hegel, more often, the Deity. The "real" will of 
man, according to Rousseau, is for his own true good an extension beyond 
his conscious desire in the particular. All men in some measure share an 
intimation of the good beyond conscious thought and desire. Similarly, 
Hegel regards the true good as beyond conscious realization and intent. Yet 
in justifying the ways of God to man, Hegel in general sees the good tran-
spiring even where the strong appearance is that of an injustice and wrong. 
This tendency to justify whatever is, is carried to an absurd extreme. It con-
fuses the proposition that in the long run right is might with the proposition 
that the particular of the moment is to be seen as itself the right. 
So also Rousseau, identifying the general will with right, and being con-
cerned with the implications of this idea in the political realm, initially dis-
tinguishes between the general will and what he calls the "will of all." The 
distinction becomes obscure. One finds him talking about the general will 
when he can only be referring to an actual consensus, or, alternatively, to a 
majority, in either case to a practical representative rather than to the full 
ideal of the sovereign will. Green, at times, will speak loosely of "right" as 
something conditioned by social recognition, as if by this he means recogni-
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tion in the actual mores, when he can only have in mind, as he has made 
clear elsewhere, an ideal social right. At least a partial apology may be made 
for Green in this regard: his life span was only forty-six years, and most of 
his work was posthumously edited and published. 
It is not necessary to adopt wholly, or largely, the doctrine of the general 
will in order to perceive the truth that is in it. One may think with Kant that 
man has a direct sense of obligation, rather than see duty as the reflection of 
the self's pursuit of its own satisfaction. Yet if the particularized self is seen 
as emanation of a universal self-concern identical with a universal other-
concern, the Kantian and the Hegelian premises are not far apart in their 
relating the reason to the will and the will to the reason. This may be said 
without prejudice to Kant's insistence upon the ultimate as unknowable. 
So, too, Rousseau's general will is a concept of reason no less than of will. 
Rousseau's confusion at times of the ideal with the actual has obscured 
his meaning. In his discussion of the practical business of how right shall 
become manifest in the community, he argues that only in the very small 
community is the functioning of the general will possible. Certain modern 
critics have held that, whatever value the concept of the general will may 
have had for the small community of primitive times, or of Rousseau's imag-
ination, it can have no meaning for the enlarged community of a later day. 
Yet if the ideal is really perceived, then its meaning for the larger stage will 
be seen as well. Man's ideal is always short of realization, while at the same 
time a veritable reality. The ideal is always at work in the reality, and the 
reality of the state is to be seen not less in man's aspiration than in crystal-
lized history. The past is not more alive, more real, than is the future. The 
future is very much the substance of man's hope, man's hope very much his 
present reality. 
Green, in his day, did not think largely in terms of the state as an evolu-
tion beyond the nation-state. But he had much to say about right in relation 
to peace and war, and his idealism, applied to a democratic purpose, was 
more far-seeing than the authoritarianism of Hegel. Though he thought 
Hegel in many ways to have been the philosopher of modern times, he was 
distrustful of Hegelian "leaps in the dark." He did not, like Hegel, identify 
freedom largely with the objectified state and with the status quo. He pre-
ferred to start with Kantian propositions and move toward his own conclu-
sions. With thoroughness (and at times at a pedestrian pace) he would un-
ravel the tangles—not invariably with clear statements of his own. Though 
he held that feeling, on the whole, achieves a surer insight than does the 
reason, his logic was more rigorous than that of Hegel, possibly not less so 
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than that of Kant himself, and in some particulars more. He had, of course, 
added to his mastery of Greek thought, the benefit of Kant's great work. 
The issue is whether Green has a reasonably consistent view of the rela-
tion of the individual to the state; whether the individual appears clearly 
pre-eminent over the state, and not, as with Hegel, the state over the in-
dividual. To Green, moreover, the state, as but means to the individual good, 
is to be distinguished from society. Rights, as belonging to individuals, can 
be understood only in their social context, and as such are prior to the state. 
While "will, not force, is the foundation of the state," yet the state is that 
organized coercive power that exists to serve the end of rights. At least 
logically, if not chronologically, society comes before the state, for the whole 
comes before the part. If rights exist at all, they pertain to the individual as 
member of some social group. The state in its most primitive form, no doubt, 
was not clearly differentiated from the familial relationship. The state exists 
to enforce rights that it did not originally create. It legalizes basic rights of 
the individual in the community and implements the same with legal pre-
scriptions of its own creation. In this sense, according to Green, rights may 
be said to derive from the state. Ideally the state is the perfect guarantor of 
rights. This does not mean that there can be no right to challenge the ob-
jectified state. Yet, unless the established state is perverted to the extent that 
the flow of justice through its channels becomes impossible, disobedience is 
likely to lead only to wider chaos or to the increase of evils. The state is to be 
challenged only with fear and trembling, yet it is not beyond challenge. It 
exists but to serve the right and the good of individual man. 
Is resistance to be justified always by the fact that the majority approves? 
Green answers that resistance may be made "not because the majority ap-
prove it, but because it is for the public good" (Political Obligation, p. 117). 
He has no clear, automatically applicable test for recognizing the situation 
that would justify resistance. But neither has any other theory (except that 
which makes the majority opinion the right opinion). Yet it does not take 
the genius of a Mill to perceive that a tyranny of the majority may also exist. 
It may be said at least that, over some period of time, the extremities of in-
justice are recognized by the generality of mandkind, as well as by the 
generality of the philosophic schools despite their differences. 
Green observed that even selfish and unjust rulers like Napoleon have 
served, despite themselves, causes greater than themselves. But he did not 
justify or excuse the iniquity of rulers. On the contrary, he is at pains to 
show that good comes only from good motives, though the evil-minded may 
unwittingly have served the purposes of the good. They would have done 
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even more if they had been impelled by right motives. The spirit of the 
argument here is unlike the spirit of Hegel's talk of the "world-historical" 
heroes, like Caesar or Napoleon, whose "conduct . . . [often] obnoxious to 
moral reprehension" he would defend as inevitable in the part of "so mighty 
a form." 6 
The metaphysical theory of the state, in its Hegelian form, has received 
its merited criticism, if not demolition, at the hands of L. T . Hobhouse.7 
But Hobhouse did not identify the idealism of Green with that of Hegel. 
It has been charged that a more logical progression in Green's thought would 
have led him nearer to Hegel, as it did Bosanquet; contrary to this judgment, 
Green was the most logical of the three. His works have had great influence 
upon, and have been highly praised by, distinguished thinkers, including 
such recent notable scholars as A. L. Nettleship, Professor E. Caird, the late 
Lord Birker (formerly A. D . Lindsay, Master of Balliol), Sir Ernest Barker, 
and others. Our purpose has been to stress, it is hoped not too tritely, the 
following points: Green viewed the state as the servant of the moral order; 
the individual as the human repository of moral being and as the end of 
the state; the core of the individual as a self-conscious reason and will re-
sponsible to a universal self-consciousness, to which Green gives the name 
of God; and the positive function of the state as maintaining the oppor-
tunity of moral and spiritual growth. 
Will materialist presuppositions in sectors of Western liberalism, as well 
as in Marxism, conspire in a confused competition with conservatism and 
reaction to obscure our growing insight into moral reality ? Materialist trends 
in Western thought have led, despite the achievements of science, to the 
atheism and the immoral in modern communism, the debt of Marx to Hegel 
notwithstanding. Abroad, in our world, however, is a spiritualizing of 
thought. The growing prestige of new theologies, and recent contributions 
by psychological science, hasten the decay of materialism. We remember 
the thinking of Green as one who combined extraordinary mystic insight 
with a severe reason applied to the political problem. 
A. L. Nettleship has said: 
The quality of mind which distinguished him in practical life followed him 
into philosophy. In both he showed the same combination of simplicity and 
depth, of homeliness and elevation, of limitation and comprehension. While 
the whole of his metaphysic might be said to be little more than a prolonged 
attempt to get to the bottom of the question, What is a fact of experience? 
an occasional remark shows that in his mind this apparently simple question 
involved that of the nature of the world and of God. And though he had 
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neither the varied information which can illustrate and enforce the bare 
results of thought, nor the plastic impulse which divines the whole before it 
knows the details, yet even when he was most abstract and difficult he always 
gave the impression of having his feet upon the ground, and if there is little 
external system in his writings, there is hardly a page upon which the unity 
of his mind has not left its mark ("Memoir" in Works, III, lxxxvi). 
Similarly, Professor E. Caird has written that Green was one who scarcely 
felt that he had a scientific right to any principle which he had not submitted 
to a testing process for years, and who never satisfied himself—as men of 
idealistic tendencies are apt to satisfy themselves—with an intuitive grasp of 
any comprehensive idea, until he had vindicated every element of it by the 
hard toil of an exhaustive reflection. . . . In this he showed how a deep faith 
in certain principles may be united with the questioning temper of science, 
and even with a scrupulous skepticism which is ever ready to go back to the 
beginning, that it may exhaust everything that can be said against them. For 
such a mind . . . appropriate activity must be rather to lay and try the 
foundations than to build the superstructure. But it is the result of such 
work, and such work alone, to secure that the foundations are immovably 
fixed upon the rock, 8 
If man's experience bears out the evidence of a spiritual reality that sus-
tains his being more surely than does the materialist premise, for example, 
of Marx or of Freud—the contributions that these men made to the under-
standing of the human nature and experience notwithstanding—then the 
influence of Green's idealism doubtless will continue to grow beyond the 
nineteenth century. 
Idealism as a philosophy has been contrasted by some with the Christian 
point of view. This assumes a narrow premise for the latter. Was Green a 
Christian? What does it mean to be a Christian? To quote Nettleship, "If it 
means to believe that every man has God in him, that religion is a continual 
death of a lower and a coming to life of a higher self, and that these truths 
were more vividly realized in thought and life by Jesus of Nazareth and 
some of his followers than by any other known men, then without doubt he 
was a Christian. If it means that the above truths depend upon the fact that 
Jesus was born and died under conditions impossible to other human beings, 
then equally without doubt he was not a Christian" (op. cit., page c ) . With 
all his extensive research in biblical sources, Green had little interest in the 
distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and "its attendant babel of 
controversy. . . ; not because he wished to shirk unpleasant questions, nor 
because he was not clear as to what he believed, but because he cared about 
the reality of religion and not about its accessories, and was convinced that 
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its reality does not depend upon its dogmatic expression" (ibid.). He did 
not deny the possibility of extraordinary spiritual phenomena, but would 
give himself, rather, to that higher reality of which these are but one ex-
pression. The political questions had for him no mean significance. He 
would perhaps think today, with Arnold Toynbee, that for mankind to save 
itself after the middle of the twentieth century requires hardly less than a 
"transfiguration" of the human being himself. He would, at any rate, give 
to the issue of the state, grown vastly more critical than in his own day, 
the whole of his tenacious mind, and with certain belief in an overruling 
Benevolence. 
NOTES 
1. Wor^s of Thomas Hill Green, ed. by R. L. Nettleship, vol. I-III (London, Longmans, 
1906). Except where otherwise indicated, quotations from the writings of Green will be cited 
in the text of this paper only by volume and page referring to this standard edition. 
2. George H. Sabine, in his masterly History of Political Theory (New York, 3rd ed., 
1961), well summarizes the general aspect of the "revisionist liberalism" of the last quarter 
of the century. He gives principal credit to Green, who was "more coherently liberal in his 
political theory than John Stuart Mill," adding, like other commentators, that his idealism, 
though calling itself neo-Hegelian, contained "not a trace . . . of the political authoritarianism 
that Hegelianism connoted in Germany" (p. 705) . 
3. Here, and in all mention of idealism in what follows, the reference is to objective 
idealism, and not to subjective idealism of the Berkeleyan kind. 
4. Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, 1948 reprint from the original publica-
tion in Volume II of Works, p. 8. 
5. Quoted by Lane Lancaster, Masters of Political Thought (Boston, 1959), III (Hegel to 
Dewey), 215-216. Dr. Lancaster, eminent scholar that he is, seems to me unduly severe in his 
strictures upon Green, yet to make a very valuable contribution upon this "master," as he 
does notably upon all the others considered by him. 
6. The above paragraph is occasioned by a reference to Hegel in Lancaster's stimulating and 
provocative chapter on Green (ibid., pp. 233-234). 
7. The Metaphysical Theory of the State (London, 1918). This vigorous attack against 
Hegelianism, written in reaction to World War I, while well reasoned and effective as a 
scholarly onslaught upon the Leviathan state, does not include a thorough consideration of 
Green. It has had, probably, more to do than has any other single work with diminishing Green's 
reputation. Hobhouse, while he had much in common with Green's humane democracy, found 
his analysis confusing, taking particular exception to the saying that "rights are made by 
recognition. There is no right but thinking makes it so" (p. 119). It is true that Green's 
expression here is not adequate to his concern with the ideal. One must read Green in his 
entirety, as well as with some allowance for slips of tongue and pen. Most of his lectures, while 
based upon fairly full manuscript, were never gone over with finality by himself before 
publication. 
8. From the preface to Essays in Philosophical Criticism, ed. by Andrew Seth and R. B. 
Haldane (London, 1883). 
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The Intruder-Motif in George Eliot's Fiction 
By GEORGE J . WORTH 
The novels of George Eliot have often been described as dealing pri-
marily with the interaction between human character and the social environ-
ment. All the critics of her work from the beginning have either pointed this 
out or taken it for granted, and the idea has been given special prominence 
in two of the excellent studies of George Eliot which have appeared in recent 
years, Joan Bennett's George Eliot and Jerome Thale's The Novels of 
George Eliot. 
It has not been sufficiently stressed, however, that most of the genuinely 
interesting characters in her fiction are seriously at odds with their social 
environments, and may even be said to be intruders in the worlds they in-
habit. This intrusion is of two sorts. In numerous cases it is physical intru-
sion: the character enters a circumscribed area from the outside, and his 
values and beliefs clash with the dominant values and beliefs of his new 
associates in such a way as to carry the plot forward and expose the theme 
significantly. Such intruders include Amos Barton, the Countess Czerlaski, 
Caterina Sarti, and Tryan in the Scenes of Clerical Life, |4ietty Sorrel 
and Dinah Morris in Adam Bede,J Silas Marner, Tito Melema in Romola, 
Harold Transome in Felix Holt, and(Lydgate, Ladislaw, and Bulstrode in 
Middlemarch^ In other instances, there is no physical intrusion, but the 
character's sense of alienation from the world he lives in is just as strong as 
if there had been: he (or, almost always, she) has lived in a given society 
from birth or early infancy, but again there is a fundamental conflict be-
tween individual and social values and beliefs. In this group we may num-
ber Maggie Tulliver in The Mill on the Floss, Romola, Esther Lyon in 
Felix Holt, Dorothea Brooke in Middlemarch, and Gwendolen Harleth and 
Daniel in Daniel Deronda. 
I 
In the closed provincial societies which George Eliot habitually depicted, 
the mere fact that a person was an outsider earned him the suspicion of the 
natives. Even Bulstrode, the wealthy banker who had lived in Middlemarch 
for years, "as a man not born in the town, and altogether of dimly-known 
origin, was considered to have done well in uniting himself with a real 
Middlemarch family" (ch. x i ) ; the solid citizens, reluctant to accept him, 
"wished to know who his father and grandfather were, observing that five-
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and-twenty years ago nobody had ever heard of a Bulstrode in Middle-
march" (ch. xiii). 
Nevertheless, more than this kind of vague antipathy was always in-
volved in the distrust or dislike with which George Eliot's intruders were 
regarded by their neighbors. Most often, it was a question of theology. In 
the pre-Reform Bill world of which she wrote in all her English novels 
except Daniel Deronda, religious heterodoxy was a serious matter. The 
Established Church was still very powerful, but much of what passed for its 
strength was in truth complacency and flabbiness. Aware of this, enlightened 
churchmen were far more disturbed by Dissent and the Evangelical move-
ment than they would have been under different circumstances, and their 
less enlightened co-religionists felt all the hostility in the presence of new 
ideas which is characteristic of narrow minds. Provincial ignorance played 
a large part in the religious intolerance with which George Eliot dealt. In 
the Scenes of Clerical Life, for example, the positive Mr. Dempster is able 
to persuade his barroom audience that "the word presbyterian is derived 
from John Presbyter, a miserable fanatic who wore a suit of leather, and 
went about from town to village, and from village to hamlet, inoculating 
the vulgar with the asinine virus of Dissent" ("Janet's Repentance," ch. i ) , 
and in the same story Evangelicalism is viewed by the townspeople of Milby 
as "a murrain or blight all the more terrible, because its nature was but 
dimly conjectured" (ch. i i i) . 
Barton in the first of the Scenes and Tryan in the third (unlike their 
counterpart, Gilfil, in the middle story of the volume), outsiders both, are 
Evangelical clergymen who encounter hostility and opposition in their new 
parishes because they preach a more challenging version of Christianity 
than that to which their parishioners are accustomed. Barton's difficulties 
are complicated by his ungainliness and social ineptitude, but the basic 
source of friction is the same in both cases: each man has imported a new 
and uncongenial brand of religion into the community. Mrs. Patten in "The 
Sad Fortunes of the Rev. Amos Barton" is typical in her complaint: " 1 
don't understand these new sort o' doctrines. When Mr. Barton comes to 
see me, he talks about nothing but my sins and my need o' marcy. Now, 
Mr. Hackit, I've never been a sinner. From the fust beginning, when I went 
into service, I al'ys did my duty by my emplyers. . . . If I'm not to be saved, 
I know a many as are in a bad way'" (ch. i ) . Barton puzzles or offends so 
many of his flock with his innovations and his bumbling that he has vir-
tually no fund of good will to draw on when his questionable involvement 
with the Countess Czerlaski begins. 
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Tryan's Evangelical preaching arouses alarm for a different reason: it is 
too effective. Although he is "the first Evangelical clergyman who had risen 
above the Milby horizon," he makes very considerable inroads in that 
parish. Before long, "Evangelicalism was no longer a nuisance existing 
merely in by-corners, which any well-clad person could avoid; it was invad-
ing the very drawing-rooms, mingling itself with the comfortable fumes of 
port-wine and brandy, threatening to deaden with its murky breath all the 
splendour of the ostrich feathers, and to stifle Milby ingenuousness, not 
pretending to be better than its neighbours, with a cloud of cant and 
lugubrious hypocrisy" (ch i i ) . 
Although her doctrines are as unsettling to her hearers as Barton's and 
Tryan's are to theirs, Dinah Morris in Adam Bede occupies a different posi-
tion. She is not as dependent on public opinion among those to whom she 
preaches as a beneficed clergyman of the Church of England would be, and 
she is more boldly in defiance of that opinion, as a woman, a Methodist, and 
a daughter of bleak Stonyshire addressing herself to the comfortable in-
habitants of Loamshire. The simple folk of Hayslope do not know what to 
make of this phenomenon, but insofar as they understand it they are dis-
turbed. As the uneasy parish clerk complains to his vicar, 
"there's no knowin' what'll come, if we're t' have such preachins as that 
a-goin' on ivery week—there'll be no livin' i' th' village. For them Metho-
disses make folks believe as if they take a mug o' drink extry, an' make 
theirselves a bit comfortable, they'll have to go to hell fo't as sure as they're 
born. I'm not a tipplin' man nor a drunkard—nobody can say it on me—but 
I like a extry quart at Easter or Christmas time, as is nat'ral when we're 
goin' the rounds a'singin', an' folks offer't you for nothin'; or when I'm a-
collectin' the dues; an' I like a pint wi' my pipe, an' a neighbourly chat at 
Mester Casson's now an' then, for I was brought up i' the Church, thank 
God, an' ha' been a parish clerk this two-an'-thirty year: I should know 
what the church religion is" (ch. v ) . 
Because her role in Hayslope is so different from Barton's in Shepperton or 
Tryan's in Milby, Dinah's religious ideas do not split the community as 
deeply. Nevertheless, a wide gulf yawns between her theological views and 
those of Adam, who represents all that is best in the village in which he has ) 
grown up. " 'I'm not for laughing at no man's religion. Let 'em follow their 
consciences, that's all. Only I think it ud' be better if their consciences 'ud 
let 'em stay quiet i' the church—there's a deal to be learnt there. And there's 
such a thing as being oversperitial; we must have something besides Gospel 
i' this world'" (ch. i ) . Though this is the rather smug Adam as yet un-
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touched by tragedy who speaks, we have no reason to believe that he changes 
his mind about this matter in the course of his bitter experiences. And it is 
precisely because George Eliot is so unconvincing on the question of how 
the doctrinal gulf between Adam and Dinah is bridged that so many readers 
are dissatisfied with the denouement of the novel. 
Silas Marner's conflict with the people of Raveloe is far more central to 
his novel than Dinah's difficulties in Hayslope are to Adam Bede. Like 
Dinah, he is a Dissenter rather than merely an Evangelical. Like her, too, he 
comes to a fertile, prosperous country from a grim manufacturing town. 
But, unlike Dinah, he intends his move to be permanent, and he runs into 
the animosity of the stolid villagers who do not know what to make of this 
odd-looking man with his queer ways who has come to live among them. 
That he does not worship at the parish church is only one of the factors 
setting him apart from his neighbors, but, significantly, his absorption into 
the community is paralleled, if not caused, by his increasing involvement in 
the prevailing religion. This, in turn, takes place through Eppie. He goes to 
the village church for the first time, at Dolly Winthrop's urging, when 
Eppie is christened. 
He was quite unable, by means of anything he heard or saw, to identify the 
Raveloe religion with his old faith; if he could at any time in his previous 
life have done so, it must have been by the aid of a strong feeling ready to 
vibrate with sympathy, rather than by a comparison of phrases and ideas: 
and now for long years that feeling had been dormant. He had no distinct 
idea about the baptism and the church-going, except that Dolly had said it 
was for the good of the child; and in this way, as the weeks grew to months, 
the child created fresh and fresh links between his life and the lives from 
which he had hitherto shrunk continually into narrower isolation (ch. xiv). 
Many years later, when he tries to find Lantern Yard, the site and symbol of 
his early religious experiences, it is gone: so really is the old Silas, whose atti-
tude toward religion had once done so much to keep him from fellowship 
with those around him. 
It is noteworthy that in the four cases I have discussed so far, the religious 
differences between the intruders and their societies are smoothed over or 
Iresolved by the forces of human sympathy and compassion. The admirable 
qualities of Tryan and Dinah are such that all men of good will must 
eventually be brought to respect them, even if they do not share them; and 
when Barton and Silas are struck down by great misfortune, the community, 
in spite of its former animosity, stands ready to help. The case of Bulstrode 
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in Middlemarch (a much later novel), reveals a view of human nature that 
is neither so simple nor so flattering. 
Middlemarch never really does accept Bulstrode. Not only his strict, 
Evangelical views on theology but also his overbearing manner, his all-
powerful position as banker, and, not least, his mysterious origin make him 
a man to* be kept at arm's length by the established members of society and 
to be feared by the more humble. And when Bulstrode encounters his great 
crisis, there is no outpouring of compassion from the community. It is the 
prevailing view in Middlemarch that Bulstrode is not entirely innocent of 
the death in his house of Raffles, a man whom Bulstrode had excellent reason 
to want out of the way, and that he has somehow subverted the physician 
Lydgate to abet this devoutly wished-for consummation. That this paragon \ 
of piety has come under a cloud is greeted with something like glee, more or j 
less repressed, by the world of Middlemarch. |'The business was felt to be so 
public and important that it required dinners to feed it, and many invitations 
were just then issued and accepted on the strength of this scandal concern-
ing Bulstrode and Lydgate; wives, widows, and single ladies took their work 
and went out to tea oftener than usual; and all public conviviality, from the 
Green Dragon to Dollop's, gathered a zest which could not be won from the 
question whether the Lords would throw out the Reform Bill" (ch. lxxi). 
The discussion at Mrs. Dollop's establishment in Slaughter Lane is no less 
spirited and a good deal more explicit than the politely shocked conversa-
tions which sprang up elsewhere in Middlemarch. As the landlady herself 
says scornfully, 
"But hypocrite as he's been, and holding things with that high hand, as 
there was no parson i' the country good enough for him, he was forced to 
take Old Harry into his counsel, and Old Harry's been too many for him." 
"Ay, ay, he's a 'complice you can't send out o' the country," said Mr. 
Crabbe the glazier, who gathered much news and groped among it dimly. 
"But by what I can make out, there's them says Bulstrode was for running 
away, for fear o' being found out, before now." 
"He'll be drove away, whether or no," said Mr. Dill, the barber, who had 
just dropped in. "I shaved Fletcher, Hawley's clerk, this morning—he's got 
a bad finger—and he says they're all of one mind to get rid of Bulstrode. 
Mr. Thesiger is turned against him, and wants him out o' the parish. And 
there's gentlemen in this town says they'd as soon dine with a fellow from 
the hulks. eAnd a deal sooner I would,' says Fletcher; 'for what's more 
against one's stomach than a man coming and making himself bad company 
with his religion, and giving out as the Ten Commandments are not enough 
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for him, and all the while he's worse than half the men at the tread-mill?' 
Fletcher said so himself" (ch. lxxi). 
The end is disaster for Bulstrode and his wife: the intruder is repelled. 
Religion, however, is not the only basis of conflict between George Eliot's 
outsiders and society.(ln a number of significant cases, they violate accepted 
\j jstandards of behavior because they are imperceptive, or willful, or driven by 
motives which are utterly alien to provincial traditions^ They do not know, 
or they do not care, that they must alter to fit their new surroundings^ 
Hetty Sorrel is an interesting early example of this sort of intrusion. An 
orphan taken into his home by her Uncle Poyser, the narcissistic Hetty is a 
complete misfit in the industrious world of the Hall Farm and the upright 
society of Hayslope. She is so totally absorbed in her own vain desires that 
/she is unable to see the discrepancy between her view of life and that of the 
\people around her. Hetty's obtuseness plunges her into tragedy and gives the 
plot of Adam Bede its most powerful forward thrust. 
The cases of Harold Transome in Felix Holt and Lydgate in Middle-
march are perhaps even more interesting. In one sense,, of course, Transome 
is not an intruder at all. At the beginning of the novel he returns to his boy-
hood home, Transome Court, after fifteen years' absence. But these fifteen 
years, which he has spent in business in the Near East, have effected great 
changes in him, much to the dismay of his mother, who expects Transome 
to slip acquiescently into the life of a country squire and to stand for Parlia-
ment as a Conservative. Mrs. Transome notices the physical alteration of her 
son immediately, but is much more deeply shocked when, minutes after 
their initial greeting, Harold announces that he is no Tory and means to 
offer himself as a Radical candidate. After this disturbing beginning, Harold 
Transome proceeds relentlessly to unsettle the life of Transome Court, the 
estate, the village of Little Treby, and, indeed, the whole constituency of 
North Loamshire. The arrival on the scene of this young man so willing 
and eager to fly in the face of private and public opinion profoundly affects 
the lives and fortunes of every important character in the novel. His in-
sistence on waging the campaign as a Radical and his involvement with the 
lawyer Jermyn, who acts as his somewhat reluctant election agent, leads, 
directly or indirectly, to the revelation of his true parentage, Esther Lyon's 
discovery of her claim to Transome Court, and Felix Holt's grave difficulties 
with the law. Of course, it also helps to make possible the outcome of the 
romantic plot of the novel, the union between Esther and Felix. 
Lydgate, despite the "spots of commonness" which George Eliot takes 
pains to point out in his character, is certainly the most sympathetic of the 
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intruder-figures whom I have treated up to now, and the fact that the world 
of Middlemarch deals so harshly with him (and Bulstrode) does a great deal 
to make the novel considerably grimmer than Eliot's earlier studies of pro"-^ 
vincial life. Lydgate is a man of lofty ideals a^nd aspirations, crammed with 
advanced Edinburgh and Paris notions, whom his new neighbors simply do 
not understand. In their limited view, a physician is and ought to be a pill-
pusher with a soothing bedside manner, not a scientist interested in research; 
and Lydgate's novel approach to medical ethics—his refusal to dispense 
drugs, for instance—arouses suspicion rather than admiration. Although 
Lydgate's attractive manner speedily secures him a following, the lay public 
as a whole is as disturbed by this intruder as the doctors and other medical 
practitioners whose delicately balanced hierarchy he brings into jeopardy 
with his new ideas. The Rev. Mr. Farebrother's warning to Lydgate is 
prophetic: "You have not only got the old Adam in yourself against you, 
but you have got all those descendants of the original Adam who form the 
society all around you" (ch. xvii). Held back by the dead weight of the 
Middlemarch girl he has married in his blindness, and frustrated by the 
incomprehension and hostility of the community, particularly after the 
Raffles scandal, Lydgate is forced to abandon his plan to carry on research 
at the New Fever Hospital, and leaves Middlemarch. He does prosper, just 
as his wife Rosamond hopes and expects he will, but his encounter with 
Middlemarch has drained all the idealism out of him!] Lydgate ends his days 
- ministering to the ailments of the rich, like the physicians at whom he had 
scoffed in Middlemarch. 
Though all George Eliot's physical intruders bring foreign ways and no-
tions into their new environments with them, this is naturally more pro-
nounced in some cases than others. Some of these people are literally foreign-
ers, and their difficulties are likely to be particularly great. The Countess 
Czerlaski in "Amos Barton" and Will Ladislaw in Middlemarch are on the 
fringes of this group. Both of them are really English but have strong foreign 
associations: the Countess is the widow of a Polish emigre dancing-master; 
Will is the grandson of another Polish refugee, and has lived much abroad 
himself. Both of them indulge in what provincial English society considers 
1 eccentric behavior, and (although there is some doubt in Shepperton about 
the Countess' claim to her title) this behavior is all the more vigorously 
condemned because it is, as Mr. Podsnap would say, "not English." 
In "Mr. Gilfil's Love Story," Caterina Sarti is a young Italian girl who 
has lived with an English county family since infancy. Though all her rear-
ing has been English, certain elements in her character, obviously intended 
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to be typically Latin, nevertheless set her apart from those around her. She is 
dark in coloring; she is musically gifted, endowed with an excellent voice; 
she still uses scraps of Italian, particularly terms of endearment; most sig-
nificantly and fatally, her nature is much more passionate than that of her 
Anglo-Saxon associates. Caterina loves a Captain Wybrow, and he makes 
love to her; he has no intention of marrying Caterina, however, and becomes 
engaged to another young lady. Caterina, we may presume, takes this in-
fidelity much more to heart than a cool English girl would have done: she 
plans to kill Wybrow, and is only prevented from stabbing him by the fact 
that he dies of natural causes first. It is Caterina, dagger in hand, who dis-
covers his body. Her remorse is as sharp as her wrath had been, and her 
sense of guilt casts a permanent blight on her life and her brief marriage to 
Mr. Gilfil. The plot as I have summarized it (I hope not unfairly), sounds 
improbable; it would have been impossible if Caterina had been English, 
which is surely why George Eliot mVde her Italian. 
Tito Melema's situation in Rornola is much more complicated. The set-
ting is Renaissance Florence and not rural England in the first third of the 
nineteenth century. Like all human communities, the Midland towns and 
villages which George Eliot depicts in her English novels are often divided, 
sometimes deeply, but by contrast with the turbulent Florence of Savonarola 
and the-Medici they seem placid indeed. Milby, Raveloe, or Middlemarch, in 
a sense, present much more of a united front to an intruder than does fif-
teenth century Florence. Also, because of the exposed geographical position 
of his city no sophisticated Florentine could declare with a sniff, as Mrs. 
Plymdale does in Middlemarch, "I should say I was not fond of strangers 
coming into a town" (ch. xxxi). Strangers came and went daily in Florence: 
if they were exceptionally charming, clever, energetic, ambitious, and un-
principled, as the Greek Tito was, they could rise to prominence quickly. 
This was especially true if they were willing, like Tito, to exploit for their 
own ends the conflicts which were tearing the city apart. An as alien, Tito 
had no emotional commitment either to the Mediceans, to the Piagnoni 
(the followers of Savonarola), or to the Compagnacci (a violent aristocratic 
group opposed to both the other factions). All he cared about was power, 
and he was willing to throw in his lot with whatever group seemed to him 
to offer the quickest and surest road to power. If this meant switching his 
allegiance from one party to another, Tito was quite prepared to do so, and 
he was adroit enough at times to work secretly with all three opposing 
parties simultaneously. When his "triple game" grew too complicated even 
for him to manage, and his own safety was threatened, Tito had no com-
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punctions about betraying his Medicean fellow conspirators to the ruling 
Piagnoni, even though this brought about the death of his wife's beloved 
godfather among others. After all, these were not his people: soon "he 
might turn his back on these hard, eager Florentines, with their futile 
quarrels and sinking fortunes" (III, xxxvii) and move on in search of new 
worlds to conquer—at Rome perhaps, or in Milan, in both of which cities 
Tito had been careful to woo influential friends. Appropriately enough, 
however, he became inextricably caught up in this web of deceit he had 
woven, and he met his death while fleeing from a mob of vengeance-seeking 
Compagnacci. The foreigner who had sought and found "such power as is 
possible to talent without traditional ties and without beliefs" (II, xix) thus 
discovered that he could not simply detach himself from his new city and 
its internecine quarrels, which he had done so much to intensify. The amoral 
Tito's treachery, public and private, is at the core of the action of Romola, 
and the fact that he is an alien in Florence does much to make that treachery 
possible. 
II 
As Barbara Hardy has pointed out in her brilliant study of George 
Eliot's novels, the most memorable protagonists of these books—Maggie, 
Romola, Esther, Dorothea, and Gwendolen—"all share the ex officio dis-
ability of being women" (The Novels of George Eliot, p. 47). But it is not 
only their sex which causes their troubles and allows the critic to consider 
these characters together. Indeed, I should like to add a man, Daniel De-
ronda, to the list, and argue that it is their feeling of being ill at ease in their 
social environments which does most to lend them such kinship as they 
havel Though the term "intruder" may not be literally applicable to any of • 
them, they are all alienated in one way or another, distressed because the 
worlds in which they live furnish them no adequate outlets for emotions and/ 
impulses which they only half understand. 
Maggie Tulliver is perhaps the most extreme case in the earlier novels: 
a dark, impetuous, imaginative stranger in the fair, comfortable Dodson 
world of St. Ogg's. As the cripple Philip, himself something of an outcast, 
recognizes, Maggie's "eyes were full of unsatisfied intelligence, and un-
satisfied beseeching affection" (II, v ) . Neither Maggie's "intelligence" nor 
her "affection" is ever permanently satisfied in her little world, and its hold 
on her is too strong to permit her to break away. 
Esther Lyon's problems, on the other hand, are of such a nature that 
they can be settled without much difficulty. As Felix Holt recognizes when 
he first sees her, she is clearly out of place in Mr. Lyon's house. 
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She was quite incongruous with his notion o£ ministers' daughters in gen-
eral; and though he had expected something nowise delightful, the incon-
gruity repelled him. A very delicate scent, the faint suggestion of a garden, 
was wafted as she went. He would not observe her, but he had a sense of an 
elastic walk, the tread of small feet, a long neck and a high crown of shining 
brown plaits with curls that floated backward,—things, in short, that sug-
gested a fine lady to him, and determined him to notice her as little as pos-
sible. A fine lady was always a sort of spun-glass affair,—not natural, and 
with no beauty for him as art; but a fine lady as the daughter of this rusty 
old Puritan was especially offensive (ch. v ) . 
But with Felix to act as her mentor, Esther is brought to recognize the vanity 
and frivolousness of her dreams. She stands by Mr. Lyon; she refuses the 
chance to be a genuine "fine lady" which the Transomes hold out to her; 
she accepts Felix. Because she is the least complicated of these intruder-
figures, she is able to achieve a more satisfactory adjustment to the conditions 
of real life than any of the others, with the possible exception of Daniel 
Deronda. 
His situation is comparable to hers because Daniel's feelings of discomfort 
are also attributable to heredity: like Esther, he does not know who he is. 
(Esther, it will be remembered, is not really Mr. Lyon's daughter, but the 
child of an English adventurer and a French mother.) Daniel believes him-
self to be Sir Hugo Mallinger's natural son, and senses that his position in 
Sir Hugo's house is somehow odd. Though he is a happy, intelligent, affec-
tionate youngster, on excellent terms with his "uncle," Daniel is afflicted by 
a "silent consciousness of grief within, which might be compared in some 
ways with Byron's susceptibility about his deformed foot" (ch. xvi). After 
he receives "the education of an English gentleman" which Sir Hugo has 
promised him, his spiritual malaise increases rather than diminishes: there 
is nothing in the world of an English gentleman that he considers worth 
doing. It is not until he discovers the truth about his Jewish parentage that 
Daniel's life takes on genuine meaning. He has, of course, already been in-
troduced to Jewish thought by Mordecai and is deeply attached to Mirah, 
but it is only when he learns of his own Jewishness that his sympathies and 
aspirations fall into a coherent pattern: he will work to restore "a political 
existence to my people, making them a nation again" (ch. lxix)—a mission 
far different from any of the careers which the well-meaning Sir Hugo has 
been urging on him. 
Dorothea Brooke in Middlemarch resembles Daniel in that she too is 
fired by a sense of mission which is, initially at least, undirected^ As George 
Eliot's famous Prelude reminds us, Dorothea is "a cygnet . . . reared uneasily 
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among the ducklings in the brown pond," a modern St. Theresa whose 
"passionate, ideal nature demanded an epic life"—a saint without a cause. 
(It may be remarked in passing that one reason Dorothea is so much more 
successful as a character than Daniel is that Eliot is able to view Dorothea's 
yearnings with detachment and occasional irony.) The matter-of-fact milieu 
of Tipton Grange affords her very little opportunity to fulfill her idealistic 
dreams, and her mistaken notion that marriage with the pedant Casaubon 
will not only remove her from this uncongenial environment but allow her 
"to devote herself to large yet definite duties," "to live continually in the 
light of a mind that she could reverence" (ch. v ) , plunges her into disaster. 
Dorothea does achieve usefulness, though of a less exalted sort than she 
had formerly craved, in her second marriage. Reaching such a point of re-
pose at the end of the novel, she is strongly reminiscent of an earlier George 
Eliot heroine. Romola, though deeply attached to her blind father, does not 
live up to her potentialities, as a woman or a human being, in catering to the 
needs of that querulous old scholar. As she waits on him, "it was evident 
that the deepest fount of feeling within her had not yet wrought its way to 
the less changeful features, and only found its outlet through her eyes" (I, v ) . 
Not until she becomes involved successively with Tito, Savonarola, and the 
suffering poor of Florence and the nearby plague-stricken village does she 
play a role in life commensurate with her desires and abilities. 
Of this second kind of intruder-figure, the one for whom the reader feels 
the greatest pity is Gwendolen Harleth, the last in the series. This is so not 
merely because Gwendolen is left unfulfilled at the end of Daniel Deronda, 
but because her isolation from the beginning is so much more desperate than 
that of any of these characters. She is not only an outcast in a social group: 
she is cut off from sympathetic ties with humanity in general by her frigid 
egotism. Spoiled and intractable from childhood, shunted about for years 
from one watering place, Parisian apartment, or expensive boarding school 
to another, Gwendolen finds it difficult to feel close to anyone. She indig-
nantly rejects the conventional girl's notion of a happy life, mindful of her 
mother's unfortunate second marriage. Gwendolen asks Mrs. Davilow, early 
in the novel: 
"Well, but what is the use of my being charming, if it is to end in my 
being dull and not minding anything? Is that what marriage always comes 
to?" 
"No, child, certainly not. Marriage is the only happy state for a woman, 
as I trust you will prove." 
"I will not put up with it if it is not a happy state. I am determined to 
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be happy—at least not to go on muddling away my life as other people do, 
being and doing nothing remarkable. I have made up my mind not to let 
other people interfere with me as they have done" (ch. i i i) . 
Accordingly, she refuses the pleasant and eminently eligible Rex Gascoigne 
("I shall never love anybody. I can't love people. I hate them" [ch. vii]) , 
only to be forced ultimately into a marriage with Grandcourt the vile, who 
robs her of her most precious possession, her freedom to do as she pleases, 
and crushes her ego in countless painful ways. She does in due course achieve 
a kind of communion with Deronda, but on his side at least it is completely 
lofty and impersonal, and her dimly felt hope that this may grow into a 
closer relationship is dashed when Daniel leaves her for Mirah, Judaism, and 
Palestine. 
I l l 
One wonders why George Eliot was so strongly drawn to the intruder-
figure as the typical mainspring of her plots. To establish links between 
literature and biography, however tentative, is always perilous, but it may 
safely be asked whether this unique human being did not look upon her 
own characteristic role in life as that of an intruder, first in her family's 
conventional, Evangelical household at Griff, and later in the great world 
beyond. 
Certainly she had ample grounds for viewing herself in this way. The 
biographical record, such as it is, makes it clear that it was never easy for 
Mary Ann Evans to feel accepted and comfortable anywhere. Even as a 
child, loving her family deeply, she lived a solitary existence much of the 
time. Cross refers to her "pre-eminently exclusive disposition" as a girl 
(George Eliot's Life, 1,11), and she herself wrote to Maria Lewis that "when 
I was quite a little girl I could not be satisfied with the things around me; 
I was constantly living in a world of my own creation, and was quite con-
tented to have no companions that I might be left to my own musings and 
imagine scenes in which I was chief actress" (Letters, I, 22}k^Uthough Mary 
Ann Evans continued through adolescence and early adulthood to do her 
duty to her family as she saw it, her sense of estrangement from her environ-
ment persisted and grew. Accordingly, we find her at the age of twenty 
writing to Miss Lewis that "I begin to feel involuntarily isolated, and with-
out being humble, to have such a consciousness that I am the negation of all 
that finds love and esteem as makes me anticipate for myself—no matter 
what; I shall have countless undeserved enemies if my life be prolonged, 
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wherever my sad lot may be cast, and I need rigid discipline, which I have 
never yet had" (Letters, I, 51) . 
What may be regarded as the climax of this phase of her alienation came 
sixteen months later, when she refused to accompany her father to church. 
In a letter which surely wounded him deeply, she announced that she 
could not unite herself "with any Christian community," that she could not 
accept "the Divine authority of the books comprising the Jewish and 
Christian Scriptures." "Such being my very strong convictions, it cannot be 
a question with any mind of strict integrity, whatever judgment may be 
passed on their truth, that I could not without vile hypocrisy and a miserable 
truckling to the smile of the world for the sake of my supposed interests, 
profess to join in worship which I wholly disapprove" (Letters, I, 128429). 
After her departure from Griff, Mary Ann Evans again and again en-
tered new worlds in which, despite encouragement and success of all sorts, 
she must have felt, at least occasionally, acutely ill at ease. Even the atmos-
phere of the Brays' circle at Coventry, liberal and tolerant, was certainly 
something of a shock to one as recently enmeshed in orthodox standards as 
Mary Ann Evans had been. Later, she could hardly have helped regarding 
herself as an intruder in John Chapman's bizarre establishment in the 
Strand; there, and apparently at Dr. Brabant's some time earlier, the other 
ladies under the roof feared that she might steal the affection of the head of 
the household and brought about her departure. 
In a larger sense, of course, her whole life during the early 1850's was an 
impertinence: here was a young provincial, a woman at that, wielding im-
mense authority on the Westminster Review, the most estimable intellectual 
publication of the day, mingling on a basis of equality with such eminent 
figures as Spencer, the Martineaus, Mill, Forster, J . A. Froude, Huxley, and 
Lewes. And her extra-marital union with George Henry Lewes, though she 
was able to justify it eloquently and many enlightened spirits stood by her, 
nevertheless forced Mary Ann Evans into a highly ambiguous position 
vis-a-vis_mid-Victorian society, from which she could not completely extri-
cate herself for a quarter-century. One is tempted to speculate whether her 
almost constant complaints about ill health (references to these take up two-
thirds of a column, in fine print, of Professor Haight's index to the Letters), 
depression, and fatigue did not owe something to a feeling, conscious or 
subconscious, that she was living in a social world to which she did not 
really belong. 
However that may be, it is not necessary to indulge in psychologizing of 
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this sort to recognize that the intruder-motif plays a prominent part in all 
of George Eliot's fiction. Although as subtle and massive arx^geuvre as hers 
can never be explained by any simple "key," the conclusion is inescapable 
\ that each of her novels is set, or kept, in motion by the clash between one 
\ or more "outsiders" and the social world at large. 
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Evidence and Testimony: Philip Henry Gosse 
and the Omphalos Theory 
by PETER CAWS 
Eccentricity has always abounded when and where strength o£ character 
has abounded; and the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been 
proportional to the amount of genius, mental vigour, and moral courage it 
contained. 
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ch. III. 
I 
Eccentricity took many forms in Victorian England, but in keeping 
with the atmosphere of the times there were two especially noticeable varie-
ties. There were religious eccentrics, like John Nelson Darby, a passionate 
nonconformist who solved the ancient problem as to the nature of the sin 
against the Holy Ghost by identifying it with the taking of Holy Orders; 
and there were scientific eccentrics, like Andrew Crosse, who in the course 
of electrical experiments at his country estate created a new species of beetle 
(Acarus crossii) and brought down on himself a torrent of totally unde-
served abuse on the grounds that he was trying to be God. From time to 
time these tendencies were combined in a single individual, with invariably 
interesting results. Religion and science have never really been comfortable 
in one another's presence, and the antics to which men are driven who try 
to make them so have not ceased yet. Contemporary attempts, however, 
seem anaemic in comparison with the fierce controversies of the nineteenth 
century. What now is done weakly, even pathetically, was then a matter for 
"genius, mental vigour, and moral courage"; and while the result might have 
been to make a man look ridiculous, it never made him look puerile. The 
subject of this essay seems often comic, sometimes tragic, but always a man 
of strong character and firm will. 
Philip Henry Gosse is best known, if at all, as the overbearing Father 
in Edmund Gosse's autobiographical sketch Father and Son, although the 
sympathies of the reader of that book are likely to lie, as they were intended 
to lie, with the son. The story is the familiar one: a sickly child, brought up 
under the stern and repressive eye of a Victorian father, eventually throws 
off the burden and sets out to live his own life. He was, of course, quite 
right to do so, and I do not wish to suggest otherwise. My purpose is to 
draw attention to what Edmund Gosse himself calls "the unique and noble 
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figure of the father"1—a distinguished naturalist, author of one of the most 
brilliant failures in the history of scientific theories, and in his own right a 
more colorful figure than the son as whose father he himself suspected he 
would one day be known. He was born in 1810, the son of an itinerant minia-
ture painter, and died in 1888 a Fellow of the Royal Society and the author 
of more than thirty books and of innumerable scientific papers. It is perhaps 
best to begin with an account of his scientific development. 
At first glance there is nothing eccentric in the professional life of Philip 
Gosse. Brought up in a small seaport town where the principal form of rec-
reation was exploring the shore or the surrounding country, and spending 
a great part of his early life in comparatively remote and wild places—first 
Newfoundland, then Canada, and finally Alabama—it was not surprising 
that his innate powers of keen observation should have led him into a career 
as a naturalist. In Newfoundland, where he was employed as a clerk in a 
whaling office at Carbonear, he bought Kanmacher's edition of Adams's 
Essays on the Microscope, an act which he regarded, in his characteristically 
self-critical way, as a formal dedication to a life of science. By the time he 
left Newfoundland for an abortive attempt at farming in Ontario he had al-
ready begun an extensive collection of insects which occupied the foreground 
of his attention; his last memento of Newfoundland was a rare cockroach, 
and the sole comment in his diary when he first reached Canada was the 
following: "July 15.—As I this day arrived in Quebec, I procured some lettuce 
for my caterpillars, which they ate greedily."2 This single-mindedness in 
matters of biology remained with him for the rest of his life; the birth of 
his only child appears in the diary with the entry: "E . delivered of a son. 
Received green swallow from Jamaica." 3 Of course such things might be 
interpreted, not unjustly, as indicating a certain stolidity of character, and 
there is plenty of other evidence to show that Gosse, as a young man, took 
things very seriously indeed, himself most seriously of all. 
The Canadian venture proving a failure, Gosse traveled to Philadelphia 
(observing en route the rudeness of the natives of Vermont) and there met 
a number of the leading American naturalists of the period, including mem-
bers of the remarkable Peale family.4 From Philadelphia he proceeded, 
mainly by ship, to Mobile, and thence to King's Landing and Dallas, Ala-
bama, where for nine months he was a schoolmaster. The natives of Alabama 
were also rude, and they were still extremely anti-English (it was barely 
sixty years since the Revolution); and although Philip Gosse enjoyed many 
things about his stay in the South, including the "woffles" which were served 
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for breakfast, the frequent violence, especially towards the Negroes, and 
the almost tangible moral strain of slavery, made him glad to leave and 
return to England after twelve years in the Americas.5 
It was not easy to find suitable work in England, and for the first year 
after his return Gosse lived in something close to penury. He spent some 
time, however, in working the notes of his Canadian period into a manu-
script entitled The Canadian Naturalist, a series of imaginary conversations, 
somewhat stiff in tone, between a father and son, on the flora and fauna of 
the region in which he had stayed. At first he met with no success in finding 
a publisher, but finally, when he was at "the extremity of dejection and dis-
gust," he was sent for by Mr. John Van Voorst of Paternoster Row. Edmund 
Gosse describes the interview: 
The publisher began slowly: "I like your book; I shall be pleased to publish 
it; I will give you one hundred guineas for it." One hundred guineas! It 
was Peru and half the Indies! The reaction was so violent that the demure 
and ministerial looking youth, closely buttoned up in his worn broadcloth, 
broke down utterly into hysterical sob upon sob, while Mr. Van Voorst, mur-
muring, "My dear young man! My dear young man!" hastened out to fetch 
wine and minister to wants which it was beyond the power of pride to 
conceal any longer.6 
This was the beginning of a long association between author and publisher. 
The Canadian Naturalist showed what he could do in a literary direction, 
and as time went on he learned to do it brilliantly. He could be erudite and 
familiar at the same time, interspersing careful zoological and botanical 
observations with amusing anecdotes, providing his own illustrations in 
line or watercolor, and turning out, over the next thirty-five years, a dozen 
or more enormously successful books of popular natural history. He ac-
quired a large and faithful public, which enthusiastically bought his books 
and took them to the seaside, despoiling in the process (much to his chagrin) 
the shore which was his favorite collecting-ground. Gosse's relation to his 
readers is perfectly foreshadowed in the relation between the father and the 
son in The Canadian Naturalist. The father, in the opening chapter of that 
book, proposes a series of excursions into the neighbouring countryside: 
"Charles.—Few things would give me greater pleasure. I have often felt 
the want of a companion in my walks, who, by his superior judgement, 
information, and experience, might remove my doubts, gratify my curiosity, 
and direct my attention to those subjects which are instructive as well as 
amusing; for I anticipate both instruction and amusement from our inquiries, 
and enter into your proposal with delight."7 The genteel sections of the 
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Victorian middle classes were equally delighted, and were instructed and 
amused in the thousands not only by Gosse's books but also by his invention 
of the aquarium, which brought the seashore into drawing-rooms all over 
the country. 
Scientific work of a more serious nature was not, however, neglected. 
Gosse crossed the Atlantic once more for a two-year study of the birds of 
Jamaica, which produced one of the important early works on the ornithology 
of the West Indies. His inflexible uprightness of character is illustrated by 
an incident in connection with the publication of a supplement to that work, 
the Illustrations of the Birds of Jamaica, a. rare and exceedingly beautiful 
set of colored plates each bearing the inscription "P.H.G. del. et lith." These 
were published by subscription, and in the course of printing it became ap-
parent that the cost of production would exceed the total amount subscribed; 
but rather than change the price of the work once announced, Gosse ab-
sorbed the extra cost out of his own pocket, actually publishing the set at a 
loss. Subsequent studies, especially of small and microscopic forms of marine 
life, led to his election to the Royal Society in 1856. Darwin corresponded 
with him, asking for information in connection with his own painstaking 
work on variation, and he was honored by being taken into the confidence 
of the biological revolutionaries of the 1850's: 
It was the notion of Lyell . . . that before the doctrine of natural selection 
was given to a world which would be sure to lift up at it a howl of execra-
tion, a certain body-guard of sound and experienced naturalists, expert in 
the description of species, should be privately made aware of its tenour. 
Among those who were thus initiated, or approached with a view towards 
possible illumination, was my Father. He was spoken to by Hooker, and 
later on by Darwin, after meetings of the Royal Society in the summer of 
1857.8 
Gradually his interest became concentrated in a few highly specialized areas, 
particularly the Rotifera, and he wrote one classic of nineteenth-century 
zoology, the Actinologia Britannica, which remained the standard reference 
work for many years. He was an indefatigable observer, and cannot really 
be said to have retired at all; at the age of seventy-five he was still busily 
occupied, publishing in 1885 a monograph on The Prehensile Armature of 
th e Papillo nidae. 
Gosse's great merit as a scientist lay in a capacity, rarely encountered, for 
precision and minuteness in observation, which called for extraordinary re-
sources of patience and eyesight, neither of which seems ever to have failed 
him in connection with his scientific work. In The Birds of Jamaica he 
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enunciates a principle to which he always adhered and which is of supreme 
importance in the descriptive branches of science: 
Perhaps a word of apology may be thought needful for the minuteness with 
which the author has sometimes recorded dates, and other apparently trivial 
circumstances, in his observations. It is because of his conviction, that an 
observer is hardly competent to determine what circumstance is trivial, and 
what is important: many a recorded fact in science has lost half its value 
from the omission of some attendant circumstance, which the observer either 
did not notice or thought irrelevant. It is better to err on the side of minute-
ness than of vagueness.9 
When, at rare intervals, he allowed himself to wander from this close atten-
tion to the facts, the results were, from a scientific point of view, less happy. 
His speculations, largely on the question of the creation and extinction of 
species (although he also put forward the theory that some frequently re-
ported sea serpents were really prehistoric monsters) were generally naive, 
while his taste, left to its own devices, ran in the direction of the Gothic novel. 
The subtitles of that most romantic work, The Romance of Natural History, 
show the scientist in an entirely different light. Chapter X, entitled "The 
Terrible" (other chapters are called "The Vast," "The Wild," "The Un-
known"), deals with the following surprising collection of incidents: "Horri-
ble Death of Thackwray—Hottentot's Adventure with a Rhinoceros—Simi-
lar Adventure of Mr. Oswell—Terrific Peril of Captain Methuen—Nearly 
Fatal Combat with a Kangaroo—Horrid Voracity of Sharks—Coolness of an 
Indian Officer—Ugliness of Vipers—Shocking Adventure in Guiana—An-
other in Venezuela—Fatal Encounter with Bees in India." The last of these 
episodes has, for this study, a special interest. It concerns two English gentle-
men, Messrs. Armstrong and Boddington; the victim, inevitably, was "alas! 
Mr. Boddington," who "unable any longer to resist the countless hordes of 
his infuriated winged foes, threw himself into the depths of the water, 
never to rise again." Gosse is not actually sure that the assailants were bees, 
and covers his admission of ignorance with this remarkable statement: 
"Whatever the true nature of the insect, it affords an apt illustration of 
such passages of Holy Scripture as the following:—'The Lord shall hiss for 
. . . the bee that is the land of Assyria,' (Isa. vii. 18.) 'The Lord thy God 
will send the hornet among them, until they that are left, and hide them-
selves from thee, be destroyed.' (Deut. vii. 20.) " 1 0 
Overlooking for the moment the claim to aptness (from whom was Mr. 
Boddington hiding? and why Assyria?), here is a strange insertion into the 
work of a Fellow of the Royal Society. But by this time, after twenty years, 
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anybody familiar with Gosse's writings would have taken it in his stride. 
Wherever one looks one finds passing confessions of faith, references to the 
Bible, exhortations to the young, and while these might at first be taken for 
customary piety, the weight of the evidence, and the recondite nature o f 
some of the allusions (such as those in the case of Mr. Boddington) soon 
suggest a different hypothesis. It is impossible to do justice to the life and 
work of Philip Gosse without paying close attention to this other side o f 
his character. 
II 
When Philip Gosse returned to England from America in 1839, urgently 
in need of employment, he was offered a post in a provincial museum. H e 
was hardly in a position to be particular about conditions of work, and the 
offer was really an act of charity on the part of an interested friend, but 
he turned it down. 
I should fear [he wrote] that I should be thrown into situations in which I 
might find it difficult to keep that purity of intention which I value more 
than life; and likewise, that my opportunities of being useful to my fellow-
men, especially to their souls, would be much curtailed. I view this transient 
state as a dressing-room to a theatre; a brief, almost momentary visit, during 
which preparation is to be made for the real business and end of existence. 
Eternity is our theatre: time our dressing-room. So that I must make every 
arrangement with a view to its bearing on this one point. 1 1 
Apparently he was entertaining, at this time, the idea of entering the ministry 
of one of the evangelical sects. But he could hardly be said to have been 
brought up in a religious atmosphere. For the origin of this pious tendency 
it is necessary to go back to Newfoundland, and to the time, almost exactly, 
of his purchase of Adams on the microscope—a time at which he "became, 
suddenly and consciously, a naturalist and a Christian." 1 2 The stimulus for 
his conversion, if it can be called that, was an illness of his sister Elizabeth, 
far away in England, to whom he was closely attached. "My prominent 
thought in this crisis was legal. I wanted the Almighty to be my friend; to 
go to Him in my need. I know He required me to be holy. He had said, 'My 
son, give Me thy heart.' I closed with Him, not hypocritically, but sincerely; 
intending henceforth to live a new, a holy life; to please and serve G o d . " 1 3 
It was as if he had signed a contract with God; and it did not occur to him 
to doubt, since he knew himself to be strong enough in character to keep 
his part of the bargain, that God would in turn do what was expected of 
Him. 
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This contract of faith he interpreted as requiring the acceptance, word for 
word, of the literal and symbolic truth of the Bible. The double sense is im-
portant. While the plain meaning of the text was to be zealously defended, 
there was more to be discovered beneath the surface. Gosse applied himself 
to the investigation of this hidden truth with an energy matched only by that 
which he devoted to his researches in natural history. At first these studies 
were carried on in comparative isolation, but after his return to England two 
circumstances mitigated this spiritual loneliness. He found, in the suburb 
of London where he was for a short time a schoolmaster, a group of 
Christians, followers of J . N. Darby, called by the outside world "Plymouth 
Brethren" but by themselves simply "the Brethren," or, modesdy, "the 
Saints." Darby, as was remarked earlier, disapproved of the ministry, so 
that Gosse was no longer tempted in that direction; but he found among 
these people a kind of intellectual interest in salvation and prophecy perfectly 
in sympathy with his own convictions. He was, throughout his life, evangeli-
cal, but never in the passionate sense usually attached to the word. His con-
cern for the souls of men sprang less from sympathy than from duty, and 
the duty was not necessarily pleasant—it was part of the agreement with 
God, a service demanded in exchange for the right to enter into the mysteries 
of the interpretation of Scripture. Independently of this connection he met, 
and later married, Emily Bowes, the daughter of a Bostonian couple, her prin-
cipal attraction being an equally fervid, equally rigid, and equally eccentric 
form of Christianity with his own. Together they read the prophets and 
commentaries on the prophets, treading eagerly, in the words of Edmund 
Gosse, "the curious path which they had hewn for themselves through this 
jungle of symbols." 1 4 The death of his first wife after only nine years of 
marriage left him, if anything, more isolated than before (the Saints proving 
too tame and unimaginative for his fierce symbolic tastes), and drove his 
already rather stern and humorless character into a melancholia from which 
he never completely recovered. 
It was inevitable that such exclusive and fanatic attention to the details 
of biblical exegesis should before long produce a distorting effect on Gosse's 
attitude to the contemporary world and, eventually, to science itself. The 
commentators were, if anything, more prophetic than the prophets, and led 
the inquisitive couple "to recognise in wild Oriental visions direct statements 
regarding Napoleon III and Pope Pius I X and the King of Piedmont, historic 
figures which they conceived as foreshadowed, in language which admitted 
of plain interpretation, under the names of denizens of Babylon and com-
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panions of the Wild Beast." 1 5 The Church of Rome in particular figured 
largely in the deciphering of the Book of Revelation, and it was denounced 
and hated with a special passion. "We welcomed any social disorder in any 
part of Italy, as likely to be annoying to the Papacy. If there was a custom-
house officer stabbed in a fracas at Sassari, we gave loud thanks that liberty 
and light were breaking in upon Sardinia. . . . " 1 6 The effects of all this were 
felt in the most unlikely quarters. There was, for instance, a man who used 
to pass down the street where the Gosses lived selling onions, with a cry of 
Here's your rope 
To hang the Pope 
And a penn'orth of cheese to choke him. 
The cheese [writes Edmund Gosse] appeared to be legendary; he sold only 
onions. My Father did not eat onions, but he encouraged this terrible fellow, 
with his wild eyes and long strips of hair, because of his "godly attitude 
towards the Papacy." 1 7 
Such peculiarities might have been merely amusing, had they confined 
themselves to international affairs. But scriptural theory found other applica-
tions closer to home, and Philip Gosse developed, out of a naturally strong 
moral sense and a tendency to introspection, a morbid sensitivity of con-
science and a practice of hypercritical self-vigilance which he did not hesitate 
to extend to his family (principally Edmund) and to the congregation of 
which, after the death of his wife and his removal to Devonshire, he became 
informally the pastor. This side of his character is so well known from 
Father and Son that there is no need to dwell on it here. The introduction 
of religious conviction into daily life produced, however, another effect of 
more direct interest, namely a relation between the scientist and his field of 
study perhaps unique in the history of science among workers of comparable 
distinction. 
Nature was the work of God, and as such was to be taken seriously. It 
must, as the work of God, be perfect. Accordingly, for Gosse, the suggestion 
that anything in Nature might have been better arranged, or the slightest 
hint of levity in connection with it, were almost comparable to blasphemy, 
and he was ready to meet either with indignation on God's behalf. In The 
Ocean, for example, he scornfully rejects a tentative version of the theory of 
development: "Goldsmith flippantly asserts, that the Shrimp and the Prawn 
'seem to be the first attempts which Nature made when she meditated the 
formation of the Lobster.' Such expressions as these, however, are no less un-
philosophical than they are derogatory to God's honour; these animals being 
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in an equal degree perfect in their kind, equally formed by consummate 
wisdom, incapable of improvement. . . . " l s But there was a danger in thus 
zealously guarding God's rights in Nature—the danger that he might, as 
time went on, come to take a certain proprietary attitude towards it him-
self; and to this temptation he soon succumbed. He felt fully justified in 
doing so, and would have been surprised and indignant, as religious people 
tend to be, if anybody had pointed out to him that to presume on God's 
favor was a form of spiritual pride. But there is no doubt that Philip Gosse 
was both proud and presumptuous, and in the Devonshire Coast there is a 
remarkable juxtaposition of passages which form such a clear basis for this 
indictment that I shall, at the risk of tedium, quote them extensively. He is 
discussing the aesthetic qualities of natural objects: 
But there is another point of view from which a Christian . . . looks at the 
excellent and the beautiful in Nature. He has a personal interest in it all; 
it is a part of his own inheritance. As a child roams over his father's estate, 
and is ever finding some quiet nook, or clear pool, or foaming waterfall, some 
lofty avenue, some bank of sweet flowers, some picturesque or fruitful tree, 
some noble and widespread prospect,—how is the pleasure heightened by the 
thought ever recurring,—All this will be mine by and by! . . . So with the 
Christian 
And thus I have a right to examine, with as great minuteness as I can 
bring to the pleasant task, consistently with other claims, what are called the 
works of nature. I have the very best right possible, the right that flows from 
the fact of their being all mine,—mine not indeed in possession, but in sure 
reversion. And if anyone despise the research as mean and little, I reply that 
I am scanning the plan of my inheritance. And when I find any tiny object 
rooted to the rock, or swimming in the sea, in which I trace with more than 
common measure the grace and delicacy of the Master Hand, I may not 
only give Him praise for his skill and wisdom, but thanks also, for that He 
hath taken the pains to contrive, to fashion, to adorn this, for me. 
And then there follows immediately this statement: 
T H E C R Y S T A L L I N E J O H N S T O N E L L A 
I have the pleasure of announcing a new animal of much elegance, which 
I believe to be of a hitherto unrecognised form. I shall describe it under the 
appellation of Johnstonella Catharina.... 
The elegant form, the crystal clearness, and the sprightly, graceful move-
ments of this little swimmer in the deep sea, render it a not altogether unfit 
vehicle for the commemoration of an honoured name in marine zoology. . . . 
I venture respectfully to appropriate to this marine animal, the surname and 
Christian name of Mrs. Catharine Johnston, as a personal tribute of gratitude 
for the great aid which I have derived from her engravings in the study of 
zoophytology.19 
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Of course it is, in a sense, unfair to put the matter in this way, and to suggest 
a patronizing flourish in this innocent piece of nomenclature; but there is 
some justice in it. Ever since that day when, in Newfoundland, he had come 
to terms with God, Philip Gosse had, consciously or not, felt himself in a 
position of privilege. Nothing illustrates this attitude more clearly than the 
nature of his prayers. 
Edmund Gosse has vividly described how his father, with clenched fists 
and cracking fingers, knelt nightly and wrestled with God, his supplica-
tions occasionally turning into outright demands. From other sources we 
can gather what the objects of those demands were. There were three things 
during his life that Philip Gosse wanted very badly indeed, and to which 
he expressly devoted a great deal of his spiritual energy in prayer; and in the 
end, to all appearances, God failed to live up to his commitments, for none 
of the three requests was granted. The first, and most persistent, was in-
spired by his reading, as a young man, Habershon's Dissertation on the 
Prophetic Scriptures, in which the Second Coming of Christ was vividly an-
ticipated; in his own words: "I immediately began a practice, which I have 
pursued uninterruptedly for forty-six years, of constantly praying that I may 
be one of the favoured saints who shall never taste of death, but be alive and 
remain until the coming of the Lord, to be 'clothed upon with my house 
which is from heaven.' " 2 0 This is not an infrequent prayer among evangelical 
Christians, who in general, however, seem content to die without a feeling 
of having been cheated. Not so Philip Gosse. Even in life his confidence 
was such that he lived in momentary expectation of this apotheosis, and 
would be chagrined when it did not occur: "He would calculate, by reference 
to prophecies in the Old and New Testament, the exact date of this event; 
the date would pass, without the expected Advent, and he would be more 
than disappointed,—he would be incensed. Then he would understand that 
he must have made some slight error in calculation, and the pleasures of 
anticipation would recommence." 2 1 But at death it was not a question of 
miscalculation. His second wife, Eliza Gosse (nee Brightwen), wrote in a 
short memoir that "this hope of being caught up before death continued to 
the last, and its non-fulfilment was an acute disappointment to him. It un-
doubtedly was connected with the deep dejection of his latest hours on 
earth." 2 2 
The second prayer concerned his son, Edmund, and was of especial im-
portance to him as incorporating the last wish of his first wife. Philip and 
Emily Gosse had, from the beginning, dedicated their child, like Samuel, 
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to the service of the Lord; and Emily, dying of cancer in 1857, reiterated 
that dedication in the most solemn and saintly manner possible, so that God 
himself, it seemed, must be bound to accept it and ensure its consummation. 
For many years all was well, and when Edmund was publicly baptized and 
admitted to the communion of the Brethren at the age of twelve Philip Gosse 
felt the sacred responsibility to be almost discharged. But in truth Edmund 
had hardly known what he was doing, or that any other life than that among 
the Brethren was conceivable, and when he went to London as a young man 
to work in the British Museum he discovered that his tastes and talents lay 
in other directions. Gradually severing his links with the Evangelical Move-
ment, he entered upon a career as a man of letters. Philip Gosse wrote 
angrily to his son and prayed angrily to his Maker, but in vain. 
There remains one episode out of the three in Philip Gosse's life of 
prayer. It was of shorter duration, but its implications were of vastly greater 
scope, and its historical interest is such that it will be dealt with in a section 
by itself. 
Ill 
Protestant Christianity, as Martineau somewhere remarks, is built upon 
the authority of the Bible, as Catholicism is built upon that of the Church. 
The vulnerability of the first position, as compared with the flexibility of 
the second, is obvious; for the Church can discreetly change its mind, while 
the Bible, as a historical document, is by definition incapable of adapting to 
novelty. Catholicism survived the nineteenth century much better, in its own 
sphere of influence, than Protestantism did, for this very reason; for in that 
century more than in any other the intellectual sympathies of the world 
were alienated from the Bible by the exposure of many apparently straight-
forward statements of fact in it as ignorant legends. The blow was not, of 
course, mortal. Ignorant people continued to believe the legends, and the 
intellectuals began to treat them as mythical adumbrations of profound truths. 
But those few really educated men to whom the Bible had been genuinely 
and directly authoritative experienced a most disturbing conflict of loyalties. 
Philip Gosse is a perfect example of the type. 
The greatest problem before 1858, when Darwin and Wallace brought 
out into the open the question of the origin of species, was geological. Ac-
cording to Archbishop Ussher's reading of Genesis there could not, in 1857 
(the year in which Gosse published his own work on the subject), be any-
thing in the world more than 5,861 years old; according to rapidly accumulat-
ing stratigraphical and paleontological evidence there was scarcely anything 
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of interest in the world whose history was not much longer than that by 
hundreds of thousands, even millions, of years. The stratigraphy might be 
accommodated, at a stretch, by introducing that famous gap of aeons between 
the first and second verses of Genesis 1, but this did not help the paleontology, 
especially that of species closely related to living ones, even identical with 
them. The "days" of creation might be extended to cover geological ages, 
but there were difficulties there about the order of appearance of fossils in the 
stratigraphical record, and besides, to the purists, this seemed already to be 
taking hardly permissible liberties with the manifest declarations of the 
Holy Spirit. These were grave perplexities for those "to whom," in Gosse's 
own words, 
the veracity of God is as dear as life. They cannot bear to see it impugned; 
they know that it cannot be overthrown; they are assured that He who gave 
the Word, and He who made the worlds, is One Jehovah, who cannot be 
inconsistent with Himself. But they cannot shut their eyes to the startling 
fact, that the records which seem legibly written on His created works do 
flatly contradict the statements which seem to be plainly expressed in His 
word. 
Here is a dilemma. A most painful one to the reverent mind! And many 
reverent minds have laboured long and hard to escape from it . 2 3 
Most of them gave up the struggle, either closing their eyes to the evidence, 
or abandoning the literal interpretation of the Bible, or in many cases just 
learning to live with the dilemma as something too great for the limited 
intelligence of man. This last was at least a humble, if not a comfortable, 
position. But none of this would do for Philip Gosse; he would be content 
with nothing less than a complete solution of the riddle. The incredible thing 
is that he succeeded in finding one so perfect that it was, and remains, proof 
against all refutation. And although he called the book in which he presented 
it to the world "an attempt to untie the geological knot," his method has all 
the audacity of Alexander at Gordium. 
It was this book, Omphalos?4* whose acceptance by the world of science 
formed the object of Gosse's third petition to God. His own attitude towards 
it is made explicit in the preface: 
I would not be considered an opponent of geologists; but rather as a co-
searcher with them after that which they value as highly as I do, T R U T H . 
The path which I have pursued has led me to a conclusion at variance with 
theirs. I have a right to expect that it be weighed; let it not be imputed to 
vanity if I hope that it may be accepted. 
But what I much more ardently desire is, that the thousands of thinking 
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persons, who are scarcely satisfied with the extant reconciliations of Scriptural 
statements and Geological deductions,—who are silenced but not convinced,— 
may find, in the principle set forth in this volume, a stable resting-place. I 
have written it in the constant prayer that the God of Truth will deign so 
to use it; and if He do, to Him be all the glory! 2 5 
That God would deign to use it, given the irresistible force of the argument, 
seemed beyond all doubt. 
Never was a book cast upon the waters [writes Edmund Gosse] with greater 
anticipation of success than was this curious, this obstinate, this fanatical 
volume. My Father lived in a fever of suspense, waiting for the tremendous 
issue. . . . My Father, and my Father alone, possessed the secret of the 
enigma; he alone held the key which could smoothly open the lock of geo-
logical mystery. He offered it, with a glowing gesture, to atheists and Chris-
tians alike. This was to be the universal panacea; this the system of intel-
lectual therapeutics which could not but heal all the maladies of the age. But, 
alas! atheists and Christians alike looked at it and laughed, and threw it 
away. 2 6 
In this the Christians, at least, were ill-advised; but at all events the reception 
of the book meant that here too Gosse's prayers had failed to find a response. 
Had he known at the time, as he did not, of the two other great disappoint-
ments that were in store for him, it might well have broken his spirit; as it 
was, coming soon after the death of his wife, the failure of Omphalos had a 
sufficiently disturbing effect. But it is time to examine the theory itself. Gil-
lispie says that it was "far from original," and Gosse himself admits that he 
got the germ of the idea, partly from an anonymous tract, and partly from 
Granville Penn's The Mineral and Mosaic Geologies of 1822. Nevertheless 
its working out in Omphalos and the detail with which its application is 
followed through bear Gosse's individual mark. 
The book is an account of an imaginary court inquiry, with witnesses. 
One curious thing about it is that, except at the very end, there is no appeal 
to the Bible; and as for Archbishop Ussher, he is not once mentioned. The 
whole tone of the book, in fact, is modern, and with one or two critical 
exceptions there is nothing in it which could not have been accepted by the 
most hardened atheistic geologist of the time. The case for the geological 
ages is presented fully, even sympathetically, as the testimony of "The Wit-
ness for the Macro-Chronology"; strata, fossils of plants and animals, ero-
sion—all the available evidence is brought out. There are two examples 
chosen for special attention: the pterodactyl (illustrated by an unintentionally 
humorous woodcut of a bat with bulging eyes and gaping fangs) and the 
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Jurassic tree Lepidodendron. But when all the data have been marshalled, 
Gosse puts his finger skilfully on the Achilles heel of the whole argument: 
". . . there is nothing here but circumstantial evidence; there is no direct 
testimony. . . . You will say, 'It is the same thing; we have seen the skeleton 
of the one, and the crushed trunk of the other, and therefore we are as sure 
of their past existence as if we had been there at the time.' No, it is not the 
same thing; it is not quite the same thing; N O T Q U I T E . . . . It is only by 
a process of reasoning that you infer they lived at all ." 2 7 Of course he is quite 
right; the inference of causes from effects commits a logical fallacy. Sciences 
which deal with the past, or with the unobservable of any kind, constantly 
commit it—they have no alternative. This fact is tacitly admitted, and then 
quite properly forgotten, as far as the daily work of the scientist is concerned. 
But when somebody like Gosse gleefully draws attention to it there is 
absolutely nothing that can be brought forward in its defense—the only 
recourse is a challenge to the critic to produce an alternative, and equally 
plausible, explanation of the effects as they appear. Such a challenge Gosse 
was quite prepared to meet. 
His own theory invokes two postulates, the creation of matter and the 
persistence of species. "I assume that at some period or other in past eternity 
there existed nothing but the Eternal God, and that He called the universe 
into being out of nothing. I demand also, in opposition to the development 
hypothesis, the perpetuity of specific characters, from the moment when the 
respective creatures were called into being, till they cease to be." 2 8 As a 
matter of fact the second postulate is superfluous—Gosse's theory, while it 
certainly removes the necessity for a theory of development (or of variation 
and natural selection), is not incompatible with such a theory. And as for 
the first, although he refuses to discuss it, nobody was in a position to main-
tain that there was any better account available of the origin of the universe, 
assuming that it had an origin. At least the Christians could accept the point 
without difficulty. Now creation is generally taken to be a beginning of 
history, and thereby also of natural history—the first verse of Genesis makes 
the idea explicit. It certainly is a beginning in some sense, but Gosse's reflec-
tions led him to see that it could not be so in the way in which, for example, 
birth is. Birth is the beginning of a phase, but it depends on an earlier phase, 
namely prenatal development, whereas creation must be an absolute begin-
ning de novo, depending upon no antecedents whatever except the will of 
the Creator. Suppose a creator setting about the creation of some natural 
object, a fern, a butterfly, a cow; at what stage of its existence should he 
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choose to call it into being? We might unthinkingly choose the mature 
form; but is there any reason why this should be preferred to an immature 
or embryonic form? Is any stage fundamentally more suitable than any 
other as a starting-point of natural history? Gosse concluded not—in-
deed that there is no such thing as a natural beginning of this necessarily 
ultimate sort, the court of nature being, in fact, circular. "It is evident that 
there is no one point in the history of any single creature, which is a legiti-
mate beginning of existence. . . . The cow is as inevitable a sequence of the 
embryo, as the embryo is of the cow." 2 9 Such a beginning must, therefore, 
be supernatural. "Creation, the sovereign fiat of Almighty Power, gives us 
the commencing point, which we in vain seek in nature. But what is creation? 
It is the sudden bursting into a circle"*0 And just as the life-cycle of the 
individual is closed upon itself, so the cycle of species, of life itself, of the 
planet and the solar and stellar systems, may in principle be ever repeating, 
from eternity to eternity, only to be commenced or terminated by an irruption 
from without. 
Gosse's stroke of genius thus lay in separating the question of creation 
from the question of history altogether. The older view has its classical 
expression in Donne: "That then this Beginning was, is matter of faith, and 
so, infallible. When it was, is matter of reason, and therefore various and 
perplex't." 3 1 Gosse brought it all into the province of faith by suggesting the 
possibility that natural objects might be created with a history, or at least 
with the appearance of one. And this suggestion, once made, ceased to be 
a suggestion and became an indispensable necessity: a natural object could 
not be a natural object without an apparent history. A tree would not be a 
tree without rings, which indicate its age, and even a newly created tree must 
have rings. A man would not be a man without a navel, Sir Thomas Browne 
to the contrary notwithstanding. 
The whole organisation of the creature thus newly called into existence, 
looks back to the course of an endless circle in the past. Its whole structure 
displays a series of developments, which as distinctly witness to former 
conditions as do those which are presented in the cow, the butterfly, and the 
fern, of the present day. But what former conditions ? The conditions thus 
witnessed unto, as being necessarily implied in the present organisation, 
were non-existent; the history was a perfect blank till the moment of creation. 
The past conditions or stages of existence in question, can indeed be as 
triumphantly inferred by legitimate deduction from the present, as can those 
of our cow or butterfly; they rest on the very same evidences; they are 
identically the same in every respect, except in this one, that they were unreal. 
They exist only in their results; they are effects which never had causes. 
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Perhaps it may help to clear my argument if I divide the past develop-
ments of organic life, which are necessarily, or at least legitimately, inferrible 
from present phenomena, into two categories, separated by the violent act of 
creation. Those unreal developments whose apparent results are seen in the 
organism at the moment of its creation, I will call prochronic, because time 
was not an element in them; while those which have subsisted since creation, 
and have had actual existence, I will distinguish as diachronic, as occurring 
during time. 
Now, again I repeat, there is no imaginable difference to sense between 
the prochronic and diachronic development 3 2 
Natural history thus appears as an unbroken progression, from some un-
imaginable beginning in the mind of God to the state of the world at present; 
somewhere in between an extrinsic act of creation occurred, and as prochronic 
events ceased, diachronic ones—identical in every essential point—began. 
When did this take place? Is there any way of deducing it from the evidence? 
Obviously not: "The commencement, as a fact, I must learn from testimony; 
I have no means whatever of inferring it from phenomena." 3 3 Fortunately 
the testimony is available. God need not have told us when the Creation 
occurred, but as a matter of fact he has done so, in Genesis, and it would be 
ungrateful—not to say foolish or even impious—in men of science to over-
look the fact. So far they have "not allowed for the Law of Prochronism in 
Creation,"3 4 but without it all calculation is useless; "the amount of error 
thus produced we have no means of knowing; much less of eliminating it ." 3 5 
Accordingly every scrap of evidence for the Macro-Chronology contains a 
fatal flaw; and, as Gosse triumphantly concludes: "The field is left clear and 
undisputed for the one Witness on the opposite side, whose testimony is as 
follows:— 
" I N SIX DAYS JEHOVAH MADE H E A V E N A N D EARTH, T H E 
SEA, AND ALL T H A T IN T H E M IS.' " 3 6 
But what, after all, did this victory amount to ? To begin with, it showed 
that there had never really been a struggle: "I do not know that a single 
conclusion, now accepted, would need to be given up, except that of actual 
chronology. And even in respect of this, it would be rather a modification 
than a relinquishment of what is at present held; we might still speak of the 
inconceivably long duration of the processes in question, provided we under-
stand ideal instead of actual time;—that the duration was projected in the 
mind of God, and not really existent."3 7 Reduced to this, the conclusion is 
merely metaphysical, that is to say empirically empty; to assert that the 
world was created is rather like asserting that overnight everything in it has 
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doubled in size, including rulers and retinae—nobody can tell the difference. 
One might as well retort that really everything has halved in size, or that 
everything has been uncreated, the former existence being real and the 
present ideal, for all that any experiment can possibly indicate to the contrary. 
Put in another way, Gosse's claim comes to the same thing as maintaining 
that, before creation, Berkeley's philosophical position was the correct one, 
while after it Locke's was. Unfortunately most men persisted in seeing 
more in it than that, continuing to believe that there was a genuine difference 
of opinion between the geologists and the Holy Ghost, that it was impossible 
to agree with both but that it mattered which one agreed with. Gosse was 
undoubtedly right—it did not matter, at least not in the way that most men 
supposed, since (apart from the extra-scientific point of faith) one could agree 
with both; but few could follow his intellectual maneuvers, perfectly rational 
though they were. 
And then any victory, even the most conclusive, becomes hollow when 
nobody takes the slightest notice of it, or when the few who do misinterpret 
it completely. Having instructed the printers to prepare an unusually large 
edition of his book against what he was certain would be a universal de-
mand, Gosse found himself in possession of most of it, while the few copies 
that went out produced a critical reaction of a totally unexpected sort. The 
theory of Omphalos, after suitable distortion—not only by the malicious— 
became monstrous, asserting nothing less than that God had placed fossils 
in the rocks for the express purpose of deceiving scientists into thinking that 
the earth was older than it really was. Perhaps the cruelest blows were struck 
by that perpetually well-meaning, infallibly clumsy Victorian, Charles Kings-
ley. 
We have reason to be grateful for Kingsley's blunt insensitivity, which 
produced, like the irritating specks of sand in oysters, responses of great 
beauty in diverse quarters—the two most famous cases are, of course, New-
man's Apologia pro Vita sua and Huxley's celebrated letter on the death 
of his son. There is no record of a similar reaction on Gosse's part, but the 
stimulus was certainly no less painful. The theory itself, it is true, was per-
fectly acceptable to Kingsley: "Your distinction between diachronism and 
prochronism [he wrote to Gosse], instead of being nonsense, as it is in the 
eyes of the Locke-beridden Nominalist public, is to me, as a Platonist and 
realist, an indubitable and venerable truth." 3 8 But Gosse's use of the theory 
to justify the geologists in the form, if not the substance, of their conclusions, 
while at the same time preserving the literal truth of Scripture, was too 
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much for him. "Your book tends to prove this—that if we accept the fact 
of absolute creation, God becomes a Deus quidam deceptor. . . . You make 
God tell a lie. It is not my reason, but my conscience which revolts here." 3 9 
Such obtuseness was bad enough—for Gosse's whole point had been to show 
that God had not lied at all, that indeed he had been scrupulously honest 
(as Gosse himself would have been in similar circumstances), correcting in 
one mode of communication, namely Biblical revelation, a possible miscon-
ception which might arise in the interpretation of a message in another mode, 
namely geological evidence—but there was worse to come. Kingsley, self-
confident as ever, went on: 
I cannot give up the painful and slow conclusion of five and twenty years' 
study of geology, and believe that God has written on the rocks one enormous 
and superfluous lie for all mankind. 
To this painful dilemma you have brought me, and will, I fear, bring 
hundreds. It will not make me throw away my Bible. I trust and hope. I 
know in whom I have believed, and can trust Him to bring my faith safe 
through this puzzle, as He has through others; but for the young I do fear. 
I would not for a thousand pounds put your book into my children's hands. 
. . . Your demand on implicit faith is just as great as that required for transub-
stantiation, and, believe me, many of your arguments, especially in the 
opening chapter, are strangely like those of the old Jesuits, and those one 
used to hear from John Henry Newman fifteen years ago, when he, copying 
the Jesuits, was trying to undermine the grounds of all rational belief and 
human science, in order that, having made his victims (among whom were 
some of my dearest friends) believe nothing, he might get them by a 
"Nemesis of faith" to believe anything, and rush blindfold into superstition. 
Poor wretch, he was caught in his own snare... . 4 0 
Bitter words for a supporter of the onion man! and especially bitter the 
remark about children, for whose mental and moral improvement Gosse, 
in his popular writings, had been so solicitous. But then Kingsley and Gosse 
were fundamentally at cross purposes in this matter. Kingsley's aversion 
for Rome was intellectual, Gosse's emotional; Gosse's interest in religion 
and science was intellectual, Kingsley's sentimental. The comparison of 
Gosse and Newman, ghastly and inconceivable as it would have seemed to 
them both, was not in fact entirely unjust, for Newman, in the Apologia, 
says: "From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle 
of my religion: I know no other religion; I cannot enter into the idea of 
any other sort of religion; religion, as a mere sentiment, is to me a dream 
and a mockery"4 1—in which substituting for "dogma" "the infallibility of 
the Scriptures" renders Gosse's belief exactly. Both Newman and Gosse had 
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seen that the defense of truth on the highest level leads sometimes to an ap-
pearance of deception on a lower, and both had been reprimanded for it by 
Kingsley, to whom truth was a simple, straightforward, rather typically 
English sort of thing. 
Newman, however, was the better off; for the Church provides an en-
vironment friendly to such subtleties, let infidels protest as they may; but 
what is a lonely Protestant to do, when God refuses to look after his own 
interests, and allows his shortsighted and enthusiastic servants to spoil the 
work of those who are more perceptive and austere? Nothing could shake 
Gosse's faith in the Bible, but its author, engaged as he was in guiding the 
Kingsleys of the world safely through their puzzles, might perhaps be 
guilty of negligence. In his reaction to the failure of Omphalos Gosse almost 
suspected as much. "I think there was added to his chagrin with all his 
fellow mortals a first tincture of that heresy which was to attack him later on. 
It was now that, I fancy, he began, in his depression, to be angry with God." 4 2 
But this was not the petulant anger of a disappointed scholar. It is exactly 
here that Gosse's enormous intellectual strength shows to its best advantage— 
the strength, in fact, not only of his intellect but also of his will. He knew 
he was right, even if God did not. And he was not broken; four years later 
he is at it again, in a second series of The Romance of Natural History, in-
corporating more and more of the contemporary advances of science into his 
own scheme, never yielding an inch in his fidelity to the inspired word. 
Kingsley had also accused him of the apostasy of evolution: "I don't see how 
yours [i.e., Gosse's prochronism] differs from the transmutation of species 
theory, which your argument, if filled out fairly, would, I think, be." 4 3 In-
deed there was a superficial similarity, but Gosse was careful to make the 
distinction for those who cared to look for it. Species may, without violating 
the sanctity of Scripture, succeed one another; they may not evolve from 
one another. 
We know that the rate of mortality among individuals of a species, speaking 
generally, is equalled by the rate of birth, and we may suppose this balance 
of life to be paralleled when the unit is a species, and not an individual. If the 
Word of God contained anything either in statement or principle contrary to 
such a supposition, I would not entertain it for a moment, but I do not know 
that it does. I do not know that it is anywhere implied that God created no 
more after the six days' work was done. His Sabbath-rest having been broken 
by the incoming of sin, we know from John v. 17, that He continued to work 
without interruption; and we may fairly conclude that progressive creation 
was included as a part of that unceasing work. 4 4 
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Gosse's devotion and ingenuity in the service of science and religion were 
unlimited; and in the end even the total indifference of both parties was not 
enough to stop his heroic rearguard action in defense of their divinely ap-
pointed unity. 
IV 
Edmund Gosse's charge against his father is that of inhumanity. "He 
regarded man rather as a blot upon the face of nature, than as its highest 
and most dignified development. . . . Among the five thousand illustrations 
which he painted, I do not think there is one to be found in which an attempt 
is made to depict the human form. Man was the animal he studied less than 
any other, understood most imperfectly, and, on the whole, was least in-
terested in." 4 5 There is, in fact, at least one illustration containing human 
figures, but it only serves to reinforce the charge: the preface to The Ocean 
is accompanied by a woodcut of "The Whale Fishery," showing two men 
being tossed out of a boat into the jaws of a gigantic cetacean. As to the 
other assertions, Edmund may have been right—certainly his own experience 
led to no other conclusion. And yet it is perhaps too easy a judgment. One of 
the tragedies of an over-intellectual faith is that it may conceal, effectively and 
permanently, more natural feelings. Abraham, with his sons in his bosom, is 
a model of paternal affection, but it is a grim reflection that, had there been 
no ram in the thicket, nothing would have prevented him from murdering 
Isaac. Kierkegaard makes of Abraham a hero of faith, and the heroes of 
faith are generally those for whom, in the end, everything works out right, 
either in martyrdom or in earthly felicity. For Gosse, in a sense, nothing 
worked out right, yet his life, although it ended in dejection, did not end 
in defeat. As in Mr. Van Voorst's office, years before, his self-possession could 
be overcome only in extremis. He was, to use another favorite term of 
Kierkegaard's—a term of the highest approbation—an individual; and if his 
behavior as an individual was eccentric (as it undoubtedly was) that very 
fact made it, in spite of his frequently expressed wish to give all the credit 
to God, a tribute to the human strength of his own character. 
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Swinburne, the Spectator in 1862, 
and Walter Bagehot 
by W. D. PADEN 
In his life of Swinburne, Edmund Gosse wrote1 that "in his twenty-fifth 
year" (that is, before 5 April 1862), apparently through Monckton Milnes, 
the poet met Richard Holt Hutton, who had been for about half a year the 
part-proprietor and co-editor of the Spectator, and who "invited him to 
write, in prose and verse, for his paper." The most probable interpretation of 
this airy phrase is that Hutton invited Swinburne to submit some verses 
and critical prose, without any explicit promise of publication. He could 
scarcely say less, and he was not likely to say more; in any case, the con-
sequences of the invitation will be canvassed in this note.2 
During the year the Spectator printed seven poems signed by Swinburne,3 
which he may have submitted in one group, in April; we do not know. The 
other verse printed in the paper in 1862 may safely be dismissed, as not his. 
Professor Chew inferred4 from the variations between the texts of three of 
the poems in 1862 and in Poems and Ballads (1866) that in the earlier year 
"Hutton was exercising, and Swinburne was submitting to, a political and 
moral censorship"; but one must object that the changes in "The Sundew" 
have no relevance, and the additional stanzas in "Faustine" and "A Song in 
Time of Order" may with at least equal probability be supposed insertions 
made after the poems' first publication. On 7 June appeared a respectful 
letter 5 over Swinburne's signature but explicitly representing the consensus 
of a number of men, in protest against the castigation that Meredith's Modern 
hove had received a fortnight earlier. To the letter Hutton appended a note 
in which he remarked that "we insert this gladly, from personal respect to 
our correspondent, whose opinion on any poetical question should be worth 
more than most men's," before passing on to a brief, staunch defense of the 
offending review. In sum, the beginning of the connection was auspicious. 
Gosse wrote that "it is less easy to speak of the prose contributions, because 
they were anonymous. Were it not for passages in private letters,6 it would be 
dangerous to assert, what, however, those familiar with Swinburne's early style 
could hardly question, that the series of five long articles on Les Miserables 
of Victor Hugo, and on Les Fleurs du Mai of Baudelaire, are his.7 There are 
several others which I am privately certain are also Swinburne's, but I de-
precate mere conjecture, and will not name them." He added in a footnote 
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that according to his information no documents of the period which might 
throw light on the matter were extant in the office of the Spectator. 
Being less decorous than Gosse, Professors Chew and Lafourcade made 
public their surmises concerning Swinburne's further contributions in prose. 
Chew wrote that "the evidence of Swinburne's early style is so convincing 
that I am willing to risk conjecture. I seem to see his hand in several, but of 
only one article am I positive . . . ." This single article was a review of Mrs. 
Browning's Last Poems, of which Chew wrote: "Such phrases as 'The im-
pulse of her eager and rich imagination in an age of pale thoughts and weak 
instincts' or 'The vanishing of a genuine poetic force in this languid and 
pallid mental world' bear Swinburne's sign manual upon them. The review 
contains a brief suggestive passage on the contrast between the superficiality 
of feeling and the profundity of imagination. Mrs. Browning, the writer says 
—and again the turn of thought is Swinburne's—'yields herself almost with 
the lashed fury of a Pythoness' to feeling." Professor Chew believed that 
reviews of Sir Henry Taylor's St. Clement's Eve and Miss Rossetti's Goblin 
Market and Other Poems were much in Swinburne's manner: "that both 
poets were among those whom Swinburne delighted to honor makes his 
authorship the more likely." He felt less certain about reviews of The Bothie 
of Toper-na-Puosich and of Clough's Poems; but he asked whether Swin-
burne's voice may not be heard in a notice of Richard Garnett's Relics of 
Shelley, a protest against the publication of scattered scraps of Shelley's verse. 
And he ended his discussion by saying that "whether these identifications 
be accepted universally or not, it is quite evident that in order to make 
his forthcoming Bibliography of Swinburne quite exhaustive Mr. T . J . Wise 
will do well to examine the columns of The Spectator of 1862 with the most 
painstaking attention." There is no sign in Wise's volumes that he felt any 
need to supplement the cautious revelation of his friend and literary col-
laborator, Edmund Gosse. 
Nine years later Professor Chew repeated his views, in phrases sufficiently 
varied to require consideration: "I think it more likely that Hutton suppressed 
[the additional stanzas to 'A Song in Time of Order'] than that they were 
afterwards added by Swinburne, for they contain allusions to the red flag 
of revolution, to the iniquities of the papacy, to 'Buonaparte the bastard,' to 
the scandals of the French political prison at Cayenne, and to Austrian 
tyranny—dubious topics to offer to Hutton's circle of Tory readers. Taustine' 
was printed with the omission of stanza xxxiii, which contains an allusion 
to abnormal eroticism."8 But Hutton had no circle of Tory readers; the 
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reference indicates some fundamental miscomprehension of the man, his 
work, and his time. The Spectator in 1862 contained strongly phrased state-
ments of idealistic dissatisfaction with almost all British institutions except 
the Throne, of which the occupant herself was not exempt from respectful 
censure.9 True, these were accompanied by affirmations in behalf of Faith, 
then undergoing a siege by the forces of science and agnosticism—enemies 
which Hutton surveyed with courteous candor from a very broad theological 
position. After a young manhood of hearty Unitarian idealism, he had been 
attracted to the affirmations of the Rev. Frederick Denison Maurice, and he 
remained a follower of that harried inquirer throughout the remainder of his 
own long career. 1 0 But had the readers of the Spectator been Tories, Chew's 
argument would remain circular, for he assumes the point he desires to prove. 
And finally, one may scan stanza xxxiii of "Faustine" in vain for any "allu-
sion to abnormal eroticism," unless it consists of the word epicene. An editor 
who had passed stanzas xxx and xxxi cannot be supposed to have balked at 
stanza xxxiii. To continue, Professor Chew was "willing to suggest that it 
is just possible that reviews of Henry Taylor's St. Clement's Eve, of Christina 
Rossetti's Goblin Market, and of Clough's work (two notices) are by him; 
that the earlier portions of a review of Richard Garnett's Relics of Shelley 
are so much in his manner as to make his authorship almost a certainty; and 
that beyond doubt he wrote the review of Mrs. Browning's Last Poems/'11 
One year before this note appeared, M. Lafourcade had written that "la 
conjecture est ici dangereuse, car le style est la seule preuve que Ton puisse 
invoquer. Signalons toutefois qu'un compte rendu du 10 mai sur le St-
Clement's Eve de Henry Taylor nous parait etre du a la plume de Swin-
burne. Certaines particularites de vocabulaire (par exemple: sheet lightning 
etc.) ne peuvent guere tromper." 1 2 He did not revert to the subject in his 
later volume upon Swinburne (1932). 
In the past many attributions based on prose style have proved untrust-
worthy; and in this case the technique has special dangers, for the reviews in 
question were Swinburne's first attempts at professional prose, and might be 
expected to resemble his later work only to a degree. But more systematic 
objections must be raised. The attributions rehearsed above may be termed 
uncontrolled; they not only disregard the available non-stylistic evidence, 
but assume that such evidence leaves it equally probable that Swinburne did 
or did not write any particular review. They do not consider chronology. They 
do not consider the reviews as wholes, nor do they advert to the presence or 
absence of passages which it is unlikely or impossible that Swinburne wrote. 
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They do not take into account the fact that twinned adjectives, lyrical meta-
phors, theories about the creative imagination, and pleasure in the dramas 
of Henry Taylor and the lyrics of Christina Rossetti were not in 1862 con-
fined to Swinburne. They include no attempt to discover what other men 
wrote for the Spectator, or were close associates of its editor at the time, nor 
any consideration of the probability that some of the reviews in question were 
written by such men. 
These cavils need not be argued in relation to the two reviews of Clough, 
for those were written by Hutton himself. The present writer had obtained 
adequate proof for the attribution when he learned of two letters in the 
Times Literary Supplement of 1959 in which Mr. Robert H. Tener an-
nounced the discovery.13 Mr. Tener's argument on the point may be repeated 
here concisely, in less tentative terms than those his modesty led him to 
employ. Hutton's well-known essay on Clough was published in the second 
volume of his Essays Theological and Literary in 1871, and suffered no 
significant subsequent change. In the single volume of his Literary Essays 
reprinted in 1896, the year before his death, the text on pages 291 to 296, 
inclusive, is almost identical with the Spectator's review of The Bothie (25 
January 1862); and the text on pages 286 to 290, inclusive, presents in more 
generous phrasing the central concepts of the Spectator's review of the Poems 
(12 July 1862). Anyone aware of the close friendship between Clough and 
Hutton would, in fact, be surprised if the two reviews should be proved the 
work of anyone other than the editor. 
Mr. Tener quoted an autobiographical narrative by Charles Henry Pear-
son, who affirmed that for nearly a year in 1861-1862 he "wrote an article a 
week, chiefly reviews of books" for the Spectator. He continued: "I also 
contributed some fugitive pieces of poetry. They were, however, over-
shadowed by two or three of Swinburne's, which first saw the light in the 
Spectator. I came more successfully into competition with Swinburne as a 
reviewer of Victor Hugo. I took the first part of Les Miserables [i.e., volumes 
1 and 2] , he the second [volumes 3 and 4 ] . 1 4 My praise was much more 
jealously measured out; but Victor Hugo himself preferred my article, ascer-
tained from Louis Blanc that I was the author, and wrote to thank me for 
i t ." 1 5 Of the half-dozen poems in the Spectator that may have been Pearson's, 
the less said the better. As for Louis Blanc, though he scrupulously refrained 
from political conspiracy of any kind during his exile in England, he was a 
friend and warm admirer of Hugo, and, being in close touch with men of 
letters, no doubt had made a point of discovering the authors of the reviews 
9 4 
SWINBURNE, THE Spectator, AND BAGEHOT 
9 5 
of Les Miserables, including that in the Spectator, and informing Hugo. 
Whether the Master implied in his letter to Pearson that Blanc had inquired 
at his request, we do not know; it is more probable that Pearson himself 
made the flattering assumption. It does not seem likely that Hugo would 
express any preference between two reviews of his work in one journal, 
and his estimate of Pearson's article, as far as we know it—"bien remarquable 
et bien eleve"16—suggests no particular enthusiasm; possibly Hugo expressed 
a preference for the Spectator's first review over those in other journals, and 
Pearson, conscious of his rivalry with Swinburne, in some way misconceived 
the compliment. In July 1862 Pearson took over the editorship of the National 
Review, of which Hutton had until then been the editor; their relations 
remained cordial. 
The Spectator's fifth article on Les Miserables, a review of the authorized 
translation into English, Mr. Tener considered possibly Pearson's but "al-
most certainly not Swinburne's." Its latter paragraphs are pervaded by a liberal 
but gradualist political theory that cannot be supposed the poet's. 1 6 a Swin-
burne's study of Hugo, then, consisted of the three articles of 21 June, 26 July, 
and 16 August, only. In this connection the invaluable M. Blanc also seems 
to have been active. Much later the poet wrote to Gosse that the first letter 
he received from Hugo came "in the summer of '62. . . . It was written in 
acknowledgment—very far too kindly expressed—of some crude and over-
bold articles (not signed) on Les Miserables which he had actually been at 
the trouble to trace to my hand by inquiry after the author's name." 1 7 It 
seems clear, despite Swinburne's plural reference, that this first letter con-
cerned only his first article, that of 21 June, and that later he sent copies of 
the second and the third to Guernsey, where they lay awaiting Hugo's lei-
sure—or rather, since Hugo could not read English, the leisure of his en-
tourage—for four months; for the Master's further letter of approval, which 
refers to two reviews, was dated 26 December 1862. "Ces remerciements 
n'etaient rien de plus que ceux que Victor Hugo adressait journellement a 
ses admirateurs, sans se preoccuper le moins du monde de leur existence 
particuliere, de leur personnalite, ou de leur absence de personnalite."18 
Mr. Tener also wrote that "a comparison of the August 2 review, Relics 
of Shelley, with Hutton's 'Shelley's Poetical Mysticism,' National Review, 
X V I (January 1863), 62-87 (revised for Essays Theological and Literary), 
will indicate a strong possibility of Hutton's authorship of that article, too. 
I am privately convinced that Hutton reviewed Goblin Market, also. I am 
much less certain, however, about the authorship of the review of Henry 
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Taylor, though I think that Swinburne probably wrote, as Chew says, the 
appraisal of Mrs. Browning's Last Poems. The passage in the latter article 
—'yields herself almost with the lashed fury of a Pythoness'—which Chew 
finds so telling is indeed persuasively Swinburne's." But in connection with 
the article on the Relics of Shelley one does not need to revert to the National 
Review of 1863, or even to the Essays Theological and Literary. To the text 
of his essay of 1863 Hutton later prefixed almost fourteen pages drawn from 
his review of Dowden's life of Shelley (Spectator, 11 and 18 December 1886), 
but otherwise it underwent no significant change during his lifetime. One 
may compare: " . . . the strange perfection of his pantheism . . . seems to us 
one of the central features of all his poetry. It shows senses of ethereal fire, 
an intellect of wonderful subtlety, a soul of pure magnanimity, but no sha-
dow of divine responsibility, no consciousness of living under an eternal eye 
and will . . ." (Spectator [2 August 1862], p. 860) and "His Pantheism was 
sincere, and at times no doubt a kind of faith to him; but belief in a uni-
versal essence gave no solidity to the order of the world, no firm law to the 
flux and reflux of human desire, had no power to accept the command, 'Be 
still, and know that I am God'" (Literary Essays, 1896, pp. 186-87). There 
can be no doubt that the two passages, which form the climaxes of the two 
essays, were written by the same man, for they contain the same very special 
conception of Shelley's thought. And in any case, it cannot have been the 
Swinburne of 1862 who wrote, in the Spectators review of the Relics of 
Shelley, "There is much of Shelley's life, looked at as a whole, which re-
lieves the naked naturalism of his theory of love." 
Nor can Swinburne be supposed the author of the review of Mrs. Brown-
ing's Last Poems, for he would not have approved the regretfully patroniz-
ing view of Aeschylus and Sophocles implied in its climactic passage: ". . . 
her manipulation of Greek myths is often eminently striking. She opens, as 
it were, a chasm of infinite depth beneath them, showing the thin crust 
which after all separated them from the deeper thought of divine truth." 
Nor can it have been Swinburne, despite his admiration for cats, who se-
lected for praise from St. Clement's Eve a girl's description of her dream of 
being a cat, and predicted "a well-deserved immortality" for the lines, spoken 
by a pampered feline, 
And I was fat and sleek, but in my heart 
There rose a long and melancholy mew, 
Which meant, "I must have mice." 
Nor, in fine, can it have been Swinburne who described Miss Rossetti's lyric, 
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'A Birthday/ as a delicate trifle containing one line of true poetry, and urged 
her to attempt more worthy genres. 
As divination from prose style has failed, another method may be brought 
forward. A man accepted as a reviewer by a Victorian editor usually was 
assigned a definite area to which he was expected to confine his efforts and 
from which he might expect other reviewers as a rule to be excluded. Swin-
burne was already widely read in French literature, and proud of his knowl-
edge; in their first conversation he may be supposed to have mentioned it to 
Hutton. If he was regarded by the editor as anything like a regular con-
tributor, and therefore given any kind of priority in a defined territory, he 
may be supposed to have written about French literature. Certainly, the four 
articles which we know to be his support such an assumption, for they deal 
with Hugo and Baudelaire. 
During 1862 the Spectator printed twenty reviews,19 which dealt in some 
way with France, her history and thought, her life, or her literature. Ten of 
these may be dismissed as irrelevant here (see Appendix A ) ; the remaining 
ten, which deal with French literature, include the six reviews advanced by 
Gosse and four others on, respectively, Mme. de Gasparin's Les Horizons 
Prochains (22 February), M. Davesies de Pontes' translation of Childe 
Harold into French (30 August), Armand Renaud's La Griffe Rose (13 
September), and the journals of Eugenie de Guerin (18 October). The arti-
cle on Mme. de Gasparin, a devout Calvinist, contains a thoughtful and 
bitter contrast between the relations of religious sects in England and in 
France; the article on Eugenie de Guerin presents her as "the highest ideal of 
the feminine nature which the Catholic faith, implicitly accepted, is capable 
of forming out of the purest and noblest material of the old French noblesse." 
In other words, the two articles deal with the religious life, rather than the 
literature which records it, and for that reason may also be dismissed from 
our consideration (see Appendix A, again). 
The Spectator's review of M. de Pontes' translation of Childe Harold 
contains nothing Swinburne might not have written. "Byron's rhetoric and 
artistic perfection," it runs, "are the result, not of elaborate polish, which 
might be imitated, but of genius, and a natural command of careless elo-
quence." If the phrase artistic perfection were qualified by the remark that 
in Byron it was subject to disruption by false notes and disintegration 
through loose structure—as the later epithet careless could be taken to imply 
—the estimate of Byron would be strictly consonant with Swinburne's in his 
preface to his Selections from the Wor\s of Lord Byron (1866). The review-
er turns to a regretful censure of M. de Pontes by a definition of metrical ef-
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fects in both English and French verse; the discussion shows a knowledge 
and a confidence that in 1862 few Englishmen shared with Swinburne. But 
the final step towards attributing the review to the poet, the step from possi-
bility to proof, cannot be taken on the basis of the internal evidence. 
Before discussing the review of Armand Renaud it is convenient to state 
our present knowledge of Swinburne's work for the Spectator and the cir-
cumstances in which his connection with the paper was severed, for the 
chronology and circumstances are pertinent to the later argument. He com-
posed a careful article on Theophile de Viau, which Gosse thought doubt-
less written in 1862 ; 2 0 the most probable season seems to be the spring, 
when he also wrote his review of Baudelaire, another careful essay.21 He 
may have written his skit on M. Prudhomme at the International Exhibition 
at any time after the great display opened on 1 May; 2 2 he submitted this to 
Hutton a noticeably long time before December. 2 8 During the spring and 
summer, in a footnote to his poem published on 24 May and in his reviews 
of 21 June, 26 July, and 16 August, Swinburne made a number of casual 
references to two fictitious Frenchmen, Ernest Clouet and Felicien Cossu,2 4 
and sometimes quoted from their works; and during the summer he wrote 
his highly indignant article on Clouet's scurrilous essays, which before 18 
August not only had he lent or sent to Monckton Milnes to amuse him on 
his sickbed, but Milnes had returned.25 This article he submitted to Hutton, 
one may guess in late August or September,2 6 a season when the editor may 
have been out of London on his annual holiday. Swinburne's erotic preoccu-
pation was increased by his long-anticipated acquaintance with the Justine 
of the Marquis de Sade, which he read for the first time a day or so before 
18 August.2 7 Doubtless in his first excited response to the Marquis, in Sep-
tember or October, he wrote his most startling and unprintable hoax, on the 
poems of Felicien Cossu and—elevated beyond prudence—submitted it also 
to Hutton. 2 8 
Swinburne went north to visit Milnes, and left Fryston on 13 December to 
stay with the Trevelyans at Wallington Hall, where he remained through 
2 January 1863.2 9 It was therefore at Wallington that he received Hutton's 
letter of 16 December, 3 0 and learned of the editor's amazement over the 
proofs of the article on Clouet, which he did not really think he could print. 
We know that in his reply Swinburne loftily affirmed that "sanity and de-
cency are the two props of my critical faculty." 3 1 In one of his demure ac-
counts of the incident Gosse wrote that the editor "expostulated severely 
with the poet, [though] not for attempting to hoax the Spectator, which 
Hutton does not seem to have suspected."32 Hutton was described by a close 
9 8 
SWINBURNE, THE Spectator, AND BAGEHOT 
friend as a man "perfectly fearless, entirely just up to his lights of honour, 
so unblemished that during a long life no one ever dared to whisper a word 
against him, essentially truthful and sympathetic, and entirely disdainful of 
all base things. But with all this, he was by no means a milksop, and could 
be very angry on occasion. He kept discipline among his contributors with 
an iron hand." 8 1 3 So far as one may judge, Hutton seems to have read Swin-
burne's climactic effort, on Felicien Cossu, after 16 December, possibly after 
he had consulted some friend with a more extensive vocabulary in demotic 
French; of his final letter to the poet wre have as yet been vouchsafed only 
one clause, perhaps the mildest it contained: "Such verses would blow the 
magazine off the face of the earth." 8 4 Swinburne came south, and wrote to 
Monckton Milnes on 21 January, "Have you read Salammbo? . . . I want to 
review it somewhere; do you know of any place one could get for it? I 
don't want to send any more to the Spectator] I don't approve of their be-
haviour (e.g. never sending one one's own articles, and taking back books 
for review—notamment four volumes of Les Miserables'^), and their prin-
ciples offend my moral sense." 3 6 
For clarity, one should add Gosse's comment on the two articles on 
Clouet and Cossu: ". . . in these curious, and somewhat bewildering [pro-
ductions] we see Swinburne satirizing the Podsnappery of the age which 
supposed all French literature to be of a subversive and horrible immorality, 
and at the same time indulging, by means of ironic censure, in a number of 
outrageously subversive sentiments of his own. . . . " 3 T 
It is noticeable that, for whatever reasons, Swinburne's reviews appeared 
in the Spectator much later in the year than one might expect. The tardiness 
may have been his own; but in later life he did not often retain his prose for 
repeated polishings, and one may suspect that Hutton was responsible for 
much of the delay. All the parts of Les Miserables had been published in 
Brussels by the end of June, yet Swinburne's reviews of the last four parts 
appeared on 21 June (dealing with Parts II and I I I ) , 26 July, and 16 August. 
(In contrast, Pearson's review of Part I, which was published towards the 
last of March, appeared on 12 April.) Swinburne wrote his article on Baude-
laire in the spring; it appeared on 6 September. His skit on M. Prudhomme, 
which he may have written as early as the month of May, lay so long on the 
editor's desk that Hutton apologized when he returned it to the poet in mid-
December in order to obtain his consent to a minor omission. In mid-De-
cember, in fact, Hutton held either two or three unpublished and unexamined 
manuscripts by the poet; his delays may explain why Swinburne did not, so 
far as we know, submit his essay on Theophile de Viau. 3 7 a 
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Actually, the four prose contributions to the paper that we know to be 
Swinburne's appeared regularly at a rate of one a month: to repeat, on 21 
June, 26 July, 16 August, and 6 September. Four of his poems appeared be-
tween 29 April and 31 May; the rest appeared at something like a rate of 
one a month, on 28 June, 26 July, and 6 September. These facts suggest that 
during June Hutton came to consider Swinburne as a partial replacement 
on his staff for Pearson, who departed on the first of July to the National 
Review, though instead of an article a week, and occasional poems, Swin-
burne was to supply an article and a poem each month. That some gap 
existed between the two arrangements may be indicated by the Spectator's 
second review of Les Miserables, which seems a month late, and deals not 
with Part II merely, but with Parts II and III. If these very tentative sugges-
tions have any validity, it is more likely that articles contributed by Swin-
burne but hitherto unidentified will be found in the issues of the latter half or 
latter third of 1862, rather than in those of the earlier months. One article that 
might be Swinburne's, the review of M. de Pontes that appeared on 30 
August, has been discussed above; if it was the poet's, it increases the proba-
bility that others of nearby dates may be his—such as the review of La 
Griffe Rose, of 13 September. 
But here again some preliminary matter should be inserted. The review 
of La Griffe Rose may have some connection with an earlier review of 
Chateau Frissac; or, Home Scenes in France, a novel written by an English-
woman under the nom de plume of Chroniqueuse; the earlier review ap-
peared on 8 March. It may be exhibited by a brief quotation: 
Chroniqueuse has apparently pursued life as a fine art in France until she 
breathes its very atmosphere, while retaining, however, a clear perception of 
the great difference in tone and colour between it and the best English so-
ciety of the same phase. She professes to point her moral against manages de 
convenance. But, in fact, she writes as if it were an offence against the true 
art of life to contract marriages of mere external convenience, mainly because 
a "great passion," and a true affection in married life, are elements of so 
much higher value to society and to all the graces, than any external means, 
that it is a wanton sacrifice of the highest social influences, to put what are 
commonly called worldly considerations before those which lend to the 
world all its refinement and beauty. Such a course degrades life from a fine 
art into one of the vulgarer arts of physical utility. It is not then so much as 
wrong, but as an offence against the true art of social enjoyment, that this 
novelette appears to enter a protest against mercenary motives for the mar-
riage contract.. . . The authoress says in her preface, that "in order to expose 
better the evils of the manage de convenance" she has "per force touched 
upon subjects which, to the pure English mind, will, perhaps, seem some-
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what risquesT We must say that the scene in Madlle. X.'s rooms, to which 
principally allusion must be here made, so far from being essential to the 
drift of the story, is lugged in by head and shoulders, apparently without 
any object, except to lend this questionable interest to the tale, the general 
spirit of which is by no means objectionable. 
The review of La Griffe Rose (13 September) must now be given in 
its entirety: 
The state of French fiction has at length become such that it is scarcely pos-
sible to give in the English language and within the settled conventions of 
English writing, an accurate account of any of its more characteristic pro-
ductions. The plot not only abounds in incidents, but essentially depends on 
relations between men and women which English books never mention, 
which Englishmen call en masse immoral, which none of us, without Con-
tinental assistance, would have the patience or the wish to pursue into their 
natural complexities. An English writer would consider he was advancing 
into debateable if not forbidden ground, if he treated of the events with 
which Sir Cresswell Cresswell is specially concerned.38 Divorce and adultery 
are, perhaps, within the present limits of English art, if treated with rapidity 
and delicacy, and if admitted to be immoral. Not one in twenty even of our 
most popular novelists could handle such topics graphically and dramatically, 
and yet not overstep the prescribed boundaries. Almost every one would 
hazard some expression or venture on some dangerous scene, which would 
exclude his book from "family" perusal, and thereby deprive it of saleability, 
and him of his remuneration. We pay our writers to be moral; and they are 
moral. But the French have no such custom; on the contrary, a French 
novelist is rather expected to be immoral. Among the purchasers of such 
works, probably the majority would feel hurt if they contained no scenes 
which English morals would forbid, and which English women would 
shrink from. A mere infraction of the marriage vow is too trifling a pecca-
dillo, if indeed it is even a peccadillo, to be the subject of an exciting narra-
tive. Dumas fils has indeed contrived to render it proper for modern art. His 
Roman d'une Femme [1848] entirely turns on such on event; but he escaped 
the vice of commonplace by making the wife love her husband, and not 
love her lover all the while that she is guilty of adultery with her lover; and 
thus contrived to make the situation sufficiently piquant. The author of 
Fannym went over to the side of the lover, showed what he considered to 
be a wife, his duties, and described his natural and suitable jealousy of the 
husband. 4 0 His book is intended for an inventory of the duties of a married 
woman towards the admirer whom she does love. In the novel before us, 
M. Renaud 4 1 has undertaken to delineate a phase yet more curious. La 
Griffe Rose is an account of the evil consequences which ensued from a 
married lady's not yielding sufficiently soon to the addresses of an admirer 
whom she does not love. She did yield at last, but it was too late. He com-
mitted suicide and she went into a convent. 
If the plot is not English, its reflections and its fundamental view of life 
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are more un-English still, if possible. Who can translate such sentiments as 
the following? "O grandes courtisanes de tous les temps! ils sont aveugles 
les philosophes qui vous insultent. Qu'ils amassent declamations sur de-
clamations! ils n'empecheront pas que le culte rendu par vous au luxe, a 
Inelegance, a tous les rayonnements de la forme, n'ait sa bonne influence, 
qu'en faisant de vos chambres une feerie, de vos toilettes un reve vous ne 
developpiez le sens artistique; qu'il ne s'exhale de vos dentelles et de vos 
parfums un certain ideal elevant Tame a sa maniere, car tout chemin mene a 
Rome, et toute beaute mene a DieuV Perhaps no one attained to God that 
way before, with whomever else they may have connected themselves. A 
whole volume, too, of utterly un-English reflection may be summed up in 
the following description of a woman's marriage, "Son esclavage de fille 
est fini; elle est femme, c'est-a-dire, en bon francais, elle peut se laisser aimer." 
Very many persons will say that such books ought not to be written; 
that, if written, they ought not to be read, that they express thoughts which 
it is unwise to think and delineate scenes which it is objectionable to imagine. 
As for the writing of such books, we have no call to say anything; the clever 
writers of them, if it is ever needful, will say all which can be said on that 
head much better than we can. It may not be much after all;—still it will be 
much more than anything we could say. But as to the reading of them, we 
think there are reasons why persons of sufficient age and sufficient moral 
stability should not eschew the practice. 
In the first place, it is a rare advantage to find in a highly civilized age a 
really jran\ literature. Books seem at first to have been written for men only. 
They now scarcely seem to be written for men at all; they are written for 
every part of the species except men. The mode in which the change has 
happened is certainly very natural; the change itself was nearly inevitable, 
and perhaps, upon the whole, by no means undesirable. So long as the hard-
headed men were, as in Greece and Rome, the principal part of the great 
literary public, all subjects could be discussed with the freedom of exclu-
sively masculine conversation. No man at a club is afraid of hurting other 
men by explaining his meaning; he believes that they have encountered 
much before, and therefore will probably be able to hear what he wishes to 
say; he is sure that if his conversation will hurt them, their moral state must 
be so delicate that something else will impair it before the day is out, even if 
he hold his tongue. The old writers must have had much the same feeling. 
They wrote for men whose minds were seasoned, or were being seasoned; 
they wrote nearly as they talked, without much fear and very little reticence. 
We cannot write so now. We have taken young ladies into the club. Every 
remarkable work of fiction is certain at present to be read by many im-
mature minds of the feebler sex before it has been many days published. 
On such minds an outspoken literature might easily produce very pernicious 
effects. A large experience proves that the moral constitution of the female 
mind loses its tone far more easily than the masculine; it is in the good sense 
and the bad a more delicate constitution. It is both more easily destroyed, 
and is finer and gentler while it lasts. There is a light bloom upon it which 
102 
SWINBURNE, THE Spectator, AND BAGEHOT 
103 
man's nature has not. but i£ that bloom is rubbed off,—and it is rubbed off 
very easily,—woman's nature becomes inferior to man's. We teach our boys 
to read novels, too, now-a-days, and we must be careful that there is not 
anything in them which we do not wish them to read. As civilization grows, 
literature is cramped; the fetters of a propriety are laid upon it, which our 
fathers had not to bear, and which hamper half its movements. 
French literature is exempt from this defect, at any rate. Young ladies are 
not allowed to read novels in France, and do not read them. They marry 
earlier than here, and before marriage they are permitted very little liberty, 
—are prevented from knowing much, and are sedulously taught to seem to 
know less than they do. Writers in France, therefore, still retain much of the 
liberty of ancient writers. And though France is unquestionably injured by 
her habit in this matter, other nations may be benefited. Hardly any part of 
life can be well comprehended until it is imaginatively delineated. Even 
common persons who pass through it learn its facts, but do not learn its 
spirit; they are as superficial travellers, who see the mile-stones and the 
hedges, and the bats, but who know little of the broad country and rural 
population on either side of them. Those who have not themselves experi-
enced any sort of life,—and there are many sorts of life which it is very 
undesirable to experience—are dependent on description of necessity. The 
demi-monde in London thrusts itself in our very faces; we see it in the parks 
and at the opera; but how are those who are too moral to associate with it 
to learn anything about it ? Some people may come to think too much about 
it if it is always unknown, mysterious, and good-looking. They may, how-
ever, learn something from M. Dumas fils and his imaginative delineation 
of it. They may learn, at least, this—that it consists of human beings "like 
unto us," who are in part evil, but yet not all evil. 
Secondly, and this is, perhaps, the more material consideration of the two, 
an observing student of French novels may easily learn from them the real 
consequence of several decent vices which exist among ourselves, but which 
are here too decent, are too much involved in the complexities of life, and 
too intermingled with other more innocent elements, to display their latent 
deformity. In France some of these vices are practiced on a great scale, as 
well as more openly, and their novelists who are cunning in the artistic 
development of immorality, display all their bad consequences without gloz-
ing over any and even with a sort of ardour. Take, for instance, the vice of 
immoral marriage, which is always one of the characteristic sins of a highly 
civilized society. It certainly is not unknown in England. Mr. Thackeray has 
proposed to call a "midnight meeting" in Belgravia of all the ladies in that 
quarter who have, as he phrases it, "sold themselves in marriage." He has 
pointed out what a respectable, genteel, fashionable, and multitudinous as-
sembly it would be; in what "diamonds and Chantilly lace" its company 
would be clothed; what bishops went to their weddings; what a big room 
would be required to hold them. 4 2 Nor is this vice confined to the highest 
class; it goes down to the lowest steps of the social scale. Not long ago a 
woman in Somersetshire, who had married a most unpromising brute, and 
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had been very ill-used by him, was asked, "However came you to marry this 
man?" "Oh, ma'am," she replied, with sobs, "he had a dresser and that." 
Yet although the existence of this vice is well known and obvious with us, 
its effects are disguised and latent. It is commonly the only considerable sin 
which a young lady has a chance of committing, and she very frequently 
commits it without reluctance. Still she hurts herself rather than us. She 
leads in appearance an unexceptionable life; society cannot discover the in-
terior of women's minds, and cannot discriminate which of them love their 
husbands when they marry them and which do not. The acutest of us would 
probably be often deceived if we attempted to decide in particular cases 
where there was real affection and where there was none. And as we cannot 
be sure where the original fault has been committed, we cannot say what ill 
consequence it has or has not produced. Very often, as far as we can judge, 
it produces no bad public results whatever. 
If a young lady sells herself to an old fool and does it decently, she is a 
discreditable young person leading a discreditable life, and that is the whole 
story. Such marriages being the exception, and not the rule, she goes to and 
fro among innocent women; she does some harm, of course; she lowers the 
tone of modesty as she passes; she thinks all men "much the same," and re-
gards a decorous and regular vice as the ineradicable habit of the human 
race. Still the state of these ladies, though despicable, is not intolerable; they 
suffer little and they have nice dresses; it will not do to "point a moral." But 
French society is different. Marriages of affection are there the exception— 
the rare exception. Marriages of convenance and arrangement are the com-
mon rule. The writers of fiction trade upon this social fact; it is the central 
idea of their works, the staple out of which most of them are manufactured. 
We see in them clearly delineated—depicted, we may say, ad nauseam—the 
whole results of a social system in which a principal engine of moral good is 
turned into a principal engine of moral evil. "If water chokes a man," says 
the Greek proverb, "what shall he take after i t ? " If marriage itself leads 
men and women into sin; if, being contracted from base motives or bad 
feelings, it is itself a sin, what is to be done, how can the social evil be cured ? 
The true salt has lost its savour, and where shall we seek a substitute? The 
inevitable consequences of such a sort of marriage are to be found in Fanny 
and ha Griffe Rose. When a woman's relation to her husband becomes sin-
ful, moralists or quasi moralists endeavour to inquire what should be her 
relation to her lover, and it cannot be said that they arrive at any very satis-
factory result. (pp. 1029-30) 
This review might be considered as Swinburne's first venture into a mis-
chievous exposition of French literature for the English public according to 
English prejudices. During the summer, one might argue, he combined the 
Spectators earnest disapproval of manages de convenance (as in the review 
of Chateau Frissac), the kind of startling quotations he was casually insert-
ing in his reviews of Hugo (though here they are authentic), and his disdain 
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for English social hypocrisies and especially for English literary hacks ("We 
pay our writers to be moral, and they are moral"), and by ironic treatment 
achieved a wicked pastiche of the Spectator's pontifical moralizing. He could 
have sent the review to Hutton as early as June or July. The escalade, one 
may suppose, was tempting; he expanded his use of non-existent French 
authors, and during the same months wrote his mock-denunciation of Ernest 
Clouet ("the zealous chisel"?). He had already experimented with explicit 
irony in his skit on M. Prudhomme (which Hutton had not yet protested, 
and in December was to improbably accept): perhaps greater exploits in 
blague were possible? Excited by the ridiculous, the strangely welcome 
pages of Justine he embarked on an even more ferocious hoax, on Felicien 
Cossu ("the well-podded reveller"?), and in late August or September sent 
the two manuscripts to No. 1 Wellington Street, and awaited the result. He 
travelled to Fryston, to Wallington . . . before a perception of incongruity 
burst into Hutton's well-regulated consciousness. The sequence is persuasive. 
To be sure, as the review progresses the irony fades and almost disappears, 
so that the final paragraph is unambiguously stern. One may recall that 
about a year later, perhaps as early as the summer of 1863, Swinburne was 
to undergo a major psychological shock when his younger cousin Mary 
Gordon, with whom it seems clear he was deeply in love, told him of her 
engagement to a man twenty-one years her senior, a military hero who had 
lost his left arm at the siege of Multan in 1849,4 3 It does not seem irrational 
to suggest that the marriage was arranged on Miss Gordon's behalf by her 
parents; and that some hint or prevision of the engagement may have per-
turbed Swinburne in the summer of 1862, and as he wrote gradually turned 
a jest into earnest. 
The argument is plausible. The attribution seems consistent with the 
nature and chronology of the poet's known work for the Spectator, and may 
be considered as anchored by a reference to his innermost life. It is a fair 
example of an attribution to an author built up in disregard of the evidence 
not directly relevant to him. The technique is dangerous. 
The notion that Victorian literature had become delimited in subject and 
treatment because of the admission of young ladies to the reading public 
was to be stated by Swinburne with much greater force in his Notes on 
Poems and Reviews (1866); but it was not peculiar to him. It had been dis-
cussed in the Saturday Review in 1859 by Leslie Stephen,4 4 and was to be 
stated, in terms quite close to those employed in the review of ha Griffe 
Rose, by Walter Bagehot in 1864, in his essay on Sterne and Thackeray. 4 5 
The wide currency of the argument may plausibly be supposed to have been 
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related to the innovations in Lord Campbell's Act for the suppression of 
pornographic books and prints (1857), which led to Sir Alexander Cock-
burn's famous and long-honored formulation of the test of obscenity, in the 
Hicklin case (1868)—"whether the tendency of the matter charged as ob-
scenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such im-
moral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall"; 
Sir Alexander added in his charge to the jury that the pamphlet in question 
would "suggest to the minds of the young of either sex . . . thoughts of a 
most impure and libidinous character."4 6 These facts do not disprove any 
ascription of the review to Swinburne, but they indicate that the argument 
has been inadequately controlled. Both Stephen and Bagehot were addicted 
to irony; and though Stephen does not seem to have had any connection 
with the Spectator, the reverse was true of Bagehot. 
Bagehot and Hutton had become close friends as young men, when they 
were students at University College, in London. After Bagehot left the study 
of law for the family bank in Somerset he contributed a number of literary 
essays to the National Review, then edited by Hutton. In 1858 Bagehot had 
married the eldest daughter of James Wilson, the founder and owner of the 
Economist, and on his father-in-law's death succeeded him as its editor. Its 
office stood not far from that of the Spectator: "The connection between the 
papers naturally became close. 'I doubt if I ever received a letter from Mr. 
Bagehot in my life,' maintained Meredith Townsend [Hutton's co-editor]. 
'If he had anything to say he ran into The Spectator, and if I had anything 
to say I ran into The Economist' Once a week, when Hutton and Bagehot 
had put their respective papers to bed, they would adjourn to the Athenaeum 
for a game of chess."4 7 Bagehot was an omnivorous reader of novels, as a 
means of relaxation, and pleaded with his five sisters-in-law to obtain them 
for him from the circulating libraries.48 During their father's lifetime some 
of these ladies had supplied reviews of light literature to the Economist,4® 
and may be supposed to have continued their work when Bagehot became 
the editor. As a rule the pages, and the "Literary Supplements," of the 
journal dealt with sterner stuff; during 1862 the Economist printed only 
seven reviews of novels, most of them brief and chatty. The review of 
Thackeray's Adventures of Philip (1 November), however, shows a penetra-
tion, an ethical severity, and and a distrust of the author, which strongly 
suggest the hand of Bagehot himself. The tardiness of the review, its length 
(which is unusual for a notice of a novel in the Economist), and the acci-
dental presence within it of two lines of type from a different discussion,50 
all suggest that the review was written and inserted to fill a gap caused by 
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the cancellation of other material. In fact, Bagehot had reviewed The Adven-
tures of Philip almost three months before, in the Spectator of 9 August; 5 1 
and there can be little doubt that in early September he was aware of Thack-
eray's attack upon the English marriage-market, which informs much of the 
first third of Philip. 
It was the kind of thing that moved an old lady to say, "Mr. Thackeray 
is an uncomfortable writer"—and Bagehot, quoting her, to agree.5 2 Bagehot 
had been raised, by a fortunate birth and a fortunate marriage, as well as his 
exceptional mind, to a significant position in the center of that upper middle 
class which then ruled England and her empire. He saw Thackeray as a 
man plagued by an oversensitivity to the actualities of English society which, 
because it was undisciplined by any intellectual analysis of the English social 
structure, led him to mourn sentimentally over the cruder manifestations of 
laudable social processes. The central principle of English society, Bagehot 
considered, was its system of removable inequalities: the opportunity it af-
forded English families to rise, by the accumulation of wealth and by pru-
dent alliances, to acknowledged membership in the dominant class, which 
Bagehot often called, perhaps a trifle casually, the world. Snobbery, then, and 
the advantageous display of nubile daughters were necessary for the larger 
good, and acceptable, since they would be governed, Bagehot assumed, in 
general, by the decent compliance with good taste that a gentleman instinc-
tively exercises. Of the final large qualification Thackeray protested himself 
unsure: an uncomfortable writer. 
Yet the detachment and penetration that were Bagehot's most impressive 
intellectual virtues may well have led him, after a startled perusal of La 
Griffe Rose, to explore the converse argument and to publish the result in 
the convenient anonymity of the Spectator. The mischievous suggestion of 
a moral reason for reading immoral books was not beyond the man who in 
1852 had perturbed the Unitarian readers of their special organ, the Inquirer, 
by seven letters from Paris in agile defense of the coup d'etat of Napoleon 
III and the predominance of the Catholic Church in the French state. The 
speculative freedom of Bagehot's conversation, his uninhibited informal pur-
suit of truth, was gratefully remembered by all his intimates. The quotations 
from Thackeray's most scarifying recent paragraph, though somewhat 
muted, would come naturally from Bagehot's pen at this time. The review 
includes an anecdote of a Somersetshire woman which rather strongly indi-
cates Bagehot as the author, for he grew up in Somerset and frequently re-
turned to his father's house. The moral passion that darkens and strengthens 
the final paragraph of the review, if taken as his elaboration of Thackeray's 
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position, seems strictly consonant with Bagehot's mind. In sum, the review 
contains nothing that negates an ascription to Bagehot, much that is con-
sistent with such an ascription, and several things that indicate his hand. 
One must conclude that these considerations balance, and indeed out-
weigh, the probability that the review of La Griffe Rose was written by 
Swinburne. The argument for Swinburne is tortuous and complicated by 
superadded hypotheses, each of which logically reduces the probability of 
the whole; the argument for Bagehot is in comparison simple and forth-
right, though also inconclusive. 
And finally, if the review of La Griffe Rose cannot be attributed to Swin-
burne, the probability that the article on M. de Pontes was his becomes small-
er, and we must turn towards the view that during April and May 1862 
Hutton regarded the poet as a contributor of verse rather than of prose, and 
in June, when Pearson's departure for the National Review became immi-
nent, came to think of Swinburne's rights and responsibilities as limited to 
one review and one poem a month—at the most, when Hutton was not too 
busy to examine his manuscripts, as Hutton soon became. 
POSTSCRIPTUM. In the catalog of the Ashley Library (VII, 42), sub 
Ernest Clouet, Wise wrote, "Accompanying the galley proof are two letters 
from Hutton to Swinburne concerning M. Prudhomme and Ernest Clouet. 
The first is undated, the second is dated December 16th, 1862"; and he pro-
ceeded to quote from the second letter. Being in London, I thought it sensible 
to inspect the letters, which are now B. M. Ashley A. 1987, fo. 188-191. Un-
fortunately, the letter Wise averred to be undated bears the date 16 September 
1862; and the letter he said bore the date 16 December 1862 bears no date 
whatsoever. (These letters will be published in Mr. Tener's forthcoming 
book on R. H. Hutton.) 
The first letter makes several things clear: (a) To Hutton's knowledge, 
during August 1862 the Spectator had printed no article by Swinburne 
except his third essay on Hugo—which destroys the possibility that he 
wrote the reviews of M. de Pontes and Garnett. (b) Since Hutton alludes 
at length to the review of Baudelaire (6 September) but neither refers nor 
alludes to the review of Renaud (13 September), the possibility that the poet 
wrote the second is almost completely destroyed, (c) The skit which now 
centers in the figure of M. Prudhomme was written to deride one "Ignor-
amus" who described his visits to the International Exhibition in All the 
Year Round on 21 June, 23 August, 30 August, and later dates—and on 30 
August (pp. 584-585) spoke severely about "the ecclesiastical decorative de-
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partment" (which included stained glass by Morris, Marshall, Faulkner, & 
Co.), and compared it contemptuously to "those pictures by the Belgian 
Leys" (which had recently overwhelmed Gabriel Rossetti); neither, he 
pointed out, seemed to know of or joy in the March of Mind. Both sentences 
spoken by M. Prudhomme in the text we have ("wicked is the word for 
this" and "after all, we need not be very angry") are direct quotations from 
"Ignoramus." The skit, which until now has puzzled many readers by its 
apparent lack of point, was in fact similar in nature to Swinburne's polemics 
in Under the Microscope: it was a defense of his friends, (d) Since on 16 
September Hutton was unwilling to publish the skit because he thought the 
public would not identify "Ignoramus" as its target, one must allow the 
possibility that the poet revised it to please the editor; it is possible that 
Messrs. Prudhomme and Coquardeau were made much more prominent, 
—conceivably, were introduced—in order to make clear the skit's tenor. 
The second letter was published by Wise, except for four sentences in its 
third and final paragraph; it has long been known that Hutton later decided 
to use the skit set in the International Exhibition, and that the article on 
Clouet, read in galley-proof, had caused him to feel grave misgivings. Since 
this second letter bears no date, we cannot say when it was written; it could 
have been written at any time after 16 September. The sentences omitted by 
Wise make several things plain: (a) Swinburne had earlier applied for 
several volumes to review, including Leon Gozlan's Balzac chez lui (Paris, 
1862), and his request had been either disregarded or forgotten by Town-
send, the co-editor, during Hutton's absence (was his absence caused by a 
death in his family?—both letters are written on mourning stationery), (b) 
Hutton explained what (he believed) had happened, but offered for review 
neither the volumes Swinburne had requested nor any others. He said 
politely that he would like to see what Swinburne would say about Gozlan's 
book: which one must note does not amount to a commission to review it. 
In general Hutton made it quite clear that he was chary of offering further 
work until the poet had tidied up his aesthetics. 
But where is Hutton's final letter, from which Wise quoted a sentence 
in 1920? That sentence is, apparently, the only available proof that Swin-
burne ever submitted to Hutton his article on Felicien Cossu. Once bitten, 
twice shy; perhaps one should decline to rely on Wise's assertion until one 
can inspect the manuscript of the purported letter? For that matter, where 
is Swinburne's letter to Hutton, in reply to one or the other of the letters 
paraphrased above, in which he maintained that "sanity and decency are 
the two props of my critical faculty"?—no other letters from Swinburne to 
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Hutton are known, or seem to have been known in the past: how can one 
explain Gosse's ability to quote from this one? Can it be possible that here 
again Gosse stepped beyond his documents? Suspicion is deplorably con-
tagious; other matters rise in the mind. In his preface to the privately printed 
edition of Swinburne's article on Baudelaire (1913), Gosse wrote that the 
poet "told me he wrote the review 'in a Turkish bath,' and I thought he 
said 'in Paris.' But was he in Paris until March, 1863?" The suggestion does 
not occur in the relevant passage in Gosse's Life; indeed, its absence there 
should be considered an implicit rejection. Nevertheless the notion was 
reproduced by Lafourcade as a simple statement (Jeunesse, I, 200), with 
the explanation that Swinburne was in Paris in the spring of 1862 on his way 
to join his family in the Pyrenees. But—as Lafourcade of all scholars should 
have known—the usual mid-nineteenth-century route from England to the 
Pyrenees did not pass through Paris, but through Bordeaux. Therefore, one 
must reject as a ghost the idea that Swinburne wrote his review of Baudelaire 
in Paris in the spring of 1862; no doubt he wrote it in a Turkish bath, but 
we do not know where the bath was, or when he wrote the article. The 
manuscript of Theophile seems to have been sold by Wise even before Gosse 
helped him publish the text, in 1915; at least, Gosse does not imply that he 
ever saw it. The manuscript of M. Prudhomme, though catalogued in the 
Ashley Library, was not received by the British Museum. It is a relief to be 
able to add that the manuscripts of the essays on Clouet, Cossu, and Father 
Garasse are today among the Ashley MSS; and that the first two seem con-
temporary by their paper and their handwriting, while the third seems 
obviously later, as Gosse asserted. 
What can be said on the basis of certain knowledge about the chronology 
of Swinburne's work for the Spectator? Beyond the dates of publication of 
the poems and the four authenticated essays, we know only that the essay on 
Clouet was written before 18 August, the skit set in the International Exhibi-
tion (in some form, possibly not the one that we have) between 30 August 
and 16 September. As for the essays on Theophile and Cossu, we lack proof 
that either was written in 1862, or was ever offered to Hutton. We do not 
know when or in what fashion the connection between the poet and the 
journal was broken, except that this occurred after 16 September; our docu-
ments allow the possibility that Hutton merely sent back the manuscripts of 
Prudhomme and Clouet with a polite intimation that he found them unsuit-
able, and that as early as 1 October 1862 Swinburne desisted from sending 
in his work or applying for more. 
What does this revised summary of our certain knowledge suggest as 
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to the nature o£ the connection between Swinburne and the Spectator?— 
That he was, at first, a contributor of verse only. Hutton published in five 
months as much verse by Swinburne as he published during the year from 
all other men; and no poet except Swinburne was allowed to sign his name 
to his work in the Spectator's grave pages. That in May, when Pearson be-
came preoccupied with his new duties on the National Review, Swinburne 
was asked to take over the series of reviews devoted to Les Miserables during 
its serial publication, so that in June, July, and August he published three 
essays on the work. Beyond this, that he successfully pressed upon Hutton, 
as his contribution for September, the essay on Baudelaire, though the editor 
came to be plagued with second thoughts, and perturbed at the pollution of 
his pages by unjustifiable metaphysics. That Swinburne's fifth manuscript, 
on the International Exhibition, Hutton at first declined; and that his 
sixth article, on Clouet, moved the editor to return both the fifth and sixth 
and the galley-proofs of the latter, with finality. In this light the connection 
seems to have been as tenuous as the poet's irresponsible mockery would 
naturally kad one to suppose. It seems to have been overestimated by Gosse 
the prosperous journalist, and its rupture seems to have been overdramatized 
by Gosse the raconteur. 
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Though Gosse always implies that the article on Cossu was sent to Hutton, the only available 
evidence seems to be this reference to verses: the other articles submitted by the poet contain no 
verses. The articles on Clouet and Cossu are now available in R. W. Hively, A. C. Swinburne 
as a Literary Critic (diss. Florida, 1958), of which a copy may be obtained from University 
Microfilms. 
35. That is, the original volumes 3-10, containing the four Parts II-V; a corroboration of 
Pearson's claim that he, not Swinburne, reviewed Part I. 
36. Swinburne Letters, I, 72. 
37. Wise C, 377. On this point, one should now consult Walter E. Houghton, The Victorian 
Frame of Mind (1957), pp. 353-371, and Norman St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law 
(1956), ch. III. 
37a. There seems to be no evidence behind Lafourcade's assertion (Jeunesse, I, 199-200) that 
Theophile was submitted and rejected. 
38. Sir Cresswell Cresswell was the first judge in ordinary and organizer of the new Court 
of Probate and Divorce in 1858-1863 (DNB). 
39. Fanny, une Etude par Ernest Feydeau (1858), a sensational first novel. 
40. Someone, probably a compositor, has created confusion here. The clauses should read 
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something like the following: "considered the situation from the viewpoint of the lover, indicated 
to the wife her duties to the lover, and described his jealousy in terms of that usually attributed 
to a husband." The description was sufficiently correct: but in this regard the book was a tour 
de force. Feydeau was no monster, but a petty acquaintance of Flaubert; no rattlesnake, but a 
wasp. His next novel, Daniel (2 vols., Paris, 1859), was chaste, pious, and sentimental. See 
Bernard Weinberg, French Realism: The Critical Reaction (1937), pp. 177-180. 
41. "Renaud, Armand, administrateur et litterateur francais, ne a Versailles le 29 juil. 1836. 
Fils d'un medecin, il se consacra a la poesie, a l'imitation d'Emile Deschamps auquel il etait 
attache. Entire a l'Hotel de Ville de Paris en 1860, il y fit un carriere administrative et fut 
charge, en 1880, de la direction du service des beaux-arts a la prefecture de la Seine; il est 
devenu en 1889 inspecteur en chef de ce service. M. Renaud a publie: les Poemes de I'amour 
(1860) ; la Griffe Rose (1864) ; [les Caprices de boudoir (1864) ; les Pensees tristes (1865);] 
les Nuits persanes (1870) ; Recueil intime (1881) ; Drames du peuple (1885)."—La Grande 
Encyclopedic La Griffe Rose is (understandably) not mentioned in the histories of the French 
novel. The quotations are from pp. 203-204 and p. 183, respectively; the Spectator's reviewer 
seems not to have read Renaud's last eighty pages, for his summary of the plot is incorrect. 
The novel consists of an arrangement of lyrical descriptions, in praise of an "idealized sensuality," 
which do not conceal a cold scepticism. 
42. The Adventures of Philip, ch. 9, paragraph 9: "Well, I am not mortally angry with 
poor Traviata tramping the pavement, with the gas-lamp flaring on her poor painted smile, 
else my indignant virtue and squeamish modesty would never walk Picadilly or get the air. 
But Lais, quite moral and very neatly, primly, and straitly laced;—Phryne, not the least di-
shevelled, but with a fixature for her hair, and the best stays, fastened by mamma;—your 
High Church or Evangelical Aspasia, the model of all proprieties, and owner of all virgin-purity 
blooms, ready to sell her cheek to the oldest old fogey who has money and a title;—these are 
the Unfortunates, my dear brother and sister sinners, whom I should like to see repentant and 
specially trounced first. Why, some of them are put into reformatories in Grosvenor Square. 
They wear a prison dress of diamonds and Chantilly lace. Their parents cry, and thank Heaven 
as they sell them; and all sorts of revered bishops, clergy, relations, dowagers sign the book 
and ratify the ceremony. Come! let us call a midnight meeting of those who have been sold in 
marriage, I say, and what a respectable, what a genteel, what a fashionable, what a brilliant, 
what an imposing, what a multitudinous assembly we will have; and where's the room in all 
Babylon big enough to hold them?" It is noticeable that the sharpest thrusts of this paragraph 
do not appear in the Spectator. 
43. Cecil Y. Lang, "Swinburne's Lost Love," PMLA, LXXIV (1959), pp. 123-130. 
44. Both are quoted by St. John-Stevas—Swinburne, pp. 62-63; Stephen, p. 58. 
45. Literary Studies, ed. R. H. Hutton (2 vols., 3rd ed., 1884), II, 120: "The audience has 
changed; and decency is of course in part dependent on who is within hearing. A divorce case 
may be talked over across a club-table with a plainness of speech and development of expression 
which would be indecent in a mixed party, and scandalous before young ladies. Now a large 
part of old novels may very fairly be called club-books; they speak out plainly and simply 
the notorious facts of the world, as men speak of them to men. Much excellent and proper 
masculine conversation is wholly unfit for repetition to young girls; and just in the same way, 
books written—as was almost all old literature,—for men only, or nearly only, seem coarse 
enough when contrasted with novels written by young ladies upon the subjects and tone of the 
drawing room. The change is inevitable; as soon as works of fiction are addressed to boys 
and girls, they must be fit for boys and girls; they must deal with a life which is real so far 
as it goes, but which is yet most limited; which deals with the most passionate part of life, 
and yet omits the errors of the passions; which aims at describing men in their relations to 
women, and yet omits an all but universal influence which more or less distorts and modifies 
all these relations." Cf. the fourth paragraph of the review. The passage occurs in Bagehot's 
discussion of Tristram Shandy, to whose sentiment he responded strongly, from whose in-
decency he shrank repelled; his nomination as Victorianum maxime could be justified by his 
complete inability, though himself an ironist, to discover Sterne's purpose in juxtaposing the two. 
46. See St. John-Stevas, pp. 66-70, 126-128. The young ladies were immortalized by 
Dickens in the figure of Miss Podsnap. 
47. Norman St. John-Stevas, Walter Bagehot (1959), p. 14. 
48. Alastair Buchan, The Spare Chancellor (1960), p. 241. 
49. The same, p. 104. 
50. The review fills about two-thirds of page 1212, and four lines of type on page 1213; 
the first two lines on the second page read: "Now these views, though in the same direction 
as those of land-/owners of the first class, yet halt far beyond them. Lord Lichfield"—obviously, 
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because the new material was two lines of type short, two lines from the previous setting 
were accidentally retained. 
51. Walter Bagehot, The Wor\s and Life (ed. Mrs. Russell Barrington; 10 vols., 1915), IX, 
282-286. This is the only contribution to the Spectator printed in the Wor\s; its origin is cor-
rectly noted in the table of contents. 
52. The paragraph is based on Bagehot's discussion of Thackeray in his essay on "Sterne 
and Thackeray" (1864). 
Appendix A 
REVIEWS IN T H E SPECTATOR O F 1862 OF BOOKS CONNECTED 
W I T H FRANCE, N O T CONSIDERED IN T H I S N O T E 
22 February Les Horizons Prochains, les Horizons Celestes, et Vesper. 
Par Madame de Gasparin (London: D. Nutt). See page 
97. 
1 March Democracy in America. By M. de Tocqueville. Translated 
by H. Reeve, Esq. A new edition, with an Introductory 
Notice by the Translator (London: Longmans). 
8 March Chateau Frissac; or, Home Scenes in France. By Chroni-
queuse, Authoress o£ Photographs of Paris Life (London: 
Tinsley Brothers). See page 100. 
8 March Memoires de la Cour d'Espagne sous le Regne de Charles II., 
16784682. Par le Marquis de Villars (London: Trlibner 
and Co.) . 
15 March (Second notice of Villars.) 
16 August Madame Duplessis Mornay, nee Charlotte Arbalest. Par 
Adolphe Scheffer (Paris: Cherbulier). 
23 August Autobiography of a French Detective from 1818 to 1858. By 
M. Canler (London: Ward and Lock) . 
30 August Histoire du Consulat et de VEmpire, faisant suite a VHistoire 
de la Revolution Francaise. Par MA.Thiers. Tome X X 
(Paris: Paulin). 
30 August An Essay on the Age and Antiquity of the Boo\ of Nebatha-
ean Agriculture. To which is added, An Inaugural Lec-
ture on the Position of the Shemitic Nations in the History 
of Civilization. By M. Ernest Renan, Membre de Tlnstitut, 
&c. (London: Triibner and Co.). 
6 September Souvenirs d'un Exile en Siberie (Le Prince Eugene Obolen-
ski). Traduit du Russe par le Prince Augustus Galitzin 
(Leipzig: Frank'sche Verlags-Handlung). 
18 October Eugenie de Guerin. Journal et Lettres publies avec I'assenti-
ment de sa Famille. Par G. S. Trebutien (Paris: Didier). 
See page 97. 
6 December Souvenirs de Soixante Annies. Par E. Delecluze (Paris: 
Levy); and Louis David; son Ecole et son Temps. Par 
E. Delecluze (Paris: Didier, 1855). 
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Appendix B 
T A B L E OF R E V I E W S ADVANCED AS BY SWINBURNE, AND HIS 
POEMS, IN T H E SPECTATOR 
25 January The Bothie of Toper-na-Fuosich: just possibly by ACS 
(Chew); proved to be by Hutton (Tener). 
29 March Mrs. Browning's Last Poems: by ASC (Chew) By ACS? 
(Tener) ; shown not to be by ACS (Paden). 
12 April Les Miser ables, Pt. I: by ACS (Gosse); proved to be by 
Pearson (Tener). 
Goblin Market: just possibly by ACS (Chew); by Hutton? 
(Tener) ; shown not to be by ACS (Paden). 
29 April A Song in Time of Order 
10 May St. Clement's Eve: just possibly by ACS (Chew); by ACS 
(Lafourcade); shown not to be by ACS (Paden). 
17 May Before Parting 
24 May After Death (Breton) 
31 May Faustine 
7 June (Letter on Modern Love) 
21 June Les Miserables, Pts. II and III: claimed correctly for ACS 
(Gosse) 
28 June A Song in Time of Revolution 
12 July Clough's Poems: just possibly by ACS (Chew); by Hutton? 
(Tener) ; proved to be by Hutton (Paden). 
26 July Les Miserables, Pt. IV: claimed correctly for ACS (Gosse). 
The Sundew 
2 August Garnett's Relics of Shelley: almost certainly in part by ACS 
(Chew); by Hutton? (Tener); proved to be by Hutton 
(Paden). 
16 August Les Miserables, Pt. V: claimed correctly for ACS (Gosse). 
30 August M. de Pontes' Childe Harold: possibly by ACS (Paden). 
.6September Les Fleurs du Mai: claimed correctly for ACS (Gosse). 
August 
13 September La Griffe Rose: by ACS? by Bagehot?—more probably by 
the latter (Paden). 
25 October "Victor Hugo's Philosophy," rev. of the authorized transla-
tion into English: by ACS (Gosse); almost certainly not 
by ACS—by Pearson? (Tener); not by ACS (Paden). 
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Abraham, 88 
"Absolute Mind," concept of Hegel, 42 
abstraction, Hazlitt's dislike of, 4, 12; weak-
ening force in Wordsworth's poetry, 8 
"abundant life," phrase of F. D. Roosevelt, 42 
Acarus crossii, 69 
Aceldama, 29 
Achilles heel, 82 
Adams, George the Younger, Essays on the 
Microscope, 70, 74 
Advent of Christ, 78 
Aeschylus, 96 
Alabama, 70 
Alexander the Great, 80 
Alison, Archibald, Essays on the Nature and 
Principles of Taste, 9 
All the Year Round, 108 
"anti-Jacobin," Blackwood's charge against 
Hazlitt, 1 
Apollo Belvidere, 15 
aquarium, 72 
Arnold, Matthew, 10, 11; compared with 
Hazlitt, 19 
Ashley Library, 108, 110 
Assyria, 73 
Athenaeum, the, 106 
Babylon, 75 
Bagehot, Walter, 105-7 
Baillie, Robert, 27 
Barker, Sir Ernest, 50 
Bateson, F. W., 16 
Baudelaire, Charles, Les Fleurs du Mai, re-
viewed in the Spectator, 91, 97, 98, 108, 
110, 111 
Bedford, Francis Russell, Earl of, 32 
Belgravia, 103 
Bennett, Joan, George Eliot, 55 
Bentham, Jeremy, 40, 41, 42 
Berkeley, George, 85 
Bible, the, 73, 74, 79, 80, 86, 87 
Bill of Attainder, 25, 26, 30, 33 
Biographia Britannica, 24 
Birker, A. D. Lindsay, Lord, 50 
Blackwood's Magazine, 1, 14 
Blanc, Louis, 94, 95 
Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Napoleon 
Bosanquet, Bernard, 50 
Bourbons, restoration of, 14 
Bowes, Emily, 75, 76, 78, 79 
Brabant, Doctor, 67 
Brays, the, 67 
Brethren, the. See Plymouth Brethren 
Brightwen, Eliza. See Gosse, Elizabeth 
British Museum, the, 79, 110 
Brooke, Robert Greville, Lord, 32 
Browne, Sir Thomas, 83 
Browning, Elizabeth Barrett, opinion of her 
husband's plays, 23; Swinburne's opinions 
of her Last Poems, 92, 93, 96 
Browning, Robert: interest in play writing, 23-
24; relations to Macready, 23-24; work 
with Forster on a life of Strafford, 24-25; 
differences between memoir and play, 25-
27; simplifies English Civil War, 28-30; 
creates confidante for Strafford, 31-33; 
characterization of Charles I, 33-34; plausi-
bility of Strafford's devotion to King, 34-
36; failings of Strafford, 36 
—A Blot in the 'Scutcheon, 23; Luria, 23; 
The Return of the Druses, 23-24; Robert 
Browning's Prose Life of Strafford, 24-27; 
A Soul's Tragedy, 23 
Brussels, 99 
Bush, Douglas, 5 
Byron, George Gordon Noel: Hazlitt's criti-
cism of, 2; compared to Daniel Deronda, 
64; translation of Childe Harold's Pilgrim-
age into French, 97, 100; evaluation in 
the Spectator, 97 
Cabinet Cyclopaedia, The, 24 
Caesar, Julius, 50 
Caird, E., 50, 51 
Campbell, Lord, 106 
Canada, 70, 74, 78 
Canning, George, 14 
Carbonear, Newfoundland, 70 
Carlisle, Lucy Percy, Countess of, 25, 31, 32, 
33, 34, 35, 36 
Carlyle, Thomas, 45, 46 
Carnarvon, Lady, 25 
Cashman, John, 14 
Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, 14 
Catholic Church, 76, 107 
Catholicism, 79 
Cayenne political prison, 92 
Champion, the, 11 
Chapman, John, 67 
Charles I, Browning's characterization of, 33-
34 
Charlton, H. B., 29 
Chaucer, Geoffrey, 4 
Chew, S. C , 91, 92, 93, 96 
Christianity, 51; George Eliot's view of, 67; 
as interpreted by Philip Henry Gosse, 69-88 
passim 
Christian mythologies, 7 
Chroniqueuse (pseud.), Chateau Frissac; or, 
Home Scenes in France, 100, 104 
Church of England, 56, 57 
Church of Rome, 76 
Civil War in America, 46 
Clarendon State Papers, 25 
Clouet, Ernest, 98, 99, 105, 108, 109, 110, 
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Clough, Arthur Hugh, The Bothie of Toper-
na-Fuosich, 92, 93, 94; Poems, 92, 93, 94 
Cockburn, Sir Alexander, 106 
Cohen, Morris, 39 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor: politics disliked by 
Hazlitt, 1; Hazlitt's censure of, 5, 8, 18; 
"Christabel" admired by Hazlitt, 8; separa-
tion of "the Good" and "the Beautiful," 9; 
political views attacked by Hazlitt, 14; 
reads Wordsworth's poems to Hazlitt, 15 
—"Christabel," 8; "The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner," 6, 8 
Compagnacci, 62 
Congress of Vienna, 14 
"consequitive reasoning," Keats's phrase, 6 
Coriolanus, 6, 7 
Cossu, Felicien, 98, 105, 109, 110 
Cottington, Francis, Lord, 28 
Coventry, 67 
Cowley, Abraham, 4 
Cross, John W., George Eliot's Life, 66 
Crosse, Andrew, 69 
Dallas, Ala., 70 
Darby, John Nelson, 69, 75 
Darwin, Charles Robert, 72, 79 
DeVane, William Clyde, 24 
"diachronic," 84, 85 
Dissent Movement, 56 
Donne, John, 83 
Dowden, Edward, Life of Shelley, 96 
Dumas, Alexandre (fils), Roman d'une Fem-
me, 101, 103 
Economist, the, 106 
Eliot, George: two kinds of intruder defined, 
55; theological alienation, 56-58; role of 
compassion in community, 58-61; non-
English intruders, 61-63; women intruders, 
63-66; solitary childhood, 66-67; rejection 
of Church, 67; status in 1850's, 67 
—Adam Bede, 55-68 passim; Daniel Deronda, 
55-68 passim; Felix Holt, 55-68 passim; 
Middlemarch, 55-68 passim; The Mill on 
the Floss, 55-68 passim; Romola, 55-68 
passim; Scenes of Clerical Life, 55-68 pas-
sim; Silas Marner, 55-68 passim 
Elysium, 13 
emotion, 3, 4, 5, 7 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9 
Erebus, 12 
Essex, Robert Devereux, Earl of, 32 
Evangelical Movement, the, 56, 66 
Evans, Mary Ann. See Eliot, George 
Evans, Robert, George Eliot's father, 67 
Examiner, the, 2, 11, 13 
Exhibition, International, 108, 109, 110, 111 
experience, common, 3 
Feydeau, Ernest, Fanny, 101 
Fiennes, Nathaniel, 30, 31 
Firth, C. H., 24, 25, 26 
Flaubert, Gustave, Salammbo, 99 
Florence, Italy, 62, 63, 65 
Forster, John, Life of Strafford, 24, 25, 32, 67 
free life, concept of, 40, 41, 43, 44 
French literature, differences from English 
literature, 101-4 
French Revolution, origin of poetry of para-
dox, 1; emphasis on abstractions, 4 ; re-
sponsible for Liberalism, 39 
Froude, J. A., 67 
Fryston, England, 98, 105 
Furnivall, F. J., 24 
Garasse, Father, 110 
Gardiner, R. S., 27 
Garnett, Richard, 92, 108; Relics of Shelley, 
92, 93, 95, 96, 97 
Gasparin, Mme. de, Les Horizons Prochains, 
97 
Genesis, 80, 82, 84, 85 
Gifford, William, 14 
Gillispie, Charles Coulston, 81 
God, Philip Henry Gosse's concept of, 76, 77, 
79, 81-88 
Godwin, William, 5, 18 
Gordium, 80 
Gordon, Mary, 105 
Gosse, Edmund: Father and Son, 69, 70, 76, 
78, 79, 81, 87, 88; Life of Swinburne, 91, 
.92, 97, 98, 110, 111 
Gosse, Elizabeth, 74, 78 
Gosse, Philip: childhood, 70; interest in na-
ture, 70-71; elected to Royal Society, 72; 
publications until 75 years old, 72; careful 
observations as a scientist, 72-73; specula-
tions and reading tastes, 73; quotes the 
Bible, 73-74; illness of his sister Elizabeth, 
74; rejects Goldsmith's remark on the lob-
ster, 76, 77; names the Johnstonella Cath-
arina, 77, 89; his prayers, 78; marries 
Emily Bowes, 75, 76, 78, 79; interest in 
evangelical preaching, 74, 75; relationship 
to his son Edmund, 71, 76, 78, 79, 88; 
concept of God, 76, 77, 79, 81-88 
—Actinologia Britannica, 72; The Canadian 
Naturalist, 71; Illustrations of the Birds of 
Jamaica, 72, 73; A Naturalist's Rambles on 
the Devonshire Coast, 77, 89; The Ocean, 
76, 88; Omphalos, 80-87; The Prehensile 
Armature of the Papillonidae, 72; The Ro-
mance of Natural History, 73, 74, 87 
Gothic novel, 73 
Gozlan, Leon, Balzac chez lui, 109 
Green, Thomas Hill: influence upon later 
political thinkers, 39, 50-52; religious ori-
entation, 42, 43, 50, 51, 52; self-conscious-
ness, 42, 43; concept of the state, 42, 43, 
44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52; influenced by Kant 
and Hegel, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50; influenced 
by Ruskin and Carlyle, 45, 46; on Caesar, 
50; on Napoleon, 49, 50; use of "moral," 
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"spiritual," and "natural," 44, 45; idealism 
of, 45; on Rousseau, 47 
—Prolegomena to Ethics, 44; Political Obli-
gation, 49 
Griff, England, 66, 67 
Guerin, Eugenie de, Journal et Fragments 
d'Eugenie de Guerin, 97 
Guernsey, Channel island, 95 
gusto, defined by Hazlitt, 3 
Habershon, Matthew, Dissertation on the 
Prophetic Scriptures, 78 
Haight, Gordon Sherman, Letters of George 
Eliot, 67 
Hamilton, James, Marquis of, 28 
Hampden, John, 33 
Hardwicke State Papers, 25 
Hardy, Barbara, The Novels of George Eliot, 
63 
Haydon, Benjamin Robert, 1, 14, 15 
Hazlitt, William: definition of poetry of para-
dox, 1; literary anti-Jacobinism, 2; defini-
tion of gusto, 3 ; on sympathetic identifica-
tion, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 19; morality in 
poetry, 5-6, 18 
—Life of Napoleon, 14; "My First Acquaint-
ance with Poets," 15; "On the Living 
Poets," 13, 15; Political Essays, 14; The 
Spirit of the Age, 15 
hedonism, 45 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 42, 46, 47, 
48, 50 
Henrietta Maria, Queen of Charles I, 32, 33, 
34 
Hicklin case, 106 
Hobbes, Thomas, 6 
Hobhouse, L. T., 50 
Hofer, Andreas, Wordsworth's sonnet to, 14 
Hollis, Denzil, 33 
Holy Ghost, the, 69, 85 
Holy Orders, taking of, 69 
Hooker, Sir Joseph Dalton, 72 
Howe, P. P., Life of Hazlitt, 2, 13 
Hugo, Victor, Les Miserables, 91, 94, 95, 97, 
99, 100, 104, 108, 111 
Hume, David, 40, 46 
Hutton, Richard Holt: invites Swinburne to 
contribute to Spectator, 91-92; reviews of 
Clough, 94; Shelley article, 95, 96; assigns 
French literature to Swinburne, 97; Swin-
burne's hoax articles and Hutton's dismay, 
98-99, 105, 106, 108, 109-11; relations to 
Bagehot, 106-7 
—Essays Theological and Literary, 94, 95, 96; 
"Shelley's Poetical Mysticism," 95 
Huxley, Thomas Henry, 67, 85 
Iago, 7 
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idealism, Unitarian, 93 
ideal right, 43, 44 
"Ignoramus," 108, 109 
imagination, faculty of, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 
17, 18 
imagination, poetry of, 3, 4, 18 
impassioned poetry, Hazlitt's definition of, 5 
Inquirer, the, 107 
International Exhibition. See Exhibition, In-
ternational 
invention, 4, 9, 10, 11, 16, 18 
Ireland, Strafford's policies in, 28, 29 
Isaac, 88 
Jamaica, 70 
Jeffrey, Francis: "Beauty," in Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 9; review of The Excursion, 9 
Jesus, Philip Gosse's faith in, 78 
John, Saint, 87 
Johnson, Samuel, 10 
Johnston, Mrs. Catharine, 77 
Johnstonella Catharina, 77, 89 
Judaism, 66, 67 
justice, moral, 6, 7; political, 6 
Kanmacher, Frederick, editor of Adams's 
Essays on the Microscope, 70 
Kant, Immanuel, 43, 47, 48, 49 
Keats, John: Hazlitt's criticism of, 2; Endy-
mion, 2; "negative capability," 5, 19; 
"soul-making," 5; invention of new myth-
ology, 8 
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Kierkegaard, Soren A., 88 
King's Landing, Ala., 70 
Kingsley, Charles, 85, 86, 87 
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Lafourcade, Georges, La Jeunesse de Swin-
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3; Imaginary Conversations, 3; "literary 
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Lewes, George Henry, 67 
Lewis, Maria, 66 
Leys, Hendrik, Baron, 109 
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class, democracy, common man, 40 
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Lindsay, A. D., 50 
Lippmann, Walter, 41 
literary Jacobinism, 1, 2, 3 
Locke, John, 6, 40, 41, 44, 85 
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London, 75 
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Lyell, Sir Charles, 72 
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Malthus, Thomas Robert, 14 
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Martineau, Harriet, 67 
Martineau, James, 67, 79 
Marx, Karl, 41 
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Maurice, the Rev. Frederick Denison, 93 
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Milnes, Richard Monckton, 91, 98, 99 
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tragedy of Satan, 12 
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moral right, 43, 44 
moral sensibility, 4 
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Napoleon III, 75, 107 
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